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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that Wittgenstein’s investigation into the concept of certainty did 
not begin with On Certainty. The origins of his analysis can be found in Philosophical 
Investigations. Although it was responding to Moore’s A Defence of Common Sense 
and Proof of the External World that produced Wittgenstein’s most sustained 
treatment of the topic, this thesis suggests that On Certainty should still be seen as a 
development of Philosophical Investigations in a particular direction, rather than a 
wholly separate interest in epistemology. In particular it is argued that Wittgenstein’s 
use-based conception of linguistic meaning cannot be put to one side when 
considering his remarks on certainty. Whilst there has been a burgeoning interest in 
On Certainty over the past two decades, only very limited efforts have been made at 
charting the relationship between the two texts, especially as to whether On Certainty 
can be taken to inform our reading of Philosophical Investigations. Thus far the 
available literature has neglected the relationship between the concept of the form of 
life and that of the world-picture. I propose that the concepts are distinct from one 
another but related, and that properly differentiating them first and then considering 
the way they can work in conjunction strengthens our understanding of Wittgenstein’s 
later work. This thesis seeks to make further contributions to the relationship between 
the two texts, examining whether concepts found in On Certainty such as certainties, 
the world-picture, and the emphasis on non-rational persuasion and conversion ought 
to force us to reassess the conception of language set out in Philosophical 
Investigations. In arguing that they do, the thesis aims to acquire a deeper 
understanding not only of On Certainty, refining some of these concepts and pushing 
them beyond their original presentation, but also of Philosophical Investigations and 
its more familiar concepts of rule-following, language-games, and the form of life. I 
conclude that, in light of the reading of On Certainty developed here, a more 
sophisticated conception of linguistic meaning can be developed. 
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Notes on the text 
 
 
Any use of italics throughout this thesis is original to a quoted source except for book 
titles (e.g. On Certainty) and foreign words (e.g. Weltbild, zugzwang). Accordingly, 
no mention will be made in quotation references to describe added emphasis or italics 
as original rather than my own; it is always the former.  
 
I use the § symbol to indicate sections of this thesis, but it is customary in quoting 
from Wittgenstein texts to use the same symbol to refer to the numbered remarks, 
particularly of Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. References to 
Wittgenstein texts will always be preceded by an abbreviation indicating the book, 
(e.g. OC §613), whereas sections of this thesis will never have an abbreviation in 
front, and will always feature at least one decimal point to indicate subsections (e.g. 
§6.5.2). 
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Introduction 
 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was working on the notes that became On Certainty until 
three days before his death, in 1951. Wittgenstein was intrigued by G.E. Moore’s 
response to the sceptic about the external world in Proof of the External World. In the 
last year and a half of his life, during four separate periods, Wittgenstein carried out a 
‘sustained treatment of the topic’ (OC, Preface). Taking Moore’s response to the 
sceptic as a starting point, On Certainty develops into an investigation far beyond its 
epistemological roots, with ramifications for the conception of language and 
communication first detailed in Philosophical Investigations. Obtaining a clear view 
of the nature of that investigation and charting a possible course for those 
ramifications is the broad aim of this thesis.  
 
Whilst Philosophical Investigations, like the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus before 
it, sparked immediate scholarly interest almost as soon as it was published, On 
Certainty has taken longer to come to widespread attention. At the moment, there is 
not the same wealth of secondary literature to guide or contend with, although some 
excellent work has been done in the past two decades. Interpretations of On Certainty 
are far from settled, and, in some areas, debates are only just taking shape.  
 
The extent to which On Certainty marks off a distinct third phase of Wittgenstein’s 
career is one such area. Much as the purported continuity of thought – or lack thereof 
– between the Tractatus and the Investigations has shaped discussion of those texts, 
the attitude one takes to On Certainty in this regard will have an impact on how we 
interpret it. I argue here for a great deal of continuity of thought between the 
Investigations and On Certainty. Wittgenstein may not have made this link explicit – 
to do so would be odd given his style of writing – but there are strong arguments 
available to suggest that his ideas of certainties and the Weltbild could not work on 
anything other than the conception of language and human practice to be found in 
Philosophical Investigations. I will argue that On Certainty refines his conception of 
language by filling out the backdrop of human action against which language use 
takes place. 
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Just as with the Investigations, pinning down what Wittgenstein wants to say in On 
Certainty is not as easy as pulling out hypotheses from the text; sensitivity to the text 
as a whole is essential here. The notes from which On Certainty was compiled were 
rough and unpolished. We can point out repetitions, slight shifts in terminology, 
explicit confusion as to how to proceed and, for instance at OC §358, dissatisfaction 
with his own phrasing. As a result of the unfinished nature of the text in question, no 
interpretation can claim definitively to be authoritative. Indeed, it is perhaps a 
consequence of Wittgenstein’s approach – giving us exercises and scenarios to 
prompt us to think for ourselves – that there is no such thing as a correct 
interpretation.   
 
The early chapters of the thesis will present reasonably uncontroversial claims about 
the core themes of On Certainty, drawing on the available scholarly material and 
interpretations, with few major refinements. The latter stages of the thesis, building on 
this characterization, will present something closer to an extrapolation of possible 
ways forward from On Certainty, and will, I expect, be more contentious.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 lay the groundwork for understanding On Certainty. Chapter 1 
focuses on Philosophical Investigations, drawing out some of the questions we can 
pose from the Investigations that might find some sort of resolution in On Certainty. 
Language-games and the rule-following considerations are not the focal points of the 
thesis, but they will be introduced as concepts, as reference to them is needed at 
various stages of the investigation into On Certainty. We will look briefly at Kripke’s 
sceptical challenge, the debate on which, later chapters will claim, can be repositioned 
in light of On Certainty. The form-of-life concept will also be introduced, paving the 
way for a more detailed discussion and comparison with the world-picture in Chapter 
5. 
 
The analysis of Chapter 1 provides an important background for Chapter 2, which 
will examine On Certainty and draw out the key themes. These will include: 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between knowledge and certainty; certainties as 
ungrounded ways of acting; and the Weltbild (hereafter translated as ‘world-picture’), 
which is comprised of certainties. As the examination progresses, links will be made 
to Philosophical Investigations, suggesting that On Certainty is not just linked to, but 
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a development of, Wittgenstein’s work on language-games and rule-following, with 
an impact on how we view communication within Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language.  
 
Chapter 3 takes two of the keys features addressed in Chapters 1 and 2 – the form of 
life and the world-picture. First, the two concepts must be properly distinguished from 
one another. The world-picture, comprised of certainties, indicates the depth of a 
practice in an individual’s life, the extent to which it structures other practices; the 
form of life suggests the breadth of practices, how widespread they are across a 
community. In investigating certainty, we trace the genesis of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of it back to Philosophical Investigations. Chapter 3 continues by 
proposing an original way in which the two concepts are linked in what will be called 
the breadth-depth axis. This step not only acts as a preliminary move towards linking 
Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, but also begins the process of 
redefining the backdrop against which we consider language to be communal. 
Crucially, it will be shown that individuals can have different certainties and world-
pictures whilst sharing a form of life. 
 
Chapter 4 expands the scope of the investigation, examining what it is it to come into 
contact with people with different world-pictures. The philosopher of science, 
Thomas Kuhn, had read Wittgenstein, and was impressed by his work, even quoting 
him on language-games in his seminal The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
Building upon existing scholarship on the parallels between Wittgenstein’s world-
picture and Kuhn’s idea of the scientific paradigm, I expand on Wittgenstein’s idea of 
what it is to undergo a conversion in relation to one’s world-picture, and how 
communication can be affected by mismatched underlying ways of acting. The 
comparisons with Kuhn serve two primary functions. First, to deepen our 
understanding of On Certainty by drawing illuminating analogies between world-
pictures and scientific paradigms; the latter provides actual examples of world-
picture-like certainties structuring the actions of scientists. Secondly, it permits the 
introduction of the concept of incommensurability into our consideration of what it is 
for people with two different world-pictures to come into contact.  
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Chapter 5 continues by considering how incommensurability can fit into work on On 
Certainty; how communication might be hindered and conversions become possible. 
Examining Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief at the beginning of Chapter 5 
provides an alternative angle from the scientific one of Kuhn to consider how 
different world-pictures can interact. I will conclude that – aside from a few other, 
less influential concerns – the possibility or ease of communication between members 
of two world-pictures is largely proportional to the similarities to be found between 
those world-pictures. In doing so, I propose an interpretation of incommensurability – 
for its exact nature has been the topic of some dispute in recent years – that I call 
dynamic incommensurability. 
 
Chapter 6 takes the detailed understanding of incommensurability into new territory, 
by considering how it affects more minute differences in world-pictures. This process 
of refining the world-picture moves deeper into the concept, beyond broad 
distinctions like those of religion or science, into further subdivisions within those 
two categories as well as differences underlying our different practices; this latter 
category I call the certainties of restricted domains. In proposing this way of looking 
at certainties, I seek to situate the position with regards to Moyal-Sharrock’s 
influential work on On Certainty and the taxonomy of certainties she proposes, 
although I hesitate to endorse wholeheartedly the enterprise of thorough classification. 
Towards the end of Chapter 6, I will also consider some arguments by Coliva that run 
counter to the proposals made here.   
 
Finally, Chapter 7 will reappraise the communal account of language as it was 
initially sketched in Chapter 1 in light of the work carried out here. In particular, the 
breadth-depth axis, as well as the refinement of the world-picture, leads us to be wary 
of taking the community from which linguistic actions derive their meaning as 
homogenized enough to be equated with a form of life. World-picture considerations 
must be included, giving us a quite different understanding of what it is to have 
meaning reside in the customs of a community. This, I will call the dynamic-
communal account of language, as it derives largely from the dynamic interpretation 
of incommensurability proposed in Chapter 5. Against this revised, more nuanced 
backdrop of human practice, the concerns of communication and conversion benefit 
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from the understanding of On Certainty we take with us into re-examining the 
language-game and rule-following considerations of Philosophical Investigations. 
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Chapter 1 – Language-games, rule-following, and ‘seeing connexions’ 
 
1.1 Philosophical Investigations 
 
1.2 Language-games 
1.2.1 The perils of the Augustinian picture 
1.2.2 The language-game of §2 
 
1.3 Rule-following 
1.3.1 Following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule 
1.3.2 Understanding a rule 
 
1.4 ‘Seeing connexions’ 
1.4.1 Perspicuous representation of language-games 
 
1.5 Kripke 
1.5.1 The normativity of rules 
1.5.2 Interpreting a rule 
1.5.3 On Rules and Private Language 
1.5.4 Kripke’s sceptical paradox 
1.5.5 Kripke’s sceptical solution 
1.5.6 The community view and the form of life 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
1.1 Philosophical Investigations 
 
‘It is just I who cannot found a school,’ Wittgenstein once remarked, ‘in any case not 
by those who publish articles in philosophical journals’ (CV, p. 70). Part of his 
reasoning, in that same passage, is that he ‘actually want[s] not to be imitated’. Whilst 
the number of articles on Wittgenstein’s work in philosophical journals is added to 
each year, his wish not to be imitated has certainly been fulfilled.
1
 
 
It is impossible to separate Wittgenstein’s style from the substance of what he is 
trying to say. Nonetheless, it is the style that one first notices; it tends to win devotees 
and detractors almost at first glance and in equal measure. Perhaps if all those who 
publish philosophical papers possessed the combined talents of Wittgenstein’s 
                                                 
1
 At least not in the world of philosophy. The novelist, David Markson, has bravely 
written two highly acclaimed books imitating Wittgenstein’s style – and, arguably, 
ideas – of the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations 
respectively. See Markson (1988) and (2010). 
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analytical mind and inventiveness with a turn of phrase, such publications would be 
unnecessary. To Wittgenstein himself, writing in the traditional academic manner 
would be unthinkable. For the rest of us, in seeking to understand and explain his 
work, it is an unfortunate necessity. 
 
In Wittgenstein’s three major works – the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, 
Philosophical Investigations, and On Certainty – there are almost no explicit 
references to other philosophers. The Tractatus notes a debt to Frege and Russell in 
the preface; there is a brief investigation into St. Augustine’s remarks on language in 
the opening of the Investigations; and On Certainty begins with G.E. Moore but uses 
him only as a starting point.
2
 Later scholars have linked Wittgenstein to Kant, 
Heidegger, and even Dostoevsky, amongst many others.
3
 All of these links and ways 
of reading Wittgenstein have their merits, but Wittgenstein made no mention of any 
of them, except Dostoevsky, and never in his strictly philosophical – as opposed to 
personal – notes. 
 
A fierce independence from outside influence marks Wittgenstein’s approach. Yet, 
his work has been appropriated – and frequently misinterpreted – in areas as far afield 
as law, geography, and film studies.
4
 This fact is hardly surprising given that 
Wittgenstein, at least after the Tractatus, presents a method rather than a doctrine. By 
‘assembling reminders’ (PI §127) and ‘erect[ing] signposts at all the junctions where 
there are wrong turnings,’ Wittgenstein hopes ‘to help people past the danger points’ 
(CV, p. 25), and avoid the traps of modern philosophy, many of them hidden by the 
‘surface grammar’ of our language (PI §664). Nowhere, though, does he trace the 
entire route for us.  
 
                                                 
2
 Philosophical Investigations also mentions Bertrand Russell (PI §§46, 79), Frank 
Ramsey (PI §81), G.E. Moore (pp. 162-3), and William James (PI §§342, 413, 610, 
and p. 187). However, none of these references constitutes anything like a detailed 
examination or appraisal of these philosophers’ works, and Wittgenstein is just as 
likely to take an interest in Beethoven (p. 156), Moses (PI §§79, 87) or Lewis Carroll 
(PI §13 and p. 169). 
3
 For Wittgenstein’s links to Kant, see, for example, Engel (1970), Schwyzer (1973), 
and Kitcher (2000). For an excellent discussion of Wittgenstein’s thought in relation 
to Heidegger’s, see Cooper (1997). For Wittgenstein and Dostoevsky, see, for 
example, McGuinness (1966). 
4
 See Arulanantham (1998), Scott (1989), and Mittel (2001) respectively. 
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Wittgenstein’s method is not born out of a will to make his own work difficult to read. 
The style of writing of Philosophical Investigations, comprised of a series of 
numbered remarks, switching focus and angle regularly and without warning, is 
‘connected with the very nature of the investigation’ (PI, Preface). Wittgenstein’s 
desire to avoid doctrine and theories develops out of the post-Tractatus understanding 
of language as being almost infinitely varied. The linguistic traps will not be in the 
same places each time we come across them, and the paths we take to reach those 
danger spots will vary, too. A doctrine might work perfectly in a limited set of 
circumstances, just as a written list of directions will be useful if one only wishes to 
repeat an identical journey, from the same starting point to the same finishing point.  
 
A method, though, can guide us in all circumstances. It is more akin to a skill than an 
instruction. The core skill that Wittgenstein wants to impart is that of ‘seeing 
connexions’ (PI §122). This is a theme to which we shall return at various stages in 
this thesis, as well as later in this chapter for a fuller explanation. First, though, we 
must understand what it is that Wittgenstein wants us to see connections between, and 
why this skill is such an important one. To do that, we must understand the basics of 
Philosophical Investigations: language-games and rule-following. 
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1.2 Language-games 
 
Philosophical Investigations opens with a quotation from St Augustine’s Confessions, 
in which Augustine explains how he thinks he, like all other infants, came to learn 
language. Augustine describes how when his elders:  
 
named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw 
this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered 
when they meant to point it out (PI §1). 
 
Wittgenstein describes this passage as giving us a ‘particular picture of the essence of 
human language’ (PI §1). It is a ‘picture’ whereby words and their meanings are 
inextricably linked, and the meaning is ‘an object for which the word stands’ (PI §1). 
The passage quoted from Augustine was not part of a theory of language, or a concern 
of philosophy at all for that matter. Augustine’s Confessions is the autobiographical 
work of a religious man, and the passage describes only how he believes he learnt to 
talk. 
 
So it is not a theory of language to which Wittgenstein is responding here, but a 
picture. Wittgenstein saw the problem with theories of language as being that they 
were trapped in this particular picture. The picture is, in a sense, pre-philosophical, and 
traditional philosophical analyses maintain it as an unrecognised assumption. Later in 
the Investigations, he talks of how ‘a picture held us captive. And we could not get 
outside it, for it lay in our language and seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’ (PI 
§115). Elsewhere he describes it as ‘a false picture’ (PI §604), the ‘illusion’ of 
language as ‘the unique . . . picture of the world’ (PI §96). He does not spare himself 
this criticism, referencing ‘the author of the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus’ at PI 
§§23, 97, and 114 as being guilty of failing to escape the picture, too. Wittgenstein’s 
response to this picture of language has to be examined in the context of what he 
thought was wrong with it. 
 
 
1.2.1 The perils of the Augustinian picture 
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We can isolate two criticisms of the Augustinian picture in the early stages of 
Philosophical Investigations, though their respective causes, and Wittgenstein’s 
responses to them, are linked. The first is that the model Augustine provides for the 
learning and use of a language does not work in all contexts, or across all parts of 
language. Augustine ‘does describe a system of communication’, says Wittgenstein, 
but ‘not everything that we call language is this system’ (PI §3). This system is 
referential; words stand for things, in a one-to-one relationship. It is a symptom of 
what Fogelin has termed ‘referentialism’, noting that ‘Wittgenstein points to the 
writings of St Augustine and to his own Tractatus as examples of this tendency.’5 
 
Wittgenstein’s objection to referentialism can be summed up by the remark that 
‘Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of words’ (PI 
§1). The Augustinian picture of language learning seems to work perfectly well for 
words like ‘chair’ or ‘loaf’. It fares less well when it is properties or numbers that are 
being taught. There is no way for a child to know that by this process of ostensive 
teaching, picking up an object and reciting the name, the teacher means to indicate the 
object and not a property or the number of that object.
6
 This picture also struggles to 
account for conjunctions, verbs, and grammar in general where it is not a noun – and 
therefore something with an obvious referent – in question. 
 
The second criticism is to do with the very conception of naming. If the meaning is the 
object for which the word stands, one would expect that if the object ceases to exist, so 
too does the meaning. Yet, we talk about Napoleon Bonaparte, Yugoslavia, and the 
Library of Alexandria even though none of these things exists any more.
7
 Similarly, 
there are some things that have never existed, and yet what we say about them seems 
still to have meaning.  We can talk about unicorns, the first female president of the 
USA, and Sherlock Holmes, even though none of these things has ever existed. The 
                                                 
5
 Fogelin (1996), p. 37. 
6
 Cf. PI §28: ‘[A]n ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.’ 
7
 Wittgenstein was by no means the first to address such problems of reference, in 
particular in relation to improper definite descriptions. See in particular Russell 
(1905) and (1919). Wittgenstein mentions this in PI §46, where he references “[b]oth 
Russell’s ‘individuals’ and my ‘objects’ (Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus)” as being 
“primary elements” of the sort of referential picture of language he opposes in the 
Philosophical Investigations. 
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cause of this confusion is that the Augustinian picture ‘confound[s] the meaning of a 
name with the bearer of the name’ (PI §40). 
 
Even if this picture were confined to the representative aspects of language, it would 
be a bad one, but it is the broader aspects of language that interest Wittgenstein. His 
efforts in the Tractatus to capture the ‘general form of a proposition’ (TLP 4.5) 
restricted his attentions to fact-stating language, where he concluded that it is only ‘the 
propositions of natural science’ (TLP 6.53) that can be expressed meaningfully.8 The 
Investigations, in part, challenges this view. 
 
 
1.2.2 The language-game of §2 
 
When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929 after a ten-year hiatus, he began to 
note problems with the approach of the Tractatus. The genesis of his doubts lay in 
concerns over the restriction of his view of language to blunt statements of facts where 
words represented ‘states of affairs’ (TLP 2.01) in the world. That is to say, they were 
confined to the Augustinian picture of language. Philosophical Grammar, compiled 
from his notes made between 1930 and 1932, poses the question: ‘Do we have a single 
concept of proposition?’ (PG §112) 
 
Wittgenstein continued to develop his investigations into the variety of language 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s: 
 
The basic evil of Russell’s logic, and also of mine in the Tractatus, is 
that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace 
examples, and then pre-supposed in full generality (RPP1 §38). 
 
Wittgenstein explores this ‘craving for generality’ (BB, p. 16-20) in the 
Investigations, and tries to combat it. In the remark after the quotation from 
Augustine, Wittgenstein describes a scenario between a builder, A, and his assistant, 
B. They work with four types of buildings-stones: blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. 
                                                 
8
 Cf. PI §65. 
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They have four words in their language: ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, and ‘beam’.9 A calls 
the words, and B brings the stone he has learnt to be bring at the call from A. This is 
to be conceived of as ‘a complete language’ (PI §2). It is ‘the whole language of the 
tribe’, and the ‘children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as 
they do so, and to react in this way to the word of others’ (PI §6). 
 
The scenario depicted in PI §2 is the first of many language-games, a concept that 
forms the cornerstone of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The language-games 
Wittgenstein constructs are not necessarily supposed to be realistic, but ‘are rather set 
up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our 
language by way not only of similarities, but also dissimilarities’ (PI §130). 
 
In this language game of block, pillar, slab, and beam, Wittgenstein constructs a 
specific scenario in which the Augustinian picture at first seems to work. 
 
[T]he question arises: ‘Is this an appropriate description or not?’ The 
answer is: ‘Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly 
circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you are claiming to 
describe’ (PI §3). 
 
He then pushes at this understanding, questioning what happens when we look at ‘an 
expansion of language (2)’ (PI §8). David Stern characterizes Wittgenstein’s approach 
as adding: 
 
other uses of signs that don’t fit Augustine’s description: §8 describes 
an expansion of the language in §2 to include numerals, 
demonstratives, and colour samples, and §15 adds names for 
particular objects.
10
 
 
The restricted circumstance Augustine’s picture does apply to is one where words are 
inextricably tied to the objects they represent. On the theory presented in the Tractatus 
                                                 
9
 For a detailed examination of these opening remarks of the Philosophical 
Investigations, in particular §2, see Goldfarb (1983).
 
10
 Stern (2004), p. 11. 
 24 
– a theory guilty by Wittgenstein’s own lights of succumbing to the Augustinian 
picture – there is a strong tie between words and the reality they purport to represent.11 
Words can picture the world by virtue of corresponding in their logical arrangement to 
the way objects are arranged in the world into states of affairs.  
 
This picture encourages us to think that there is a hidden essence behind our words, 
and that, by analysing our words, we can somehow discover that essence. By 
expanding the language-game of PI §2, Wittgenstein hopes to break the allure of that 
corresponding relationship between words and reality. Instead of the meaning of a 
word being determined by the object for which that word stands, Wittgenstein declares 
that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (PI §43).12 
 
Only by recognising that there are ‘countless different kinds of use of what we call 
“symbols”, “words”, “sentences”’ (PI §23) can the hold of the Augustinian picture be 
broken. This is an aspect of Wittgenstein’s approach known as anti-essentialism.13 We 
can compare words with tools: 
 
there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, 
nails and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse as the 
functions of these objects (PI §11). 
 
                                                 
11
 As an illustration of this, Monk describes the occasion that gave Wittgenstein the 
idea of his picture-theory of language in the Tractatus: ‘Wittgenstein read in a 
magazine a report of a lawsuit in Paris concerning a car accident, in which a model of 
the accident was presented before the court. It occurred to him that the model could 
represent the accident because of the correspondence between the parts of the model 
(the miniature houses, cars, people) and the real things (houses, cars, people). It 
further occurred to him that, on this analogy, one might say a proposition serves as a 
model, or picture, of a state of affairs, by virtue of a similar correspondence between 
its parts and the world.’ Monk (1991), p. 118. 
12
 Monk attributes the breaking of the hold on Wittgenstein of the picture-theory of 
language to an encounter with the Italian economist, Piero Sraffa. In 1929, during a 
conversation, Wittgenstein insisted that “a proposition and that which it describes 
must have the same ‘logical form’ (or ‘grammar’ depending on the version of the 
story). To this idea[,] Sraffa made a Neopolitan gesture of brushing his chin with his 
fingertips, asking: ‘What is the logical form of that?’” Monk (1991), p. 261. 
13
 To be contrasted with Wittgenstein’s description of the Augustinian picture as 
giving us a ‘particular picture of the essence of human language’ (PI §1). 
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Further: 
 
this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but 
new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come 
into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten (PI §23). 
 
Linguistic use is born of human practice. With the advent of computers and the 
technological age, new words are coined each year, each one with customs on use and 
meaning. The meanings of old words gain new meanings. ‘Prestigious’ originally 
meant ‘deceptive’, and only in the nineteenth century became synonymous with 
‘distinguished’ or ‘esteemed’. ‘Willy-nilly’, once meaning ‘willing or not willing’, 
has come to mean ‘in a haphazard fashion’. Some other words become obsolete and 
get forgotten as practices die out.  
 
Here, the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-
form (PI §23). 
 
Wittgenstein calls ‘the whole process of using words’ in PI §2 a language-game, but 
will also ‘sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game’, and ‘shall 
also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a 
“language-game”’ (PI §7). The calling of these slices of human linguistic practice 
‘games’ is partly to encourage us away from thinking of language as having essences 
lying behind it. 
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. 
What is common them all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be something 
common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t 
think, but look! (PI §66) 
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The difficulty for our purposes here, of course, is that we cannot define a language-
game. That is the entire point. For it is the practice of always seeking definitions – the 
craving for generality – that Wittgenstein wants to dissuade us from. As we will see, 
Wittgenstein makes frequent use of analogies, metaphors, and fictional scenarios to 
convey the concept. The point of the concept is to demonstrate the ‘multiplicity of 
language-games’ (PI §23), as Wittgenstein does when he lists the following examples 
of language use: 
 
Giving orders, and obeying them 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) 
Reporting an event 
Speculating about the event 
Forming and testing a hypothesis 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams 
Making up a story; and reading it 
Play-acting 
Singing catches 
Guessing riddles 
Making a joke; telling it 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic 
Translating from one language into another 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying (PI §23) 
 
Were we to be presented with this list, and asked what it is, we would be likely to say 
something like ‘It is a list of activities that people do’. Each activity, we might say, 
has different rules and customs, different ways of going about each particular 
practice. Each is a more or less distinct practice, although distinctions will not always 
be clear-cut. 
 
We can separate some different ways in which Wittgenstein puts the idea of language-
games to use. The first way – that of primitive language-games – we have already 
seen, in PI §§1-3, and the language-game of the builders. Wittgenstein later references 
this process as ‘the method of §2’ (PI §48), indicating that it is a procedure he uses 
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again. He will often initially construct a primitive language-game that fits our 
philosophical preconceptions. These preconceptions are usually linked to the 
assumption that we can find hidden essences behind words by analysing them, as part 
of the Augustinian picture of language. In the immediately following remarks, he will 
add or subtract an aspect of the language-game. This process encourages us to 
question the appropriateness of the picture we started out with. Finally, he presents 
either a conclusion or, more often, the barest sketch of a conclusion.
14
 Never is that 
conclusion presented in the form of a general hypothesis, only as a response to the 
specific example. Every case is different, because language-games do not have an 
essence or something that is common to all. Most frequently, the conclusion indicates 
that the picture we began with works only in very limited circumstances, and cannot 
be applied universally, thereby promoting the idea of the multiplicity of language.  
 
Another way Wittgenstein uses the language-game concept is when he calls ‘the 
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a “language-
game”’ (PI §7). This is the sense in which this thesis is most interested. In taking this 
use of language-game as the primary one, we are concerned with how linguistic use 
differs from community to community. One word might be used in two different 
communities, but with very different meanings. The different meanings cannot easily 
be accommodated on the Augustinian picture. However, on Wittgenstein’s, where 
meaning is use, nothing other than use is a factor in determining meaning.  
 
In its very simplest form, this conception addresses how a word like ‘bat’ can mean 
one thing to a table-tennis player and the community surrounding the sport, and 
another to a chiropterologist (one who studies mammals of the order chiroptera). 
Language-game communities are not mutually exclusive. A chiropterologist might 
also be a keen table-tennis player. However, in order to be understood, he has to know 
which game he is playing. If he is playing the table-tennis language-game – that is, he 
                                                 
14
 I am indebted to David G. Stern for this tri-partite description of Wittgenstein’s 
method. See Stern (2004). Stern takes this further, and identifies three separate voices 
throughout Philosophical Investigations: a narrator, an interlocutor, and a narrative 
alter-ego; see Stern (2004), pp. 1-17 and in particular p. 17. Whilst Stern’s approach 
is interesting, and yields some useful results, I consider this approach too restrictive, 
and in some cases inappropriate, for a text that tries to resist a traditional structure of 
this sort.  
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is with table-tennis players – and he starts talking about how he has recently seen a 
bat eating fruit whilst hanging from a tree, he might be met with confusion.  
 
This confusion arises because different language-games have different rules just as all 
regular human activities have different rules. We follow rules all the time: driving on 
the correct side of the road and obeying traffic lights; playing a game of chess; 
smoking outside; writing from left to right on the page. The rules may be different in 
different communities: most of the world drives on the right; some countries still 
permit smoking indoors; some scripts, like Hebrew or Arabic, demand that we write 
from right to left, or top to bottom in as in tategaki Japanese. 
 
This situation is analogous with language. One would not play with the rules of 
draughts when playing a game of chess. If one did, one would likely be expelled from 
the chess-playing community, and called either a cheat or a novice who doesn’t know 
how to play the game. Rules are important if an activity is to make sense. Rules 
ensure that the same parameters govern activity each time that practice is undertaken. 
If chess had no rules, it could hardly be game for which people learned, practiced, and 
competed. If language had no rules, no one could mean anything by anything.  
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1.3 Rule-following 
 
The task for Wittgenstein’s understanding of rules and rule-following is to explain the 
relationship between rules and meaning. Wittgenstein himself, in explaining the 
concept, drew on several analogies and examples. By looking at some examples of 
activities he takes to be governed by rules in the same way as language, we can begin 
to get a grip on this complicated aspect of his work.  
 
Wittgenstein takes the propositions of mathematics to be rules. This may seem 
obvious enough. However, it derives from his understanding of mathematics as in one 
sense: 
 
a branch of knowledge,—but still it is also an activity (PI, p. 193). 
 
This move puts mathematics on a par with any other rule-governed activity, like 
playing chess, driving a car, or writing a limerick. When we follow a rule in 
mathematics, we perform an action. So, if asked to perform the sum ‘67+58’, we 
know that the rule of addition entitles us to replace one set of mathematical symbols 
with another. We answer – or write or count out beads on an abacus – ‘125’. If we 
give a different answer, we might be given another try; perhaps we made a basic 
mistake. But if a pupil were to insist repeatedly that the answer is ‘4’, we would say 
that he or she has failed to grasp the rule of addition. This aspect of learning or 
training in a rule is an important one, to be returned to shortly. 
 
Logic of the sort used by philosophers follows rules in a similar way. The law of 
modus ponens is a rule. The rule stipulates that if two particular propositions are true 
– ‘if p then q’ and ‘p’ – then we can replace them with the expression ‘q’. We need 
not understand this in the esoteric language of formal logic. This is a rule of inference 
almost everyone uses. Take two propositions, such as ‘If I have a child, then I am a 
father’, and ‘I have a child’. We declare them both to be true. So we can replace the 
two expressions with ‘I am a father’.  
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We could apply the modus ponens rule to chess. Take ‘If my bishop is diagonally 
aligned with your king, and there is nothing blocking its path, then you are in check,’ 
and ‘My bishop is diagonally aligned with your king, and there is nothing blocking its 
path’. The first is true because we are playing chess. The second is true because that is 
the arrangement of the pieces on the board. So, I am entitled to say ‘You are in 
check’. That’s one action I could perform, a vocal one. Alternatively, if it is my turn, I 
could take your king and end the game. Demonstrating mastery of a rule requires an 
action.  
 
Understanding how to play chess requires the mastery of the rules of the game, and 
‘[t]o understand a language means to be master of a technique (PI §199). It makes no 
sense to ask the function of a rule divorced from its context, from the game in which 
it is played. Therefore: 
 
[t]he question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a 
piece in chess?” (PI §108) 
 
We are tempted, on the Augustinian picture, to ask what the meanings of words are, 
and determine them once and for all, in all contexts. This leads to confusion, for once 
we have determined the rule for a word in one context, we are inclined to believe that 
we understand it ‘in full generality’ (RPP1 §38). In fact, we can use words differently, 
just as we can use tools or any object in multiple ways. If I have lost the pieces to my 
draughts set, we could use the draughts board and represent the pieces with those 
from my chess set. Here, the piece in chess we would call the bishop is not being used 
as a bishop; it is instead a draughts piece.  
 
This analogy illustrates the difference between what Wittgenstein terms ‘surface 
grammar’ and ‘depth grammar’ (PI §664). The surface grammar – the appearance of a 
chess-piece bishop – deceives us into thinking that that piece could only be used with 
the application of the rules of chess. Its depth grammar – which requires sensitivity to 
context and to the game being played – belies its actual function. That is to say, its 
meaning is determined by its use. 
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1.3.1 Following a rule and acting in accordance with a rule 
 
Once we know the rules of the game we are playing, the rules determine which 
actions are correct (such as in mathematics) or permissible (such as in playing chess). 
However, we must have an understanding of what it is to obey a rule. To obey a rule, 
one must understand what it demands and what it requires. We must distinguish 
between obeying a rule and merely acting in accordance with a rule. Someone who 
has never played chess before and knows nothing about it might come across an 
unattended chessboard, which the players have left mid-way through a game with the 
intention of returning to it later. This passer-by might mischievously move a piece on 
the board, at random. As it happens, this move might be in accordance with the rules. 
Perhaps he or she only moves the king one space and not into a position of check, or 
moves a knight in its characteristic L-shaped pattern into a free square.  
 
What distinguishes this action from knowing the rules of chess and playing a move 
that obeys those rules? Why is this acting in accordance with a rule, rather than 
obeying it? These questions are tantamount to asking in what way do rules determine 
and restrict our actions. Why, that is, does 67+58 always have to add up to 125? And 
why, from the propositions ‘If I have a child, then I am a father’ and ‘I have a child’ 
must I deduce the proposition that ‘I am a father’? Wittgenstein addresses this 
problem at length in the remarks PI §§143-201. 
 
 
1.3.2 Understanding a rule 
 
In PI §143, Wittgenstein introduces the example of a teacher trying to teach a pupil 
the ‘add one’ rule, getting to him to understand that the series from zero to nine 
progresses ‘zero, one, two, three, four, five, six etc.’ The pupil may make any number 
of errors: skipping out numbers; including all the numbers but in random orders on 
each attempt; repeatedly putting ‘four’ before ‘three’; and so on. The teacher tries to 
point out the pupil’s mistakes, and eventually succeeds in getting the pupil to continue 
the series correctly up to nine. 
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How, though, can we be sure that the pupil understands the ‘add one’ rule when he 
has only demonstrated it as far as zero to nine?  Must he demonstrate that he can do it 
correctly up to 17, to 29,374, to a million? There doesn’t seem to be a point at which 
we can definitively say the pupil has grasped the rule, because at any point in the 
series the pupil might veer away from the ‘add one’ rule, and begin adding two 
instead. We are tempted to say that to understand a rule is to be able to carry it out 
correctly in any possible circumstance. However, the number of possible 
circumstances is infinite. We can only realistically demand a finite number of 
applications of the rule from the pupil by which he can demonstrate his understanding 
of the rule: 
 
You will perhaps say: “Of course! For the series is infinite and the bit 
of it that I can have developed finite.” (PI §147) 
 
Understanding a rule cannot be demonstrated by performing all of its possible 
applications and so we are left with the original problem of what it is to understand a 
rule.  
 
In response to the same dilemma again, we might be tempted now to suggest that 
there is some hidden mental state or process; ‘such a state is called a disposition’ (PI 
§149). This mental state – whatever it amounts to – would have to entail the grasping 
of the infinite applications of the rule in an instant, without actually performing the 
infinite applications. When, though, are we in this state of knowing the infinite 
applications of a rule? Wittgenstein poses himself this question, and in doing so 
points out some of the ensuing difficulties with reducing understanding to a mental 
state. 
 
Always? day and night? or only when you are actually thinking of the 
rule? (PI §148) 
 
When do you know how to play chess? All the time? or just when you 
are making a move? And the whole of chess when you are making 
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each move?—How queer that knowing how to play chess should take 
such a short time, and a game so much longer! (PI, p. 50)
15
 
 
The idea of a mental state or disposition as constituting understanding is incoherent. 
As Robert L. Arrington notes, ‘one can no more go through the infinite applications in 
one’s mind than one can do so on paper’.16 Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a 
disposition or mental state to determine whether someone understands a rule.  
 
He now draws another analogy, between knowing simple rules of mathematics and 
knowing the alphabet. We say of someone that they know the alphabet in particular 
circumstances. It is not sufficient to have recited the alphabet all the way through just 
once. We do not say of someone that they know the alphabet if they have learned to 
spell only a few words. Someone is declared to know the alphabet by demonstrating 
the ability to recite it, spell various words, and file documents alphabetically, all in a 
variety of circumstances.
17
 Therefore: 
 
The grammar of the word “knows” is evidently closely related to that 
of “can”, “is able to”. But also closely related to that of “understands”. 
(“Mastery” of a technique.) (PI §150) 
 
This applies to language in that: 
 
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To 
understand a language means to be master of a technique (PI §199). 
 
By casting understanding a rule as being proficient in a particular practice, 
Wittgenstein avoids the confusion that stems from picturing it as an inner mental 
state. In characterising language-games earlier, the following quotation was used:  
                                                 
15
 This remark comes as a footnote at the bottom of the same page as §148. Anscombe 
and Rhees, in the editors’ note at the beginning of Philosophical Investigations, 
mention that the ‘passages printed beneath a line at the foot of some pages are written 
on slips which Wittgenstein had cut from other writings and inserted at these pages, 
without any further indication of where they were to come in’ (PI, Editors’ Note). 
16
 Arrington (2001), p. 123. 
17
 Cf. PI §149. 
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Here, the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a life-
form (PI §23). 
 
 With this conception of what it is to understand and to follow rules as being an 
ability, the idea of language-games being a practice or an activity is developed.  
 
To make sense of a rule-governed practice, that practice cannot have happened only 
once. ‘To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are 
customs (uses, institutions)’ (PI §199). Furthermore, ‘it is not possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule’ (PI §199). 
Rules may be codified or uncodified. Either way, a formal code is not necessary to 
learn or understand a rule. As P.M.S. Hacker and G.P. Baker note: 
 
When grammarians began the task of tabulating rules of Latin 
grammar for foreigners who wished to learn the language, they 
imposed order upon linguistic usage by complex systems of 
classification of declensions, conjugations, moods, etc. The rules they 
then formulated were not rules anyone had hitherto used or enunciated 
(no Roman mother had ever corrected her child’s mistakes by pointing 
out that avis belongs to the third declension and therefore has a 
genitive plural ending in –ium).18 
 
Similarly, one could learn how to play chess without ever reading a list of the rules, 
but rather by watching others play, engaging in practice games, and having one’s 
moves corrected. Most of us learned our native tongue without knowing anything of 
the grammarian-influenced rules about moods, tenses, objects, subjects, predicates, 
and so on. What constitutes a custom, then, is a community of able practitioners of 
that activity. The teacher instructing the pupil how to continue the ‘add one’ series of 
§143 has been deemed an able practitioner of this, and probably other, mathematical 
functions. Otherwise he wouldn’t be a teacher. How has he demonstrated his own 
                                                 
18
 Baker and Hacker (2009), pp. 53-4. 
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mastery of the technique? By performing applications of the rule in a variety of 
circumstances.  
 
Language, too, as another type of activity, functions in this way. Understanding a rule 
neither requires a demonstration of its infinite possible applications, nor is it a hidden 
mental process. Learning a language, like learning any activity, is a matter of learning 
the rules that govern it. Demonstration of one’s understanding the rules of any 
activity, including language, demands the demonstration of applications of those rules 
in a variety of circumstances. Ultimately, it is for the community of able practitioners 
of any practice to declare a novice at that practice to have acquired that ability.  
 
Although we will look at objections and slightly different interpretations later on, the 
general consensus is that this conception of rules demands that language use is a 
communal activity. If meaning is use, that use must be entrenched to the extent that it 
forms a custom. Those who have acquired the ability – that is, mastered the technique 
– for that custom, without needing ever to codify or make anything explicit, determine 
the rules for correct application of the rules that govern that custom.  
 
In the last section of this chapter, as an introduction to Kripke’s influential 
interpretation of the rule-following considerations, we will look at what constitutes 
the normativity of rule-following; what it is for a rule to require a particular action, 
and the reliance on the concept of a community for linguistic meaning. First, now that 
we have a clearer grasp of both, we turn to linking rule-following with the earlier 
concept of language-games, via an examination of what Wittgenstein means by 
‘seeing connexions’. 
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1.4 ‘Seeing connexions’ 
 
Various threads need to be drawn together. Several analogies and scenarios of 
Wittgenstein’s have been introduced – games, chess, teaching a pupil basic 
mathematics – as an indirect method of explaining language-games and rules. This 
approach was seen as necessary by Wittgenstein to avoid proposing any sort of 
theory. 
 
What has emerged from the preceding sections is an understanding of linguistic 
meaning as being determined by use. That use cannot occur just once, or for a lone 
individual, but as part of a community.
19
 Different rules apply to different activities. 
One would not bring the rules of draughts to a chess game. The term ‘language-game’ 
is designed to show that, even within a single natural language like English, different 
rules pertain to different circumstances and communities. This was hinted at in a very 
simple form in the comparison between the chiropterologist and the table-tennis 
player in §1.2. 
 
Wittgenstein never addresses how rules develop. That is a potentially interesting 
question, but not one that will be addressed in this thesis. Wittgenstein is only 
interested in what can be seen with no special investigation. On Wittgenstein’s 
conception: 
 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is 
nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to 
us (PI §126). 
                                                 
19
 There is a vast amount of literature dedicated to the debate as to whether 
Wittgenstein’s conception of language entails that there can be no such thing as a 
private language. Norman Malcolm (1986, 1989) has been a strong proponent of the 
‘community view’, countered by Baker and Hacker (2009) and Colin McGinn (1984), 
who have argued that an individual can follow a rule. We will examine this debate in 
a preliminary stage at the end of this chapter in looking at Kripke. Conclusions will 
also be drawn on what constitutes such a community in Chapter 7 in light of the 
forthcoming investigation into On Certainty. For now, in giving a basic background, 
we leave this question to one side.  
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It is of paramount importance that philosophy ought not seek to explain phenomena, 
but to obtain ‘a clear view of the aim and functioning of words’ (PI §5).20 A wish to 
clear away confusions caused by our use of language is fundamental to Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy. Much of the confusion we encounter is created by confusing surface 
grammar with depth grammar (PI §664), or using language with one, fixed set of 
rules, regardless of the language-game in which we are involved. Wittgenstein 
introduces two interrelated concepts in battling such confusions: perspicuous 
representation and family resemblance. 
 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command 
a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this 
sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that 
understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’. Hence the 
importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases (PI §122).
21
 
 
Gaining a perspicuous representation of our use of words enables us to see 
connections in those different uses. Language-games – found and invented – provide 
the intermediate cases for comparison. Earlier, in challenging the idea of there being 
essences behind words that fixed their meanings once and for all, the following 
quotation was used: 
 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. 
What is common them all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be something 
common, or they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
                                                 
20
 Cf. PI §§92, 122, 125, 126. 
21
 Wittgenstein’s translators preferred the old-fashioned transcription of ‘connexions’ 
to ‘connections’. I will use the former when quoting Wittgenstein directly, but the 
latter elsewhere. 
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relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t 
think, but look! (PI §66)
22
 
 
The concept of language-games is based on the way we call several different activities 
‘games’, yet they do not have something common to all. It is now useful to bring in 
another paragraph made later in that same remark: 
 
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail (PI §66). 
 
The next remark continues: 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities 
than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between 
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—
And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family (PI §67).  
 
When we see connections in language use – similarities or dissimilarities – we do so 
in the same way that we might see connections between members of the same family. 
There is not one thing common to all, but rather a network of resemblances. A clear 
view or perspicuous representation is needed in order to make these connections. This 
process might require careful inspection, but not weighty philosophical theses and 
defences: ‘To repeat: don’t think, but look!’ (PI §66). 
 
In examining particular uses of the same word, we should look for connections 
between the particular uses, not for a description that purports to fix the word’s 
                                                 
22
 Compare this with Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, where, 
regarding the various rites described by Frazer, he comments: ‘pp. 617ff. (Chapter 
LXII, “The Fire Festivals of Europe”) The most noticeable thing seems to me not 
merely the similarities but also the differences throughout all these rites. It is a wide 
variety of faces with common features that keep showing in one place and another. 
And one would like to draw lines joining the parts that various faces have in 
common.’ (RFGB, p. 13) 
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meaning in all its possible applications. If you and I use a word in the same way then 
it has the same meaning, and we are playing the same language-game. If you and I 
encounter a third person using that word in a different way, it may not be as simple as 
declaring ourselves right and them wrong. We would have to rule out the application 
of the word being a simple mistake on the third person’s part; perhaps a slip of the 
tongue, or, in learning some new words, two words’ meanings have been swapped 
and confused. If, though, that person can point to a custom, a community that uses 
that word regularly as he just has, we have encountered a different language-game, 
with different rules for the correct use of that word. 
 
To try and understand this new-found language-game, we would look to spot 
similarities and dissimilarities with our own, to see if perhaps their use of that 
troublesome word is in some ways connected to our use, even if not identical in all 
respects. Instances of this sort of confusion might range from the prosaic – the 
difference between ‘bum’ in Britain and in the USA – to the much more technical or 
esoteric.  
   
 
1.4.1 Perspicuous representation of language-games 
 
Wittgenstein is particularly interested in the esoteric language used by philosophers. 
He thinks that, whilst philosophers try to explain the world as it applies to everybody 
– ethics, religious belief, the nature of the physical world – they do so in a language 
peculiar to themselves. ‘The language used by philosophers is already deformed,’ 
Wittgenstein suggests, ‘as though by shoes that are too tight’ (CV, p. 47). It is 
therefore an important aspect of Wittgenstein’s method of linguistic analysis to point 
out how words are not only used differently in different circumstances, but also to 
indicate how far these specialist uses are often removed from ordinary language use. 
According to Richter: 
 
It would be madness to remind people at random of the ordinary uses 
of randomly chosen words. Wittgenstein of course does not engage in 
anything so futile. Instead he targets the Freudian, the Jamesian, the 
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Platonist, the Cartesian, and so on, and reminds them of the ordinary 
uses of words such as ‘mind’.23 
 
Here we can see the importance of rules to language-games, and the purpose of 
introducing these two concepts of perspicuous representation and family resemblance 
to Wittgenstein’s project of clearing up philosophical confusions. Take the Cartesian 
and the Freudian uses of the word ‘mind’. Cartesian dualism treats the mind as 
‘completely different from the body’; the body is ‘by its very nature always divisible, 
while the mind is utterly indivisible.’24 Freud divides the mind into functions: the id, 
the ego, and the super-ego.
25
 This structure was not linked in a one-to-one relationship 
with neurological brain states, but Freud used them to explain and classify various 
mental disorders: 
 
Transference neuroses correspond to a conflict between the ego and 
the id; narcissistic neuroses, to a conflict between the ego and the 
super-ego; and psychoses, to one between the ego and the external 
world.
26
 
 
A modern neuroscientist, by comparison, would probably do the opposite from Freud, 
and equate the mind with certain patterns of brain states. Everything from emotional 
responses to solving a jigsaw, cooking a meal to mental disorder, is dependent and 
directly correlated to biochemical states of affairs in the human brain.  
 
In ordinary language, however, if I speak of ‘knowing my mind’, ‘changing my 
mind’, ‘having a mind to teach someone a lesson’, or ‘paying it no mind’, I do not do 
so with a Freudian’s or a neuroscientist’s conception. Neither brain states nor ids, 
egos and super-egos are part of what I mean when I use the word ‘mind’. That is not 
because of any inner mental process determining what I mean when I use the word 
‘mind’, but because I do not use the word ‘mind’ in that sort of way. The problem, 
particularly for philosophy, is that: 
                                                 
23
 Richter (2004), p. 7. 
24
 Descartes (2006), p. 59 [Sixth Meditation; 86 and 85]. 
25
 See Wollheim (1991), p. 175. 
26
 Quoted in Wollheim (1981), p. 236. 
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When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition”, “name”—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in 
the language which is its original home?— 
 What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use (PI §116). 
 
Of course, one would be entitled to point out that my proposed uses of mind are 
inconsistent. ‘Paying it no mind’ suggests that we grant a matter no attention, whereas 
‘changing one’s mind’ is suggestive of making a decision and then altering that 
decision. How, then, can talking about the everyday use of language help us fend off, 
for example, the Freudian and the neuroscientist, if everyday use is so inconsistent?  
 
In fact it is part of the point of Wittgenstein’s approach that even in our everyday 
language, we do not use the same words in consistently identical ways. The surface 
grammar, that is, the identical word ‘mind’ appearing in all the examples, conceals 
the depth grammar, which is the different ways in which the word ‘mind’ is used in 
those examples.
27
 Traditionally, philosophers have failed to pay attention to these 
differences, which has led them into confusion. Part of the difficulty is that the: 
 
aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—
because it is always before one’s eyes.) (PI §129)  
 
The method of seeking a perspicuous representation is what Wittgenstein hopes will 
help to jolt us out of our familiarity. This point also suggests a deeper function for 
language-games. By frequently presenting in his language-game examples a scenario 
that at first seems familiar to us, and then adding or subtracting small parts of the 
language-game, Wittgenstein hopes that we can see things afresh. Sometimes we are 
                                                 
27
 See Cottingham (1998), p. 112. Cottingham does, on the other hand, make the 
excellent point that words like “‘repression’, ‘rationalization’, ‘sublimation’ – are 
now pretty much taken for granted in our everyday modes of self-understanding,” and 
have become absorbed into our ordinary language (Ibid). 
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encouraged to see similarities with other uses and sometimes to see dissimilarities. 
Either way ‘seeing connexions’ is the process by which we can proceed to clear up 
some of the philosophical confusions arising from a failure to pay proper attention to 
our grammar.    
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1.5 Kripke 
 
 
In PI §§185-201, Wittgenstein investigates some further aspects of rule-following, 
specifically the normativity of rules – how we know what it is that a rule requires us 
to do – and whether interpretation of a rule is necessary at the point of every possible 
application. These passages, along with the broader section PI §§134-242, lead 
Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language to claim that there exists a 
sceptical challenge to meaning in Philosophical Investigations, which he tries to 
combat by means of his own sceptical solution.  
 
Kripke’s account depends on a community view of language, whereby we are 
warranted to claim that words mean what they do by virtue of the role such practices 
have in our form of life. The latter term, form of life, is not one we have encountered 
yet, but it will be addressed in detail later in detail in Chapter 3. The following, 
closing section of this chapter outlines Wittgenstein’s remarks on some issues for 
rule-following as well as Kripke’s account. These matters will then largely be put to 
one side until Chapter 7, to make way for a detailed investigation into On Certainty.  
 
 
1.5.1 The normativity of rules 
 
At PI §185, Wittgenstein suggests that we ‘return to our example (143)’, where we first 
encountered the scenario of the pupil learning to continue a series. The pupil has 
‘mastered the series of natural numbers’, and is now being taught ‘other series of 
cardinal numbers’ (PI §185). The aim is to get him to the stage where he can write 
down series of the form 
 
0, n, 2n, 3n, etc. at an order of the form “+n”; so at the order he writes 
down the series of natural numbers (PI §185). 
 
Now he is instructed to continue a series of ‘add two’. He has performed this series of 
computations satisfactorily up to 1000. The pupil is then asked to continue the series 
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beyond 1000, and something strange happens. Instead of continuing ‘1000, 1002, 1004 
. . .’, as we would expect, he writes ‘1000, 1004, 1008 . . .’ When questioned, the pupil 
is adamant that he is following the same rule as he was when continuing the series up 
to 1000. Further investigation might discover that the pupil’s understanding of the 
order amounts to ‘“Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on”’ (PI 
§185). 
 
It would seem that we can rectify this easily, and insist that the pupil follows the same 
rule whatever the circumstances. The problem here is that the pupil thinks that he is 
following the same rule. We return to a difficulty similar to the one we encountered 
earlier. In order to demonstrate that he has grasped the rule in its infinite applications, 
must he perform an infinite number of computations? For, if he does not – and 
obviously he can’t – it is impossible to tell whether at some point his understanding of 
the rule diverges from that of the teacher’s. The pupil interpreted the ‘add two’ rule to 
entail adding two up to 1000, four up to 2000, six up to 3000.  
 
The pupil and the teacher are following different rules. However their respective uses 
of the term ‘add two’ are identical, overlapping precisely, up until the series reaches 
1000, at which point the rules’ functions diverge. Even were we to test the pupil up to 
a million, how can we be sure something like this won’t happen to his interpretation 
later in the series? 
 
 
1.5.2 Interpreting a rule 
 
Wittgenstein suggests it would appear that ‘a new insight—intuition—is needed at 
every step to carry out the ‘+n’ correctly’ (PI §186). The pupil needs to know the right 
step to take at any particular stage in the possible applications of the series. The right 
step, the teacher might want to say, is ‘the one that accords with the order—as it was 
meant’ (PI §186). However, we have already ruled out two ways in which the teacher 
can have meant the order in all its possible applications. The teacher could not have 
meant it by running through all the possible applications in his mind, and he could not 
have meant it in the sense that there is some hidden mental state via which he has 
instantaneous access to all those possible applications. Wittgenstein is left wondering:  
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how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I 
do, is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule (PI §198). 
 
Whilst the example Wittgenstein has used is mathematical, this is only for the clarity 
of the issue this approach provides. If we take this in its more general form, given that 
rules are a necessary feature for meaning in any linguistic practice, this can apply to 
words, too. Some sort of ‘superlative fact’ (PI §192) would solve the problem, 
something to which we can turn in order to justify, once and for all, my claim that I 
mean the same thing I always have in my application of the rule. 
 
If ‘whatever I do [can] be brought into accord with the rule’ (PI §198), the entire 
notion of following a rule correctly and consistently loses its sense. If a rule can be 
correctly but inconsistently supplied, it cannot provide a normative constraint on our 
actions. It is as if a pupil of chess learned that kings can only move one space in any 
direction, provided it is not into a position of check. That is the rule. At some point in 
the game, the pupil moves the king two spaces. When asked why he has ignored the 
rule on the movement of the king, the pupil would insist he is following the same rule 
as always.  
 
By careful probing, it turns out he has taken the rule to mean ‘kings can only move 
one space, unless the only other pieces left on the board are pawns and the other king, 
in which case the king can move two spaces’. This would be a fairly rare occurrence 
in a game of chess, so it might have taken several, possibly hundreds, of games, for 
this peculiar event to happen. Up until this point, it has seemed to the teacher that the 
pupil understands fully the rules of chess, and in particular the rule about movement 
of the king.  
 
The pupil, too, is confident in his claim always to have understood what the rule 
requires of him, and that he has always followed the same rule. In declaring that he 
understood what the rule requires of him back when he was learning the game, there 
is no way the teacher could have ensured that this peculiarity would never happen. 
Neither the teacher nor the pupil could insist upon testing in all the possible 
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circumstances in which a king might be moved, and there cannot be a hidden mental 
state to which either can point.  
 
Like Wittgenstein’s example of the ‘add two’ rule, the chess pupil’s understanding of 
the rule and the teacher’s understanding of the rule demand identical applications up 
until the specific set of circumstances described – there being only two kings and 
some pawns left on the board – at which point the functions of the rules diverge. We 
are left with a paradox about rule-following, which Wittgenstein describes in §201. 
Although Wittgenstein rejects the paradox later in §201, Kripke takes the early stages 
of Wittgenstein’s remark to propose his sceptical challenge for meaning. This position 
is known as meaning scepticism. 
 
 
1.5.3 On Rules and Private Language 
 
Kripke’s On Rules and Private Language has become a perennial feature of 
scholarship on Wittgenstein’s ideas on language and rule-following. It is divided into 
two parts. In the first part, Kripke’s reading casts Wittgenstein as presenting a sceptical 
position about rule-following and therefore about meaning; this is the so-called 
sceptical paradox. The second part contains Kripke’s proposed sceptical solution, and 
also a discussion of the private-language argument. The sceptical paradox asserts that 
out of the rule-following considerations of Philosophical Investigations – roughly PI 
§§134-242 – comes the paradox that there can be no such thing as having justification 
to say that we mean anything at all by a particular expression. We lack what 
Wittgenstein called the ‘superlative fact’ to which we can point in providing such a 
justification.  
 
Proposed solutions to the paradox vary, but they can usually be divided into straight 
and sceptical solutions. Straight solutions suggest that just such a fact or mental state is 
available. The dispositionalist account debated by Horwich (1995, 1998), Miller 
(2000), and Vignolo (2008) is an example, although Kripke himself considers it 
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‘misdirected’.28 Sceptical solutions accept the paradox, but suggest that talk about 
meaning is still possible. Kripke characterizes Wittgenstein as offering a sceptical 
solution.  
 
First, though, Kripke rules out straight solutions by a process of elimination. Kripke 
rightly interprets Wittgenstein as rejecting meaning-Platonism, whereby the correct 
application of the rule is determined by something mind-independent and 
metaphysical. This would be the idea that ‘the beginning of a series is a visible section 
of rails invisibly laid to infinity’ (PI §218).29 Kripke then, according to Boghossian, 
examines ‘facts about how the speaker has actually used the expression, facts about 
how he is disposed to use it, and facts about his qualitative mental history’.30 Kripke 
finds them all insufficient to fix meaning.  
 
There has been some debate as to whether Kripke is mounting an epistemological or a 
constitutive sceptical attack on meaning; some have even suggested that he attempts 
both separately.
31
 An epistemological paradox would be concerned with an 
individual’s ability to know, and to justify, whether or not she is engaging in a 
consistent practice of meaning ascription. If Kripke is mounting a constitutive 
sceptical attack, on the other hand, it would concern the very possibility of meaning, 
regardless of our knowledge or awareness of it. Whilst this is an area that has led to 
some debate, I side with Boghossian’s view that the answer is relatively 
straightforward.   
 
The fact that Kripke’s interlocutor is ‘permitted complete and omniscient access to all 
the facts about his previous behavioural, mental, and physical history’ renders this 
debate obsolete.
32
 For if the interlocutor is granted such omniscient knowledge, of 
both internal and external phenomena, then any paradox cannot possibly be concerned 
                                                 
28
 Kripke (1982), p. 23. See also McDowell (1984). McDowell presents Wittgenstein 
as proposing a straight solution to his own paradox.  
29
 See §§212-225, and in particular §§218-225. It is uncontroversial to claim that 
Wittgenstein rejected meaning-Platonism, and so I go into no more detail here, but for 
further discussion see Wright (2001a), particularly pp. 314-315 and Wright (2001b), 
particularly pp. 140-2. 
30
 Boghossian (1989), p. 508. 
31
 See McGinn, C. (1984), p. 149. 
32
 Boghossian (1989), p. 515.   
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with finding something that may pertain, but may not be knowable to the individual in 
question. It has to be concerned with the possibility of meaning itself, regardless of 
any epistemic question. That is not to say that there is no epistemic question of 
whether one can know whether one is successfully engaging in consistent meaning 
ascription; only that, within the framework of Kripke’s exposition, it is not a matter 
for debate.  
 
The sceptical solution, as its name suggests, seeks to resolve the obvious difficulty of 
being unable to ascribe semantic content to our use of language, whilst retaining the 
sense of the paradox. Kripke himself sees the sceptical paradox as ‘insane and 
intolerable’.33 The goal of the sceptical solution, then, as Boghossian notes, is to 
acknowledge the sceptical paradox whilst ‘showing that what it asserts does not 
ultimately lapse into pragmatic incoherence’.34 The method Kripke uses is to replace 
the familiar truth-conditions for what constitutes a meaningful sentence with 
assertability conditions. He goes on to describe these assertability conditions, arguing 
that a positive assertability condition (similar to the ‘T’ in a truth table of truth-
conditions) must refer to the practice and disposition of a community of speakers. It is 
in this section that Kripke’s argument against private language is also developed, and 
the resulting position Kripke takes up is that any linguistic practice considered wholly 
in isolation from any sort of community is thereby devoid of meaningful semantic 
content. Therein lies his argument against the possibility of private language, and his 
argument for a communal view of language and meaning. 
 
 
1.5.4 Kripke’s sceptical paradox 
 
Kripke opens his argument by quoting from PI §201: 
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by 
a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with 
the rule.  The answer was: if any action can be made out to accord 
                                                 
33
 Kripke (1982), p. 60. 
34
 Boghossian (1989), p. 518. 
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with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And 
so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
35
 
 
Kripke illustrates the paradox and develops it with another mathematical example, in 
an exchange between himself and a sceptic about meaning. Kripke, a competent 
practitioner of addition and familiar with the term ‘plus’ or ‘+’ has never performed 
the computation ‘68+57’. On performing it, he obtains the answer ‘125’. 
 
Then, ‘a bizarre sceptic . . . questions [his] answer’.36 Does Kripke, on the basis of how 
he has used the plus function in the past, not take the computation of ‘68+57’ to be 
‘5’? Perhaps in Kripke’s applications of the ‘plus’ function in the past he really meant 
a function called ‘quus’, which is defined by: 
 
x quus y  = x+y, if x <57 
    = 5 otherwise
37
 
 
 The sceptic’s claim is that it is Kripke who is currently suffering a delusion, 
‘under the influence of some insane frenzy, or a bout of LSD.’38 Kripke has always 
meant the ‘quus’ function when he has used the term ‘plus’, and has acted accordingly. 
All that is happening now is that he is misinterpreting his own previous usage.  
 
Kripke admits that if the sceptic makes this claim sincerely, then he is crazy. The 
example really serves to pose two questions from the sceptic. Considering that this 
particular computation has never been performed before by Kripke: 
 
[f]irst, [the sceptic] questions whether there is there any fact that I 
meant plus, not quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. 
Second, he questions whether I have reason to be so confident that 
now I should answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’.39 
                                                 
35
 Kripke (1982), p. 7. The quotation is taken from the first half of PI, §201. 
36
 Kripke (1982), p. 8. 
37
 Kripke (1982), p. 9. Wittgenstein draws a similar example about unexpectedly 
going wrong with a simple mathematical computation at RFM, I-135, p. 90. 
38
 Kripke (1982), p. 9. 
39
 Kripke (1982), p. 11. 
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The two questions present a demand for justification, either, in the first instance, by an 
external fact, or, in the second, by something internal, perhaps a mental state. As we 
have seen, neither approach is feasible. If nothing determines that Kripke has always 
performed simple addition when faced with the plus symbol, then the very notion of 
following a rule is cast into doubt. ‘It seems,’ says Kripke, ‘that the entire idea of 
meaning vanishes into thin air’, and he rejects the possibility of a straight solution.40  
 
 
1.5.5 Kripke’s sceptical solution 
 
A sceptical solution must accept the paradox, whilst maintaining that our ordinary 
linguistic practice need not be troubled by our inability to provide a justification for 
our meaning claims. The model for Kripke’s sceptical solution is the replacement of 
truth conditions with assertability conditions.
41
 He poses himself the question: 
 
[G]ranted that our language game permits a certain ‘move’ 
(assertion) under certain specifiable conditions, what is the role in 
our lives of such permission?
42
 
  
And answers: 
 
 All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means 
something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under 
which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of 
asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No 
supposition that ‘facts correspond’ to those assertions is needed.43 
 
Drawing on PI, §219, Kripke then asserts that: 
 
                                                 
40
 Kripke (1982), p. 22. 
41
 Kripke (1982), p. 74. 
42
 Kripke (1982), p. 75. 
43
 Kripke (1982), p. 79. 
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Ultimately we reach a level where we act without any reason in terms 
of which we can justify our action. We act unhesitatingly but 
blindly.’44 
 
Kripke further cites Philosophical Investigations to justify his claim that just 
because we cannot provide the sort of justification the sceptic demands – the type a 
straight solution purports to provide – does not indicate that we have cause to doubt 
our ascriptions of meaning. 
 
To use a word without justification [Rechtfurtigung] does not mean to 
use it without right [Unrecht] (PI §289). 
 
In other words, justification on this level is unnecessary for meaningful language. The 
sceptic is right to point out that our language use rests on nothing concrete, but not 
that we need to adopt a sceptical attitude to meaning claims as a consequence. It is, 
says Kripke: 
 
part of our language game of speaking of rules that a speaker may, 
without ultimately giving any justification, follow his own confident 
inclination that this way (say, responding ‘125’) is the right way to 
respond, rather than another way (e.g. responding ‘5’). That is, the 
‘assertability conditions’ that license an individual to say that, on a 
given occasion, he ought to follow his rule this way rather than that, 
are, ultimately, that he does what he is inclined to do.
45
  
 
However, such an individual cannot have such a license in the absence of a broader 
community. Both Kripke’s community view of meaning and his arguments against 
private language depend on this point. Quoting Wittgenstein, he points out that: 
 
                                                 
44
 Kripke (1982), p. 87. There is an interesting debate on what Wittgenstein means by 
acting ‘blindly’ in this context; see Stern (2004), pp. 154-156, and Fogelin (1994), pp. 
219-220. This concern will be explored a little further in §6.5.2 in relation to 
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, where he distinguishes between 
acting on a pre-rational basis and on opinions. Cf. Clack (1999, 2003). 
45
 Kripke (1982), pp. 87-8. 
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To think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’; otherwise thinking one was 
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI §202).
46
 
 
The assertability conditions that license an individual to make meaning claims are 
acquired through being deemed a competent practitioner of the activity in question by 
the community of competent practitioners. In Wittgenstein’s original example, and in 
Kripke’s, that practice is addition, and the community of competent practitioners 
made up of mathematics teachers and other numerate adults. For language, broadly 
speaking, it will be those who speak the language and regularly make themselves 
understood and understand others in that language.  
 
 
1.5.6 The community view and the form of life 
 
Until Kripke’s work, it was widely assumed that Wittgenstein upheld a community 
view of language roughly along the lines described by Kripke in his sceptical 
solution. Criticisms of Kripke are often not so much that his sceptical solution is a 
wildly inaccurate portrayal of Wittgenstein, but rather that he overstates the problem 
and the significance of the paradox.  
 
There are those who maintain that a lone individual – isolated not just by chance, but 
logically – would be capable of following a rule, among them Fogelin, McGinn, and 
Blackburn.
47
 Whilst this is a stimulating debate, it deals with peculiar exceptions. 
None of these ‘Individualists’, as Stern calls them – as opposed to ‘communitarians’ – 
suggests that the majority of our language use and concomitant rule-following is 
anything other than a communal activity.
48
 For the: 
 
word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another, they 
are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the 
use of the other with it’ (PI §224). 
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Kripke declares that this sort of agreement, ‘the set of responses in which we agree, 
and the way they interweave with our activities, is our form of life’.49 On the other 
hand, ‘beings who agreed in consistently giving bizarre quus-like responses would 
share in another form of life’.50 Instead of justification, Kripke proposes that we point 
to our form of life – the practices of our community – and indicate that ‘this is simply 
what I do’ (PI §217). 
 
The enigmatic term ‘form of life’, or variations thereof, makes five appearances in 
Philosophical Investigations; three times in Part I, and twice in Part II. It is described 
as ‘complicated’ and that which ‘has to be accepted’ (PI, pp. 148 and 192). When 
humans agree as to what is true or false, that is ‘not agreement in opinions but in form 
of life’ (PI §241). Any sort of linguistic practice in which humans engage, any 
language-game, is ‘part of . . . a life-form’ (PI §23).51 Even to ‘imagine a language 
means to imagine a life-form’ (PI §19). Where there is a language-game, real or 
fictional, there must be a form of life in which it takes place.  
 
Although these are the only explicit references, the form-of-life concept is invoked 
elsewhere in Philosophical Investigations. The implication of the remark ‘If a lion 
could talk, we could not understand him’ (PI, p. 190) is that understanding is 
impossible when our form of life is radically different from those with whom we are 
trying to communicate. The rule-following considerations – identified by Boghossian 
as roughly §§138-242
52
 – draw attention to the importance of a community with a 
way of life in which certain, for example, mathematical, procedures take place: ‘. . . a 
person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a 
custom’ (PI §198). Such customs cannot occur in a void: ‘hence it is not possible to 
obey a rule “privately”’ (PI §202).  
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In asking what justification might be available for one’s following a rule the way one 
does, Wittgenstein is ‘inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”’ (PI §217). He has 
‘reached bedrock, and [his] spade is turned’ (PI §217). When digging deeper than the 
language-game falters, Wittgenstein is inclined to invoke the form of life, just as 
Kripke does in his sceptical solution. Instead of ‘This is simply what I do,’ he might 
just as easily say: ‘This is simply my form of life.’53 For what humans do ‘blindly’ 
and without ratiocination is what comprises a form of life; a certain class of actions 
that make up the respective forms of life for different communities (PI §219). 
 
Reading Philosophical Investigations, it becomes clear that the form-of-life concept 
mutually supports the idea of a language-game. Rush Rhees summarised this neatly in 
saying ‘rules of grammar are rules of the lives in which there is language.’54 Without 
a form of life, a language-game cannot exist, and utterances and written words are 
mere squeaks and squiggles. The meaning of a word depends upon its role in a 
language-game, and language-games, with all their internally interconnected rules and 
actions, only make sense when ‘surrounded by certain normal manifestations of life’ 
(Z §534). Yet, for something so obviously fundamental to Wittgenstein’s rich 
understanding of language, the form-of-life concept is left curiously undefined. It 
functions as a somewhat ungainly recurring metaphor, restated in various guises, to 
indicate that philosophical enquiry can go no further and no justifications can be 
provided for our actions. More renderings of the metaphor are to be found outside of 
Philosophical Investigations – for example that last quotation from Zettel – but there 
is nothing that directly states, in plain terms, just what a form of life amounts to.  
 
Metaphors have their uses in philosophy, and Wittgenstein’s are often particularly 
inventive and illuminating.
55
 However, many philosophers, particularly those not 
inclined towards a Wittgensteinian approach, find fault with his resorting to 
terminology that is so underdeveloped. When pressed, it is difficult to supply 
anything other than a restatement of the material to be found in Philosophical 
Investigations: metaphors, loose suggestions, and a general inability to parse out the 
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term at all succinctly. If we are to understand what a form of life is, beyond merely 
restating the metaphor in increasingly esoteric terms, a fresh approach is required. By 
developing an understanding of On Certainty, the concept of the form of life and its 
role in a communal conception of linguistic meaning can itself be better understood. 
Only then, and with an understanding of the world-picture concept of On Certainty, 
can we reappraise the communal conception of language.  
 56 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided a background against which On Certainty can be 
understood. Philosophical Investigations as a whole – and the concepts of language-
games, family resemblance, and rule-following in particular – presents some of 
Wittgenstein’s best-known ideas. Our examination of On Certainty, beginning in the 
next chapter, would make little sense without an understanding of these ideas and of 
Wittgenstein’s method.  
 
Language-games and rule-following go hand in hand. Language-games are concerned 
with meaning, and how it can change depending on how use differs in different 
contexts. Rules are necessary to fix meaning within a language-game, as they indicate 
a custom. Without a custom, there are no rules, and with no rules, there is no 
meaning. 
 
Seeing connections is our method for gaining a clear view of our linguistic practice. 
In order to acquire a perspicuous representation and see these connections, we need to 
find or invent intermediate cases in the form of language-games. In the first instance, 
this process leads us to question the Augustinian picture described at the beginning of 
Chapter 1. In resisting the temptation to seek one thing common to all uses of a word, 
but rather a network of family resemblances, we take the first step to clearing away 
philosophical confusions that have been caused by the obscuring role of surface 
grammar. 
 
The examination of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein – though interesting in its 
own right – primarily serves to draw attention to an area of weakness in the 
communitarian explanation of linguistic meaning. Without a clear understanding of 
what such a linguistic community amounts to – where a community’s boundaries 
might lie, and what happens when different communities come into contact or conflict 
with each other – the idea of a form of life is underdeveloped. Whilst On Certainty 
addresses a number of philosophical topics, I will argue in the forthcoming chapters 
that a useful – and hitherto largely unexplored – way of reading the text is that of 
developing the form-of-life concept in conjunction with the world-picture concept 
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from On Certainty in order to bolster Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic meaning. 
Seeing connections will be an essential aspect of that investigation. 
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Chapter 2 – The Weltbild 
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2.3 The distinction between certainty and knowledge 
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 2.6.1 The riverbed 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
2.1 On Certainty 
 
The starting point of On Certainty is relatively uncontroversial in its interpretations. 
Wittgenstein, responding to G.E. Moore, makes a distinction between instances of 
knowledge and those of certainty. From there, interpretations, or at least emphases, 
splinter and multiply.  
 
In style, On Certainty bears a resemblance to Philosophical Investigations. Both open 
with a reference to another scholar – in On Certainty G.E. Moore, in Philosophical 
Investigations Augustine – and there then follows a series of numbered remarks. 
These remarks are not always clearly linked to one another. Topics and concerns 
come into and out of focus without a clear, linear argumentative structure. Both texts 
display Wittgenstein working through ideas in real time, posing himself questions, 
and rarely, if ever, providing clear-cut solutions.  
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Yet, Stroll’s declaration, and Moyal-Sharrock’s endorsement of it, that On Certainty 
is ‘the hardest . . . to get a handle on’ of Wittgenstein’s mature works is overly 
pessimistic.
56
 It need only be so troublesome if the reader is desperate to draw out 
traditional philosophical theses. It is true that, if taken as a text on its own, it has the 
potential to be baffling. However, if the reader, particularly one reasonably familiar 
with Philosophical Investigations, is willing to acquiesce to the style of 
Wittgenstein’s thought, not only can the nature of the certainties in question be 
broadly agreed upon, but the possibilities for further investigation can be found 
liberating, rather than an impediment. 
 
I noted in my introduction that, building on a basic consensus, I consider what follows 
in this thesis to be an extrapolation of On Certainty. I also think that the same could 
be said for almost all purported interpretations of the text. If seeing connections was a 
core skill we hoped to achieve from Philosophical Investigations, then seeing 
connections in relations to questions of certainty and knowledge is what is undertaken 
in On Certainty. It is Wittgenstein bringing his own method to bear on a particular 
topic that concerned him in the final years of his life.  
 
There is a peculiar degree of cognitive dissonance in many areas of Wittgenstein 
scholarship. On the one hand, it is frequently asserted, quite correctly, that 
Wittgenstein did not want to propose philosophical theories.
57
 On the other, his work 
is sometimes treated as though there really are theses to be drawn out but 
Wittgenstein just objected to stating them explicitly. Consequently, Mounce takes 
Wittgenstein in On Certainty to be advocating a form of classical realism, whilst 
Brenner proposes an interpretation along the lines of a Kantian transcendental 
idealism.
58
 David Bloor identifies something like a theory advocating social 
conservatism.
59
 James C. Edwards sees scope for bolstering a reformed version of 
religious ethical dogmatism.
60
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Some of these readings, of which the above are merely a few examples, have more to 
commend them that others. That is somewhat beside the point. The real issue is that 
there is simply not the material in On Certainty to decide all that much conclusively. 
We can only imagine the response one might receive if one had the opportunity to ask 
Wittgenstein if he really was a realist, a transcendental idealist, a social conservative, 
or a religious-ethical dogmatist. We must assume that Wittgenstein took his own 
thoughts and warnings about theorising in Philosophical Investigations seriously. We 
have no reason to think otherwise. On Certainty might therefore best be seen as 
alerting us to the ‘danger points’ (CV, p. 25) and ‘assembling reminders’ (PI §127) 
when it comes to the way we think about certainty and knowledge, rather than the 
muddled presentation of a straightforward epistemological – or indeed any other – 
position.  
 
The opening of On Certainty addresses just such a danger point, in response to G.E. 
Moore. Moore’s two papers, In Defence of Common Sense, written in 1925, and Proof 
of an External World, written 1939, are identified by the editors of On Certainty as 
the subject matter of On Certainty §1.
61
 Although the papers are separate, their 
concerns are related. In In Defence of Common Sense, Moore lists a set of 
commonsensical propositions – so obvious that he calls them truisms – which he 
claims that he, and many others, knows. In the Proof of an External World, Moore 
seeks to rebut the sceptic about the external world by claiming that he knows that he 
has a hand (and another hand), and he is surer of these claims than any proposition the 
external-world sceptic could put forward.  
 
Wittgenstein thinks that, in the sense used by Moore, in neither case are these claims 
of knowledge; they are instances of certainty. Certainties are differentiated from 
knowledge on the basis of the role they play in our lives. In order to see this, we do 
not need complex philosophical theories. We need only look at the way these 
supposed instances of knowledge are used.
62
 Although we might, as Moore did, say of 
ourselves that we know such things, taking such a claim at face value would be to be 
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deceived by the surface grammar.
63
 Wittgenstein does not doubt Moore’s truisms, 
only Moore’s claim that he knows them. On Certainty then develops our 
understanding of what these truisms amount to. Although certainties resemble them, 
unlike ordinary empirical propositions, which we could claim to know, certainties are 
not ‘subject to testing’ but rather make up the ‘substratum of all my enquiring and 
asserting’ (OC §162).  
 
The network of certainties makes up a world-picture.
64
 One’s world-picture is not 
itself a hypothesis, ‘because it is the matter-of-course foundation for [any] research’ 
(OC §167). The question ‘Is [our world-picture] true or false’ (OC §162) is a 
meaningless one. Each certainty acts like a ‘hinge’ (OC §§341, 343, 665). If we want 
to investigate anything, it must stay put, immune from doubt or testing: ‘If I want the 
door to turn, the hinges must stay put’ (OC §343). Whereas Moore uses the truisms to 
reject the external-world sceptic in an apparently straightforward way, Wittgenstein’s 
interpretation of the truisms leads him to a different position: that we cannot seriously 
entertain the concerns of the sceptic. The existence of the external world is a certainty 
for almost any empirical enquiry in which we might wish to engage. If we doubt the 
existence of the external world, then here a ‘doubt would seem to drag everything 
with it and plunge it into chaos’ (OC §613). 
 
These are some of the uncontroversial aspects of On Certainty, agreed upon by almost 
all scholars. Later, we will address further issues regarding the world-picture, 
including what happens when two different world-pictures come into contact or 
conflict, how communication is affected in such cases, and whether we can learn 
anything about how to tackle the sceptic about meaning in light of Wittgenstein’s 
examination of Moore’s response to the external-world sceptic. This chapter will go 
so far only as to explain the background to On Certainty in the form of Moore’s two 
papers and then seek a clear understanding of the basic elements of certainties and the 
world-picture. First, we turn to a brief exposition of Moore’s papers, in order to 
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understand the background of scepticism and what it is that Wittgenstein is initially 
responding to in On Certainty. 
 63 
2.2 Moore 
 
2.2.1 A Defence of Common Sense 
 
Somerville points out that in A Defence of Common Sense “Moore nowhere defines 
the term ‘common sense,’ nor expressly says what a common-sense belief is, though 
he gives examples of them.”65 This is quite correct. However we can nonetheless 
draw out some key features by examining the examples and then comparing them 
with the approach taken in Proof of an External World. 
 
Moore’s conception of a common-sense view is built around two things. First, that 
there are things that we know and some of these comprise our common-sense view. 
Second, Moore’s account is propositional. This means that these things that we know 
are expressed in propositions, which, we might ordinarily presume, are open to the 
ascription of truth functions like any other empirical proposition.  
 
Moore begins A Defence of Common Sense by listing a set of propositions. Moore 
lists these, and makes three assertions about them: he knows these propositions to be 
true; many – Moore shies away from saying all – other people know them to be true; 
he knows that other people know them to be true, and other people know the same of 
him. Moore then concedes that some philosophers, namely sceptics, have doubted 
these truisms, or at least our ability to know them. It is this sort of peculiar, 
philosophical scepticism that he sets at odds with what we would ordinarily claim we 
know for sure. 
 
This initial set of propositions will later be referred to as the Moorean propositions, 
and some selections are worth quoting here as Wittgenstein makes occasional oblique 
references to them in On Certainty: 
 
There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This 
body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed 
continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; it 
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was, for instance, much smaller when it was born, and for some time 
afterwards, than it is now. Ever since it was born, it has been either in 
contact with or not far from the surface of the earth
66
; and, at every 
moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, 
having shape and size in three dimensions . . . from which it has been 
at various distances . . . 
 
. . . [T]here have, at every moment . . . been large numbers of other 
living human bodies, each of which has . . . (a) at some time been 
born, (b) continued to exist from some time after birth, (c) been, at 
every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not far 
from the surface of the earth; and many of these bodies have already 
died and ceased to exist. But the earth had existed also for many years 
before my body was born . . .
67
 
 
There is significant scope to these propositions. Although in expressing the 
propositions Moore relates them all to his own body, they also cover other humans, 
objects of all sorts existing in three dimensions, and the age of the Earth. These are all 
things Moore claims to know and so they are all formulated as empirical propositions. 
That is to say, as Moyal-Sharrock puts it, they refer to ‘physical objects, events, 
interactions.’68  
 
Two more features of the Moorean propositions ought to be noted here, before 
moving on to Proof of the External World. The propositions are non-technical. 
Whereas it takes significant expertise to calculate the precise age of the Earth or the 
number of other humans on the planet, Moore’s propositions are, he claims, knowable 
– and indeed known – by him and many others. They are also context-independent. 
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Anyone could say, in the exact same phrasing, identical propositions to the ones 
Moore enunciates, and they would remain meaningful and obviously true.  
 
 
2.2.2 Proof of an External World 
 
In Proof of an External World, Moore was addressing the concern as to whether it is 
possible for humans to be certain about any sort of contingent proposition. Even at the 
time, this was not a new concern. Descartes sought to respond to the challenge of 
scepticism with the cogito.
69
 The tradition goes back far further still. Although there is 
some debate as to whether Pyrrho himself was a sceptic, that which derived from his 
thought, Pyrrhonism, certainly advocated a sceptical approach, and therefore we can 
trace this line of thought back to the third century B.C. 
 
Scepticism is not usually seen as a claim, or set of claims. Scepticism is usually used 
as an attack on a theory, presenting the challenge of proving that one can be certain of 
the more basic premises on which the theory’s conclusions rest. Scepticism can be 
applied to almost any area of philosophy, from the specific to the general. We have 
already seen the difficulty of rejecting the former of these sorts of attacks in §1.5 with 
the brief exploration of Kripke’s sceptical challenge for meaning. One might also be a 
sceptic about the existence of other minds, abstract objects, or any number of other 
things the existence of which philosophers may doubt. Kripke’s argument, however, 
is a very particular and specialised instance of scepticism.  
 
Proof of an External World, in contrast, seeks to show simply that knowledge of 
physical things beyond our own minds is possible. In this paper, Moore is ostensibly 
situating himself as opposed to the idealist. We might term idealism as disbelief in 
external, physical objects, and scepticism, in this case, as doubt about their existence. 
The idealist puts forward the thesis that there is no external world; the sceptic doubts 
the existence of the external world. It causes us no problems to couch Moore’s paper 
as responding to a sceptical challenge, even if Moore has not explicitly set himself 
against one. Provided we do not seek to rebut the sceptic by proving the lack of 
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existence of the external world – which, whilst an unlikely tactic, would technically 
uphold the idealist’s position – but rather by proving that it does exist and we can 
have knowledge of it, then by refuting idealism the corresponding sceptical position 
will also become untenable. Wittgenstein himself seems to conflate the two in On 
Certainty, so for our purposes we need not be too concerned with the distinction.
70
 
 
Moore’s argument is traditionally described as follows, consisting of two premises 
and a conclusion: 
 
1. Here is one hand (said whilst raising a hand) 
2. Here is another hand (said whilst raising the other hand) 
3. Therefore two human hands exist. 
 
Moore’s strategy with this argument is to supply two premises of which he, and 
everyone else, is surer than anything the sceptic could propose in response. The 
sceptic does not have an argument of his own as such; he merely doubts the premises. 
As Marie McGinn explains: 
 
Moore’s Proof should be seen as an argument from the inability of 
scepticism to bring conviction that our ordinary judgements and 
knowledge claims are false or unwarranted, to its complete intellectual 
bankruptcy.
71
 
 
Despite the name of the paper, however, this is not a proof in the ordinary sense. 
Whilst Moore may hope to prove the existence of the external world, he cannot call 
this a proof because the premises themselves cannot be proved. Moore points out that 
if someone were to request a proof ‘Here’s one hand and here’s another’, what they 
are requesting ‘is not merely a proof of these two propositions, but something like a 
general statement as to how any propositions of this sort may be proved.’72 Yet this 
need not, Moore insists, damage the validity of the conclusion, for ‘I can know things, 
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which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as I 
think) I could not prove them, were the premises of my two proofs.’73 
 
At first glance, Moore has not refuted the idealist here. The idealist may well grant 
Moore his argument, but deny that two human hands exist independently of any 
minds. The idealist would argue that the presence of these two hands is merely an 
idea, and that ideas are mind-dependent. However, hidden behind these three 
sentences are some further steps. As Moyal-Sharrock notes, ‘this endeavour began 
with an act, the act of showing his hand, and this purported to be a display of 
knowledge.’74 The action locates the object of Moore’s statement at a particular point 
in time. Stroll therefore suggests that 3, the conclusion, ought to be amplified to read: 
 
4. Therefore two human hands exist at this moment.75 
 
This, however, is still not enough to refute the idealist. The idealist may well accept 
this proposition, but still claim that the hands exist only in the mind. Moore has not 
yet shown the mind-independence of the existence of the two human hands existing at 
this particular moment. At the beginning of the paper, Moore made it clear that, 
following from Kant, he was concerned with proving ‘the existence of things outside 
of us.’76 Moore also takes great care to point out that he interprets Kant’s ‘the 
existence of things outside of us’ to mean ‘things external to our minds.’77 He further 
defines these as things that are ‘to be met with in space.’78 Moore is careful to exclude 
things like after-images and pains. There are, therefore, two further points, tacitly 
implied in Moore’s proof, but not explicitly stated: 
 
5. The existence of any human hand does not depend upon our 
being in a certain psychological state. 
 
6. Anything whose existence does not depend upon our being in 
a certain psychological state exists outside of our minds, i.e. 
mind-independently. 
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A stronger conclusion – better adapted to refuting the idealist – can now be deduced 
from the preceding three extra premises: 
 
7. Two human hands now exist mind-independently.79 
 
This we will call Moore’s proof, even though it is not strictly what Moore himself set 
out. Concurring with Stroll, this is clearly what Moore intended; all that has been 
done here is to draw out the steps that were left tacit. The new formulation is 
somewhat less elegant than the original three-step proof, but the extra steps render it a 
far stronger argument in refuting idealism or scepticism. 
 
There still remains the problem of the initial premises. The problem is not really that 
Moore has not proved the premises. If we had rigorously to prove every premise we 
ever used in a proof, we would have an almost infinite regression, being forced to 
prove each subsequent set of premises further and further back. The proof, such as it 
is, still bears all the hallmarks of a rigorous proof: the premises are different from the 
conclusion; the premises are known to be true; the conclusion follows from the 
premises (given the expanded set of premises, 4, 5, and 6). The difficulty lies in that 
even if we did have to face this kind of regressive series of proofs for every premise 
we ever constructed, we can at least, in most cases, imagine how this might be 
achieved, even if we have no inclination to do so. But the case here is different. 
Moore simply cannot – rather than has not bothered to – say how he knows them to be 
true, but know them to be true he does and so, the implication is, does nearly 
everyone else.  
 
A Defence of Common Sense focuses on the breadth of the truisms, in terms of the 
sheer variety of seemingly empirical concerns the propositions address. A different 
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point is at issue when looking at Proof of an External World. It has been noted that 
Moore cannot prove his premises. Yet, consider Moore’s initial two claims, about 
having two hands, in the absence of any complex philosophy or theorising. We 
would, ordinarily, consider such truisms so deeply embedded in our lives that we can 
accept Moore’s premises without ever considering it a requirement that they be 
proved. The premises lie, so to speak, at a certain depth in our lives. These themes of 
breadth and depth will be returned to in Chapter 3. First we are in need of a basic 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s response in On Certainty to Moore’s two papers, and 
of the features of Moore’s thought Wittgenstein found so intriguing yet fatally flawed.  
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2.3 The distinction between certainty and knowledge 
 
 
In the first remark of On Certainty, Wittgenstein states: ‘If you do know that here is 
one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest’ (OC §1). Despite first appearances, it becomes 
clear that this is a somewhat sardonic comment, although it is some time before he 
feels he can state explicitly that ‘Knowledge and certainty belong to different 
categories’ (OC §308). Ultimately, Wittgenstein denies that Moore knows that he has 
a hand.  
 
This denial may seem peculiar, but what he is really saying is that Moore is certain 
that he has a hand, but doesn’t know it, because knowledge and certainty are very 
different things. The latter, in this context, is not merely an added emphasis upon the 
former.
80
 Instead of claiming knowledge about such things, he insists the question we 
must ask is ‘whether it can make sense to doubt it’ (OC §2). He soon returns to this 
topic, expanding upon it. ‘Now do I, in the course of my life,’ he says, ‘make sure that 
I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is?’ (OC §9). We do not. It is 
something that we take for granted. Taking this point further will enable us to see the 
relationship between knowledge and doubt. 
 
 
2.3.1 Doubt and mistake 
 
There are parallels with this line of thought in Philosophical Investigations. There, 
Wittgenstein notes that:  
 
The use of the word “rule” and the use of the word “same” are 
interwoven. (As are the use of proposition and the use of “true”.) (PI 
§225) 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the concept of a rule has no meaning without a repeated 
custom, the same practice carried out again and again. There is a similar relationship 
                                                 
80
 Again, cf. OC §8. 
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between the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘doubt’. If someone doubts a proposition, p, they 
could be said not to know p. Similarly, if someone simply has no opinion or knows 
nothing about p, they could be said not to know p. In either case, empirical evidence 
and arguments could be marshalled on behalf of either side, in favour of p and against 
p. As such, it makes sense to say of someone that they doubt p. When it comes to a 
Moorean proposition, though, ‘[g]rounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in 
its favour, nothing against it’ (OC §4). 
 
Wittgenstein acknowledges that the sorts of propositions Moore expounds as truisms, 
the Moorean propositions part of a common-sense view, hold a specialised status in 
our lives (OC §137). But he does not concede that we know them. These, says 
Wittgenstein, are not candidates for knowledge because it is impossible to doubt 
them. Were someone to doubt that she herself had a body, or that there currently exist 
many other humans, or that the Earth had existed for many years before she was born, 
we would tell her she was not making sense. She must be deluded, drugged, or 
perhaps joking. What evidence for her doubts could she provide? It would seem none 
– at least, none that we could take seriously – and so grounds for doubt are lacking.  
 
To make sense of knowledge, then, it must have a criterion for correctness.
81
 It must 
be possible for one to be wrong about an empirical proposition. This thought, too, 
finds its root in Philosophical Investigations. In this passage, Wittgenstein raises 
concerns about the use of ‘to know’ similar to those explored in On Certainty: 
 
If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how 
else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am 
in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the same certainty with which 
I know it myself!—It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a 
joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except 
perhaps that I am in pain? 
. . . 
                                                 
81
 See PI §§258-261 for Wittgenstein’s exploration of the example of someone 
writing the word ‘S’ in a diary each time he feels a particular sensation. 
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The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt 
whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. (PI §246)
82
 
 
Mistake or doubt can occur with regards to someone else’s pain. Perhaps in a sports 
match I am not sure whether they are faking an injury. I could then, too, decide they 
are indeed faking, only to be wrong about it. But to say of myself that I know I am in 
pain or that I doubt I am in pain suggests that I could be mistaken if wrong or 
persuaded if in doubt. That, says Wittgenstein, does not make sense, and so knowledge 
has no application in this language-game. Saying ‘I know that I am in pain’ is no more 
than a grammatical deceit; all we are really trying to say is, ‘I am in pain’.  
 
It is interesting to note that in the passage above Wittgenstein refers to his own 
ascriptions of pain to himself as a form of certainty. Taken in conjunction with 
Wittgenstein’s remark in On Certainty – ‘For to say one knows one has a pain means 
nothing’ (OC §504) – not only is the distinction between knowledge and certainty 
reinforced, but clear links can be made with his earlier thought from Philosophical 
Investigations. The distinction is made on the same grounds: doubt and mistake are 
logically meaningless in these cases. The Moorean propositions are instances of 
certainty, not of knowledge. 
 
 
2.3.2 Certainty – a continuing theme in Wittgenstein’s later thought 
 
There are several references in Philosophical Investigations to certainty or being 
certain of something. In every instance, certainty is used to mean something like 
‘cannot be wrong’. Just as Wittgenstein’s use of certainty in On Certainty differs from 
the everyday use of the term – where it might mean being just particularly sure of 
something – his use of certainty in Philosophical Investigations functions in a similar 
way. Taking PI §324 as a further example to the discussion of PI §246 above, 
Wittgenstein compares the certainty that he can continue a basic numerical series with 
his certainty that if he were to drop the book he is holding it would fall. Wittgenstein: 
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 Cf. PI §288. 
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would be no less astonished if [he] suddenly and for no obvious 
reason got stuck in working out the series, than [he] should be if the 
book remained hanging in the air instead of falling (PI §324). 
 
The idea here is one that pre-figures frequent comparisons in On Certainty between 
our certainty of mathematical propositions and the sorts of empirical propositions that 
have become part of our frame of reference. To begin the process of drawing out such 
comparisons, consider first: 
 
When someone is trying to teach us mathematics, he will not begin by 
assuring us that he knows that a+b=b+a (OC §113). 
 
The implication here is that basic mathematical propositions like these are not objects 
of knowledge, but rather of certainty. From the certainty Wittgenstein associates with 
mathematical propositions, he suggests that non-mathematical examples might play a 
similar role in our lives: 
 
I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12=144. And now one cannot 
contrast mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of 
empirical propositions. For the mathematical proposition has been 
obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the 
actions of the rest of our lives (OC §651).
83
 
 
If the proposition 12x12=144 is exempt from doubt, then so too 
must non-mathematical propositions be. (OC §653) 
 
This idea of non-mathematical certainties also finds expression in Philosophical 
Investigations: 
 
I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire: that is certainty. 
That is to say: here we see the meaning of certainty. (What it amounts 
to, not just the meaning of the word “certainty.”)  
                                                 
83
 Cf. PI, p. 192. 
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(PI §474) 
 
Both what this particular certainty amounts to and the manner in which it is 
demonstrated is, fundamentally, action-based. I will flinch and keep my hand away if 
the source of fire is brought near. When cooking over, or trying to light something 
with, the fire, I will ensure my hand stands no danger of being burnt by it. If someone 
were to be burnt by it, we would have to distinguish a mistake from an aberration. A 
mistake would be if I became distracted or physically slipped and burnt myself. But it 
would be an aberration – we would think someone deluded – if she were to plunge her 
hand in the fire intentionally and expect not to get burnt. Certainties are enacted; they 
are not a particular mental state indicating just a contingent lack of doubt, but rather 
the logical impossibility of doubt. Even ‘“[m]athematical certainty” is not a 
psychological concept’ (PI, p. 191). 
 
Just as the certainty that if I put my hand in the fire I shall get burnt is constituted and 
demonstrated by my actions, so too are mathematical certainties.
84
 As discussed in 
Chapter 1, I demonstrate my mathematical ability by actively continuing the series, be 
it verbally, writing on paper, or arranging some magnetic numbers on a board. Once 
we have mastered these mathematical techniques, we remove them from a heuristic 
context and take them out into the world. We calculate how to split a restaurant bill, 
whether we have enough tennis balls for all the courts being used for a tournament, or 
how many rolls of wallpaper will be needed to cover a room. 
 
I demonstrate my certainty that the fire can burn me by avoiding getting too close to 
the fire. I demonstrate my certainty of gravity – that is, that the book will fall if 
dropped – by asking someone to carry a book for me if my hands are full, or to open 
the door for me, because if I release the books I know they will drop. Pointing to an 
internal sensation is futile in demonstrating a certainty: 
 
Ask, not: “What goes on in us when we are certain that . . . . ?”— 
but: How is ‘the certainty that this is the case’ manifested in human 
action? (PI, p. 191) 
                                                 
84
 See PI §§138-242. 
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Wittgenstein’s relatively tentative forays into certainties in Philosophical 
Investigations do not receive a full development until On Certainty. Nonetheless his 
conception of the role certainties play in our lives in Philosophical Investigations is at 
least the germination of the ideas developed in On Certainty. Certainty is not an 
internal psychological concept or state. Certainty is demonstrated and constituted by 
human actions. Doubt and mistake are not applicable to certainties; we would 
consider an error an aberration stemming from a delusion or mental illness. All of 
these strands of thought are present in both Philosophical Investigations and On 
Certainty.  
 
 
2.3.3 Stroll on negational absurdity 
 
Non-mathematical certainties are a part of our lives and Wittgenstein wants to 
identify the Moorean propositions as certainties like these. Doubt and mistake have no 
role in these certainties, and therefore claims to know them are nonsensical. One 
cannot be mistaken about having a body or the Earth existing for a long time before 
one’s birth any more than one can be mistaken about the sum ‘12x12=144’. The 
consequences of doubting any of these things would be bizarre. Avrum Stroll 
introduces the concept of negational absurdity when he argues that ‘the denial of any 
primordial p has the property of being negationally absurd.’85 
 
That is to say that the denial of any proposition that makes up part of the common-
sense view – for example, ‘I am a human being’ – is not simply a mistake that can be 
accommodated. Rather, it is an aberration. Wittgenstein addresses this point directly 
in relation to Moore’s truisms:  
 
If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which 
he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we 
should regard him as demented (OC §155). 
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 Stroll (1994), p. 45. Stroll uses the term ‘primordial’ to refer to the Moorean 
propositions.  
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Or, as Rhees puts it, if things like the Moorean propositions: 
 
are called into question we wouldn’t know what to say; we wouldn’t 
be able to carry on language at all.
86
 
 
Moore and Wittgenstein agree to the extent that anyone denying something along the 
lines of a Moorean proposition cannot be taken seriously; their claims would be 
absurd. They disagree in that whereas Moore is content to state them, and claim he 
knows them, Wittgenstein does not think it makes sense even to affirm them, except 
in very specialised contexts. OC §468 illustrates this point: 
 
Someone says irrelevantly “That’s a tree”. He might say this sentence 
because he remembers having heard it in a similar situation; or he was 
suddenly struck by the tree’s beauty and the sentence was an 
exclamation; or he was pronouncing the sentence to himself as a 
grammatical example; etc., etc. And now I ask him “How did you 
mean that?” and he replies “It was a piece of information directed at 
you.” Shouldn’t I be at liberty to assume that he doesn’t know what he 
is saying, if he is insane enough to want to give me this information? 
(OC §468) 
 
Of course, one could imagine a situation in which it makes perfect sense to state 
‘That’s a tree’. Perhaps someone else is in doubt as to whether the shape on the 
horizon is a person or not, or a novice botanist asks an experienced colleague whether 
what she sees before her is a tree or a shrub, and the colleague provides the answer. 
Wittgenstein makes a point like this early in On Certainty: 
 
“A” is a physical object” is a piece of instruction which we give only 
to someone who doesn’t yet understand either what “A” means, or 
what “physical object” means. Thus it is instruction about the use of 
words, and “physical object” is a logical concept. (Like colour, 
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 Rhees (2003), p. 70. 
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quantity, . . .) And that is why no such proposition as “There are 
physical objects” can be formulated.  
Yet we encounter such unsuccessful shots at every turn (OC 
§36) 
 
Apropos of nothing, though, such affirmative statements are just as absurd as their 
respective negations. Moore’s claims that he is a human and the Earth is very old do 
not count as one of these specialised circumstances; presumably Moore does not feel 
the need to explain to us what the terms ‘human’ or ‘Earth’ mean. Wittgenstein is 
characteristically scathing about the sorts of claims philosophy attempts: 
 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again, 
“I know that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone 
else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane. 
We are only doing philosophy” (OC §467). 
 
Consider replacing the garden with a lecture hall, and the claim about the tree with the 
claim that ‘The Earth is very old’ or ‘There exists at present a living human body, 
which is my body’. We would be within our rights to ‘regard him as demented’ (OC 
§155). If philosophy of this sort is supposed to legitimise such utterances, then 
perhaps such practices are insane, too. 
 
The distinction between knowledge and certainty, therefore, points to certainties as 
having a different role in our lives from ordinary empirical propositions. It does not 
make sense either to affirm or to deny them. That role is something like standing fast 
for us, immune from doubt or even expression: 
 
Instead of “I know…”, couldn’t Moore have said: “It stands fast for 
me that…”? And further: “It stands fast for me and many others…” 
(OC §116) 
 
Thus, certainties cannot be expressed – or denied – in propositions, at least in most 
circumstances. Where a sentence that, on the surface, seems to be a certainty is 
expressed, it only resembles a certainty in a superficial way. It is not being used as 
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one. A wounded soldier might say ‘Here is a hand’, to indicate that he has only one, 
the other having been destroyed on the battlefield. Although this sentence is, in form, 
identical to Moore’s original premise, it is used in response to a specific question, 
perhaps at the triage station. Moore’s, by contrast, was ‘a piece of superfluous 
information’ (OC §460), and therefore seemed ‘odd’ (OC §389) or a ‘joke’ (OC 
§463). As the next section will explain, certainties seem so peculiar when expressed 
because they are misguided attempts to verbalise ungrounded ways of acting.  
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2.4 An ungrounded way of acting and the end of justification 
 
Over the course of several passages spread throughout On Certainty, Wittgenstein 
considers what it is that makes propositions of the sort attempted by Moore sound so 
peculiar. In §7, Wittgenstein asserts that:  
 
My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over 
there, or a door, and so on.—I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over 
there”, “Shut the door”, etc. etc (OC §7).87 
 
These are very localised examples, about everyday objects. Moore’s claims, 
particularly in A Defence of Common Sense, were far broader. Similarly, though, my 
life shows that I am certain of the existence of my body, of the bodies of other 
humans, and that the Earth is very old. I move in a way that demonstrates my lack of 
doubt that I have hands and legs. I move out of the way of passers-by. Perhaps I read 
history books and debate with a friend –another human with a body of her own that 
has also never been far from the surface of the Earth – whether Shakespeare’s 
portrayal of Richard III was a fair one. My friend and I do not, as a preliminary to our 
discussion, feel the need to ascertain whether the Earth really is old enough to 
accommodate a writer from four hundred years ago and a monarch from five hundred 
and fifty years ago.  
 
We act in a way that demonstrates our certainty that we have hands and that the Earth 
is very old ‘without learning any explicit rules’ (OC §95). If asked to justify such 
certainty, we would be at a loss. Unlike an ordinary empirical proposition, for which 
we ask for and are supplied with evidence, we learn such matters indirectly: 
 
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can 
discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. 
                                                 
87
 The equivocation between ‘know’ and ‘am certain’ in this passage can be put down 
to this remark being from the earliest stages of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the topic. 
Within a few more remarks his phrasing settles down and he becomes more 
comfortable with the distinction between knowledge and certainty he spends much of 
the rest of the book investigating. 
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This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the 
movement around it determines its immobility (OC §152). 
 
In practice, this results in the fact that: 
 
Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc., etc.—
they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc., etc. (OC §476) 
 
In §1.3, we looked at how Wittgenstein wanted to describe linguistic use as a practice. 
This point was revealed in the discussion of how one demonstrates competence in a 
practice: mastery of a technique. The pupil showed that he had understood how to 
continue the series by actually continuing the series, performing particular actions. It 
is notable that Wittgenstein was so intrigued by Moore’s response to the sceptic, 
which, as it was formulated earlier, contained an action as part of the premises. Recall 
the original formulation of Moore’s proof: 
 
1. Here is one hand (said whilst raising a hand) 
2. Here is another hand (said whilst raising the other hand) 
3. Therefore two human hands exist. 
 
Moore points to his action – that of raising his hand – as part of the persuasive power 
of his premises. Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, does something similar 
with regards to rule-following. In response to a request for justification as to why one 
follows a rule as one does, Wittgenstein points to an action, and there lets justification 
stop: 
 
“How am I able to obey a rule?”—if this is not a question about 
causes, then it is about the justification for my following a rule the 
way I do. 
 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, 
and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply 
what I do.” (PI §217) 
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In the course of teaching the pupil, the rules themselves are not up for investigation or 
debate. One can doubt that the teacher has got the rule right – perhaps he has come 
into class drunk or short on sleep – but not that the rule itself is right. Presuming he is 
of sound mind, if asked to justify his following and teaching the steps of the rule as he 
does, he would say ‘This is simply what I (or the community of competent 
mathematicians) do.’ 
 
We find this gesturing to an ungrounded way of acting in On Certainty, too. For when 
Wittgenstein asks: ‘Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure that I know that 
here is a hand—my own hand, that is?’ (OC §9), the answer is clearly that no, we do 
not. One would not, in the course of a complex mathematical computation, make sure 
that one knows the sum ‘12x12’ really equates to ‘144’. In §1.3, parallels were drawn 
between mathematical examples of following a rule and linguistic ones. In relation to 
On Certainty, mathematical examples are again useful as a way of illustrating the type 
of certainty we have about non-mathematical things. Wittgenstein, at several points, 
explicitly equates the two: 
 
We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any 
mathematical proposition, how the letters A and B are pronounced, 
what the colour of human blood is called, that other human beings 
have blood and call it “blood” (OC §340). 
 
Consider again OC §651, this time with the final clause included: 
 
I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one 
cannot contrast mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of 
empirical propositions. For the mathematical proposition has been 
obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the 
actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to 
forgetfulness, oversight, and illusion (OC §651). 
 
Mistake – forgetfulness, oversight, and illusion – is always possible. I might go wrong 
in my computation, or forget, for a moment, how the letters A and B are pronounced. 
Genuine doubt, though, sincere and lasting, is impossible for both these mathematical 
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examples and as to whether I have a hand, which is my own hand. These things 
cannot be doubted because doubt demands evidence, justification for why one 
believed it in the first place. But for these examples, these objects of certainty, 
justification has no role to play because we did not learn them like ordinary 
propositions. It is not the case that a demand for justification is never appropriate: ‘To 
be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end’ (OC §192).  
 
When an investigation reaches the level of certainties, we have hit bedrock, and are 
inclined to say: “This is simply what I do” (PI §217), for ‘somewhere we must be 
finished with justification’ (OC §212). The end to the search for justification, though, 
is not like giving up, or taking something on trust, or settling for an assumption: 
 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—
but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, 
i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at 
the bottom of the language-game (OC §204). 
 
Justifying and providing evidence comes to an end when we point to an action – or 
network of actions – and say ‘This is simply what I do’. These are features of our 
lives that are so obvious as to sound odd when expressed in the form of a proposition. 
In the case of Moore’s proof, no one seriously doubts whether or not they have two 
hands; everything they do in life belies their certainty about this. To hear it expressed 
as a proposition, though, strikes us as strange.  
 
Although we can, clumsily, attempt to formulate a proposition to describe these ways 
of acting, the peculiar feature of them is that, whilst their expression looks like an 
empirical proposition, it functions in a way more like a rule. Moyal-Sharrock neatly 
summarises this point when she says: 
 
Whereas Moore in his ‘Proof’ treated then as empirical propositions 
and attempted to prove their indubitability, Wittgenstein views them 
as logical, and presupposes their indubitability. For Wittgenstein, 
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then, these are indubitable not as in: proved beyond the shadow of 
doubt, but as in: not subject to doubt at all.
88
 
 
These ways of acting, not subject to doubt, ‘stand fast’ (OC §234) for us. Although on 
the surface it may seem it, ‘not everything that has the form of an empirical 
proposition is one’ (OC §308). Some so-called propositions have ‘a peculiar logical 
role in the system of our empirical propositions’ (OC §136). As we will see in §2.5, 
this peculiar role is to ordinary life what grammatical rules are to language; they 
provide a structure and a framework of indubitability, without which none of our 
other actions could make sense. A certainty, therefore, has ‘the character of a rule’ 
(OC §494)
89
, and so is not subject to empirical justification. Wittgenstein locates the 
end of justification as lying with an ungrounded way of acting.
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 86. 
89
 Again, cf. PI §217. 
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2.5  Hinges  
 
The types of so-called propositions we hold to be certain have been described as 
being learned indirectly. Hence why their expression in the form of a proposition 
sounds strange. There is no role for such utterances in our language-games because 
they function more like logical rules, and ‘everything descriptive of a language-game 
is part of logic’ (OC §56). For a competent mathematician to assert, for no particular 
reason, that ‘12x12=144’ – even though he regularly performs computations that 
make it clear he has never held this in doubt – would be strange in the same way it 
would be for a human being of sound mind, like Moore, to assert that the Earth is very 
old.   
 
Wittgenstein deploys a metaphor to make sense of these ways of acting that function 
as part of logic. The metaphor is an important one, because the phrasing has lead in 
the literature to a common way of describing these pseudo-propositions – or, rather, 
the ways of acting Moore attempts to express in pseudo-propositions – as ‘hinges’.  
 
(T)he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact 
that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were 
like hinges on which those turn (OC §341). 
 
The terms ‘hinges’ and ‘certainties’ are henceforth used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. Hinges provide a network of actions immune from doubt so that other 
investigations can proceed without having to justify every premise in an infinite 
regress of the sort described in §2.2. Taken in this way, we would be wrong to 
consider them ordinary, empirical propositions. The point, though, is descriptive, not 
prescriptive, for: 
 
it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain 
things are in deed not doubted (OC §342).
90
 
 
                                                 
90
 As we will see in the Chapter 4, it will be fruitful to compare the hinges specifically 
relating to scientific practices with the ‘established bases’ that make up a scientific 
paradigm for Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.                                                             
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It may seem a prosaic point, but it is of great importance that the two words in italic 
are split, not the single word ‘indeed’.91 It is a fact of scientific investigation that 
some things are not doubted in deed.
92
 If scientific investigations suffered from the 
same demand for justification the sceptic places on Moore, progress would stall. It is 
essential to an investigation into, say, the heat-conducting properties of a new man-
made material that we do not call into question, without good cause, the accuracy of 
our apparatus, or the basic laws of thermodynamics. For:  
 
we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced 
to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges 
must stay put (OC §343). 
 
Although ‘Annahme’ is correctly translated as ‘assumption’, it is not a cognitive 
assumption, in the sense that we are conscious of a difficulty and content to ignore it. 
That would be to render these hinges as propositions; something which, as we have 
seen, Wittgenstein takes issue with. These are ways of acting, and rather than my 
cognitive capabilities being satisfied with an assumption, ‘My life consists in my 
being content to accept many things’ (OC §344). 
 
So, for the scientist working on heat-conducting properties, some hinges must stay put 
if he wants to proceed with the rest of his investigation. In the broader context of 
human life – hinges like the age of the Earth, that I have two hands and a human 
body, that there exist objects in the external world – these must also stay put if I want 
to do anything from pick up a book to discuss the fairness of Shakespeare’s portrayal 
of Richard III. Wittgenstein provides further inventive illustrations, all emphasising 
that hinges are ways of acting. Sometimes they are to do with the mastery of a 
specific technique, like playing chess: 
 
                                                 
91
 The translation of the German, in der Tat, might more idiomatically be translated as 
‘in fact’ or ‘actually’. However Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe are justified in 
their choice of translation by focusing on the fact that these are actions, i.e. deeds. 
Compare this, too, with PI §546: ‘Words are also deeds.’ 
92
 See also CV, p. 36: “Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning 
was the deed.’” 
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When I am trying to mate someone in chess, I cannot have doubts 
about the pieces perhaps changing places of themselves and my 
memory simultaneously playing tricks on me so that I don’t notice 
(OC §346). 
 
Or performing mathematical computations: 
 
The mathematical proposition [12x12=144] has, as it were officially, 
been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: “Dispute about other 
things; this is immovable—it is a hinge on which your dispute can 
turn” (OC §655). 
 
But also do with everyday practices: 
 
Imagine a language-game “When I call you, come in through the 
door”. In any ordinary case, a doubt whether there really is a door 
there will be impossible (OC §391). 
 
Hinges are neither true nor false. If they are part of the logic of our lives, like rules, 
ascriptions of truth-values are misplaced here. In other words, they are not empirical 
propositions. Wittgenstein, in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, considers 
mathematical rules in a similar way: 
 
Is 25
2 = 625 a fact of experience? You’d like to say: “No”.—Why 
isn’t it?—“Because, by the rules, it can’t be otherwise.”—And why 
so?—Because that is the meaning of the rules. Because that is the 
procedure on which we build all judging (RFM, VI-28, p. 330).  
 
Wittgenstein goes on to claim that ‘when we carry out a multiplication, we give a 
law’, and contrasts ‘the law [with] the empirical proposition that we give this law’, 
further stating that he knows how to enact the law ‘with certainty’ (RFM, VI-29, p. 
330). The law itself is a way of acting, and Wittgenstein distinguishes between the 
law and the expression of that law as a proposition. Whilst in mathematics the 
expression of such laws do not sound quite so strange as they might when we try to 
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express logical laws like ‘The Earth is very old’, the point remains the same: the laws 
themselves are deeds, because ‘following a rule is a human activity’ (RFM, VI-29, p. 
331).
93
 
 
The frequent use of mathematical examples is apt because we see here in Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics a further prefigurement of a crucial aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty. The rules of mathematics, Wittgenstein noted, 
provide ‘the procedure on which we build all judging’ (RFM, VI-28, p. 330). Several 
times, comparisons have been made between the role of rules in mathematics and 
those of the hinges in ordinary life, be it engaging scientific investigations, playing 
chess, or simply picking up a book.  
 
Hinges provide the procedure on which we build all judging in a more general way, 
not restricted solely to mathematics. Only by taking it as read, for example, that the 
Earth is very old can we discuss historical figures or events. We will return to this 
point in much more detail in the next section of this chapter, §2.6, when we examine 
the concept of the world-picture, made up of the network of hinges, culminating in a 
‘frame of reference’ (OC §83) within which all our practices function. First, a point of 
contention in recent scholarship needs to be examined: whether hinges should be 
regarded as propositional or non-propositional. 
 
 
2.5.1 A propositional or a non-propositional account of hinges? 
 
Hinges are habitual ways of acting that make empirical investigations possible, by 
themselves remaining immune from doubt. This was the basis on which certainty was 
distinguished from knowledge. Certainties cannot meaningfully be doubted, whereas 
propositions – objects of knowledge – can have evidence to support either side of the 
argument, there is no such function for certainties. Attempting to express hinges, 
either to cast doubt on them or simply to assert them apropos of nothing, results in 
nonsense. Stroll’s concept of negational absurdity illustrated this point succinctly. 
Any attempt to affirm or negate something that is properly an object of certainty, not 
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of knowledge, in the form of a proposition is liable to render the speaker insane or 
deluded in our eyes. 
 
There is a tension, though, in that Wittgenstein, following Moore, does give examples 
of certainties in propositional form. He addresses Moore’s claims to ‘know that here 
is one hand’ (OC §1) and finds fault with the knowledge claim, whilst simultaneously 
praising Moore for isolating some interesting features of our language. Likewise, I 
have made frequent use of purported certainties such as ‘The Earth is very old’, as 
does Wittgenstein (see, for example, OC §§85 and 89). It is not a reasonable defence, 
though, to state that it is all right really, because we are doing philosophy, and that it 
is only in ordinary language that we get ourselves in a muddle; all we are trying to do 
is clear up some of these confusions. Our use of them in philosophy presents the very 
‘propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched—these 
[Wittgenstein] should like to expunge from philosophical language’ (OC §30).94 
 
On the one hand, we can, and Wittgenstein does, express these in the form of 
empirical propositions. Not only that, but they seem to make sense in that they 
contain familiar words in a meaningful syntactical structure. That is to say, ‘There are 
countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us’ (OC §273). On 
the other hand, the starting point for On Certainty is precisely that they are not 
empirical propositions, at least not in the context originally intended by Moore. This 
alternative conception is perhaps best embodied by a remark we have already looked 
at: 
 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—
but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, 
i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at 
the bottom of the language-game (OC §204). 
 
There are two considerations to take into account that go some way to relieving this 
tension. The first is that On Certainty is an unfinished work. Where we see confusion 
in the text, this confusion is often a symptom of Wittgenstein’s own uncertainty as to 
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 Compare this, too, with another caustic remark, perhaps only partly in jest, at OC 
§467: ‘This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.’ 
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how to proceed. The apt metaphor or analogy is not just an illustrative device for 
Wittgenstein, but an integral part of the process. Seeing connections between 
metaphors and their targets is just as important as seeing them between uses of words 
in the context of language-games. It is therefore not surprising that the tension exists.  
 
This point, though, does not necessarily excuse the tension, or render it trivial; it 
merely explains its presence. Part of the problem is that in conveying his ideas by 
writing, various avenues of explanation are cut off from the author. Wittgenstein 
cannot, as we sometimes feel he might like to, point out with a physical gesture some 
aspects of life for a comparison, intending to convey what he means. As he notes in 
Philosophical Investigations, ‘Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about 
words’ (PI §120). 
 
There is no other way to indicate clearly what his target is when differentiating 
between objects of knowledge and those of certainty. To an extent, Wittgenstein’s 
style avoids transgressing his own boundaries as much as possible. He does not quote 
the Moorean propositions, but only alludes to them in OC §1. If we keep in mind, 
though, that at least at some points, in order to be clear, he has to express the 
propositions that he thinks should not be said – those that might lead an observer to 
think him ‘insane’ (OC §467) – then Wittgenstein’s uncertainty as to how to proceed 
can be cast in a different light.
95
 Not only is he unsure of the resolution to the 
questions he poses himself, he is also acutely aware that the rendering of the 
expression of the problem in a straightforward way presents symptoms of the problem 
itself. Hence why, in a bracketed subnote to §387, he comments: 
 
I believe it might interest a philosopher, one who can think for 
himself, to read my notes. For even if I have hit the mark only rarely, 
                                                 
95
 There are obvious comparisons to be made with this approach and the ladder 
metaphor of the Tractatus: ‘My propositions serve as elucidations in the following 
way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when 
he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw 
away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and 
then he will see the world aright’ (TLP 6.54). For a brief but nuanced discussion of 
the ladder metaphor solely in regard to the Tractatus, see Hacker (2001), pp. 327-331. 
For an extreme view from the New Wittgenstein school of thought, see Read (2007), 
where he presents an ineffabilistic reading of both the Tractatus and On Certainty. 
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he would recognise what targets I have been ceaselessly aiming at 
(OC §387). 
 
The target is unusually clear for Wittgenstein: certainties are ways of acting, 
expressible in propositional form if we wish, but bound, except in unusual 
circumstances, to sound peculiar. Avrum Stroll, however, has proposed a different 
interpretation, whereby On Certainty shifts as it progresses with regard to the 
propositionality of hinges: ‘The idea that some propositions are beyond doubt 
gradually gives way in On Certainty to a different, non-propositional account of 
certainty.’96 
 
Even the initial, propositional account, however, according to Stroll, is not 
propositional in the sense that Moore’s account is. The distinction between objects of 
knowledge and those of certainty remains. Stroll distinguishes the earlier from the 
later account on the basis that, earlier in the text, Wittgenstein is liable to speak of 
these special propositions as being immune from the need for justification (OC §192) 
and a peculiar type of empirical proposition (OC §§35 and 83). Later, more emphasis 
is placed on ‘acting, being trained in communal practices, instinct, and so on’.97 
 
Moyal-Sharrock holds Stroll’s account in high regard, but proposes two amendments. 
The first is that ‘there are moments . . . where Wittgenstein actually contemplates a 
genuine propositional account . . .  (e.g. OC §273)’, but the propositional and non-
propositional accounts are not separate and consecutive.
98
 The second is roughly 
equivalent to my own point, made above, that On Certainty is ‘indicative of an 
ongoing, nonlinear, and nonprogressive struggle’.99 She suggests, therefore, that we 
“not think of Wittgenstein’s ‘propositional’ and nonpropositional [sic] accounts as 
consecutive”, although she still identifies these two distinct strains within the texts.100 
 
Stroll’s account is not wholly without merit, but when we consider that the phrasing 
in which Wittgenstein’s work is presented was as much a source of agony for him as 
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the problems themselves, it seems more plausible that Wittgenstein did not so much 
develop a non-propositional position out of a propositional one as improve upon his 
presentation of the issue. The idea that Wittgenstein was initially toying with a 
propositional account when from the first remark it is clear that he does not think 
Moore’s expressions are suitable for knowledge claims is not a persuasive one.  
 
Moyal-Sharrock’s amendments do represent an improvement. However her claim that 
at some, sporadic moments Wittgenstein did consider a propositional account, just not 
followed by a non-propositional one, is hard to tally with the overall continuity of 
Wittgenstein’s account. Rather than thinking of Wittgenstein weighing up a 
propositional and a non-propositional account, it makes more sense to think of him as 
juggling propositional and non-propositional uses of the same idea. This way of 
looking at On Certainty maintains the undeniable tension within the expression of the 
idea, but is more sympathetic to Wittgenstein’s intentions.  
 
 
2.5.2 Propositional or non-propositional: collapsing the distinction 
 
One aspect that both Stroll and Moyal-Sharrock overlook is that whether one chooses 
a propositional or a non-propositional account, these look rather like theories. Not, 
admittedly, the overblown philosophical theories so often a target of Wittgenstein’s, 
but positions with theses to be backed up nonetheless. We ought to remind ourselves 
to take Wittgenstein’s warnings about such matters seriously. A more appropriate 
source for the tension might be that sometimes one can say things like ‘The Earth is 
very old’ as a perfectly reasonable empirical claim, whilst in other circumstances it 
functions as a certainty, an ungrounded way of acting.  
 
Wittgenstein’s primary target is the claims made by philosophers, in particular by 
Moore. When presented with the claim ‘I know that that’s a tree’, he initially cannot 
understand the sentence. He takes it at first to be a piece of ‘superfluous’ information 
(OC §348) because: 
 
 92 
I don’t look for the focus where the meaning is. As soon as I think of 
an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its 
meaning becomes clear and ordinary (OC §347). 
 
Finding an everyday use for ‘I know that that’s a tree’ is hardly difficult. Contexts in 
which teaching is taking place are perhaps the most obvious. Although perhaps not so 
readily apparent, we could also find similar contexts for any of the other purported 
certainties: ‘The Earth is very old’; ‘This is a hand, and it is my hand’; ‘There are 
many other humans with bodies, just like me’. Only when these are presented as 
context-independent philosophical claims do they cause difficulty.
101
 For that reason, 
it is these uses Wittgenstein ‘should like to expunge from philosophical language’ 
(OC §31).   
 
The multiplicity of linguistic use, so key a component to his thought in Philosophical 
Investigations, is Wittgenstein’s concern with regard to the apparent tension. He even 
echoes a memorable remark from Philosophical Investigations (already mentioned in 
Chapter 1): 
 
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a 
screw-driver, a rule, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words 
are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases 
there are similarities.) 
 Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of 
words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. 
For their application is not presented to us clearly. Especially when 
we are doing philosophy! (PI §11)
102
 
 
And in On Certainty, immediately following the discussion of the claim ‘I know that 
that’s a tree’: 
 
Isn’t the question “Have these words a meaning?” similar to “Is that a 
tool?” asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say “Yes, it’s a 
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hammer”. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a 
hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, or a conductor’s 
baton? Now make the application yourself (OC §352). 
 
In some contexts, phrases like ‘The Earth is very old’ have an ordinary, empirical 
application. In others, they are more like rules, belonging to the logical description of 
our language-games (OC §56). The very fact that we seem to be able to express them, 
as Moore did, is the source of both deep-lying philosophical confusion and the 
apparent tension in On Certainty. Wittgenstein confirms this analysis of the problem: 
 
But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he 
would be wrong; Yet this is right: the same proposition may get 
treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a 
rule of testing. (OC §98) 
 
We are deceived by the perfectly legitimate, though rather rare, circumstances in 
which a phrase that could be an attempted expression of a certainty is used as an 
ordinary, empirical proposition. Note that Wittgenstein does not claim that the 
proposition describes a rule of testing, rather that it is treated as one. The latter 
formulation emphasises the enacted nature of certainties, and further discredits claims 
that he was countenancing a propositional account of certainty. 
 
This tension was rightly identified as present by Stroll and Moyal-Sharrock, but 
wrongly attributed to Wittgenstein’s weighing up separate propositional and non-
propositional accounts. All we need to overcome this confusion and to dissolve the 
tension is to note the variety of applications of a single phrase, and treat not just 
words but whole sentences as being like tools. This is an approach of which 
Wittgenstein – if we take Philosophical Investigations firmly in mind – would surely 
approve, whilst maintaining hinges as ungrounded ways of acting, unsuitable as 
objects of either empirical investigation or knowledge claims.  
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2.6 The Weltbild and the riverbed 
 
At OC §§93, 94, 95, 162, 167, 223, and 262, Wittgenstein uses the German term 
‘Weltbild’, which is best translated as ‘world-picture’. With this phrase, Wittgenstein 
illustrates what we have when we take the sum of our certainties. All certainties that 
provide the logical rules for all our other investigations are, with this term, grouped as 
one conglomeration. This grouping, as we shall see, is not necessarily always marked 
off by sharp boundaries (cf. OC §§52, 97, 318-320, 454) – either, as a whole group, 
from empirical propositions, or the individual certainties themselves from each other 
– but it is nonetheless an important and extremely useful conceptual tool in 
Wittgenstein’s analysis.103 
 
There is another, comparable term one ought to look out for in On Certainty, which 
we might view as alternative attempts to illustrate the same point: ‘Bezugssystem’, 
which appears at OC §83.
104
 The preceding three remarks help to clarify its import: 
 
§80 The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of 
these statements. 
 
§81 That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it becomes 
uncertain whether I understand them. 
 
§82  What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to 
logic. It belongs to the description of the language-game. 
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 Compare, too, these remarks from On Certainty with those at PI §§76-7, BB, p. 19, 
and Z §§392, 439.  
104
 There is another interesting German term, used only once, and left untranslated in 
English editions of On Certainty: ‘Weltanschauung’. This term is closer to ‘world-
view’ than ‘Weltbild’, which is better rendered as ‘world-picture’. The use and 
importance of the term Weltanschauung will be addressed in §6.4.1 in relation to 
some criticisms of Moyal-Sharrock’s account of a taxonomy of certainties. For now, 
it can be left to one side. If we take into account his uses of Weltanschauung in other 
texts, there is no doubt that Wittgenstein was wary of Weltanschauung, and preferred 
Weltbild. 
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§83 The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our 
frame of reference [Bezugssystem]. 
 
As noted in §2.5, that OC §83 refers to the ‘truth of certain empirical propositions’ 
need not be a matter for concern. There is no doubt that he is referring to what have 
here been called certainties or hinges. They are described in OC §81 as things about 
which we commit aberrations, rather than mistakes, and in OC §82 as belonging to 
logic and to the description of the language-game (cf. OC §§56 and 136), and so are 
not being treated as regular empirical propositions.  
 
The translation of Bezugssystem, ‘frame of reference’ is a useful starting point with 
which to begin constructing an understanding of the world-picture. Wittgenstein also 
uses the term once in Philosophical Investigations: 
 
The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference 
[Bezugssystem] by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language. (PI §206) 
 
It is notable that even in Philosophical Investigations he is focused on a communally 
practiced network of human actions – the common behaviour of mankind – as a 
system of reference against which we make other judgements. In Philosophical 
Investigations, his remarks are primarily concerned with interpreting an unknown 
language, which is unsurprising given that language is the core focus of the 
Investigations. There is also a lack of nuance regarding the common behaviour of 
mankind in this quotation, in that it is implied that such practices are homogeneous 
across all humanity. As we will see later in this section as we come to examine the 
riverbed metaphor of On Certainty §§97-99 and again in more detail in Chapters 4 
and 5, Wittgenstein develops this view to account for changes and differences 
between different communities.  
 
Nonetheless, there are similarities in how Wittgenstein is taking ways of acting as 
providing logical rules, which in turn provide ‘the procedure on which we build all 
judging’ (RFM, VI-28, p. 330), between the earlier works and On Certainty. Common 
to all is an understanding of certainties as not being learned explicitly: 
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The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind 
of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the 
game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit 
rules. (OC §95) 
 
In describing a world-picture as a kind of mythology, he is further divorcing the 
certainties from a propositional role. The role of mythologies in communities is not 
predicated on whether or not they are true.
105
 There is, as Schulte puts it, no “negative 
or perjorative element . . . in Wittgenstein’s way of using the word ‘mythology.’”106 
Mythologies are meaningful – like linguistic use – if there is a place for them in the 
lives of humans. The Norse ritual practices concerning dragons governed significant 
parts of their lives, regardless of whether or not dragons actually existed in the 12
th
 
century in Northern Europe.
107
 As such, Wittgenstein’s explanation of world-pictures 
is intended to be neutral and descriptive only.
108
 All that matters is that ‘I have a 
world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum for all my enquiring 
and asserting (OC §162).  
 
The understanding of the world-picture as neither true nor false and the basis on 
which we carry out all other judging is neatly summed up in a remark in which 
Wittgenstein refers to Lavoisier, although it could just as easily go for any scientist or 
even anyone carrying out any sort of empirical investigation: 
 
Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with 
substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that 
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 Indeed, this is the crux of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frazer in Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough. Frazer criticised the magical and ritualistic practices of 
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Frazer (2003), pp. 48 and 711-712, and RFGB, passim, and in particular pp. 7, 12.  
106
 Schulte (2007), p.63 
107
 For the tales of Norse mythology and in particular of the powerful dragon 
Nidhogg, see Dronke (1997), especially the poem ‘Völuspá’. 
108
 Cf. CV, p. 3: ‘This method consists essentially in leaving the question of truth and 
asking about sense instead.’ Also, PI, §124: ‘Philosophy may in no way interfere with 
the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it . . . [Philosophy} leaves 
everything as it is.’  
 
 97 
takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might 
happen otherwise at another time. He has got hold of a definite world-
picture—not of course one that he invented: he learned it as a child. I 
say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is a matter-of-course 
foundation for his research and as such goes unmentioned (OC §167). 
 
This passage helps draw together several threads at once. The world-picture goes 
unmentioned because trying to express the ways of acting that constitute it would be 
both pointless and absurd in their expression. It is distinguished from a hypothesis as 
it is ungrounded; it is what makes hypotheses possible by ensuring that we don’t need 
to investigate everything, from the apparatus to our basic understandings of chemical 
reactions. It provides a consistent basis for judgement; Lavoisier need not fear that the 
reaction ‘might happen otherwise at another time’.  
 
Finally, Lavoisier has not invented this world-picture. If he had, the experiments he 
conducts might have no interest for another chemist who had invented his own world-
picture too, and so would possess a different ‘matter-of-course foundation’ on which 
to judge any research. If another chemist, for example, had a different conception of 
what it is for something to burn, not only would his hypotheses be different from 
Lavoisier’s, but the very basis on which he makes his judgements would be 
incompatible with Lavoisier’s.109 Because a world-picture is learned as a child: 
 
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. 
No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between 
true and false (OC §94). 
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 This example raises the notion of what Kuhn termed ‘incommensurability’ in 
relation to different scientific paradigms. Indeed, Kuhn himself makes use of 
Lavoisier in explaining his concept of a paradigm for scientists. See especially Kuhn 
(1970), pp. 53-60, although he appears frequently in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. We will address the concept of a paradigm in Chapter 4, before a full 
investigation into incommensurability and its implications for world-picture conflict 
in Chapter 5.  
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So our world-picture, this network of certainties, is something we inherit as children. 
This is the sense in which Wittgenstein likens it to a mythology, as it is imparted by 
the community around us, for, ‘From a child up I learned to judge like this. This is 
judging’ (OC §128). Because it is not learned explicitly in propositional form, the 
child would probably not be able to describe the world-picture that makes up the 
substratum of all his enquiring, judging, and asserting. It is ‘not that I could describe 
this system of convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure’ (OC 
§102). The term world-picture is intended to depict this structure, as it forms ‘the 
scaffolding of our thoughts’ (OC §211).  
 
There seems, at first, to be a conservatism running through the concept of the world-
picture. The system made up of our certainties is something that structures all our 
processes of judging and investigating. It is also something that is handed down to us 
indirectly through all that we learn in childhood. ‘In order to make a mistake, a man 
must already judge in conformity with mankind’ (OC §156). Similarly, if we are to be 
in agreement on a proposition, our standards of judgement must be the same. 
 
Even when the world-picture term is first introduced, problems for a modern reader 
immediately appear. Consider the example Wittgenstein provides about judging in 
accordance with mankind here: 
 
The propositions presenting what Moore ‘knows’ are all of such a kind 
that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. 
E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close 
proximity to the earth.—Once more I can speak of myself here instead 
of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? 
Either a memory, or having been told.—Everything that I have seen or 
heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the 
earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the 
opposite (OC §93). 
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Wittgenstein’s picture of the world, which he has inherited, includes the certainty that 
not only ‘has no man ever been far from the earth’, but also that it is impossible.110 
Our picture of the world includes no such certainty. In fact, the comparable certainty 
in our Western, twenty-first-century world-picture declares precisely the opposite 
conviction. Yet, our world-picture is something we inherit. If Wittgenstein’s 
generation held this conviction, how has it come to change? Furthermore, has it 
changed for everyone? Wittgenstein’s riverbed metaphor investigates how changes to 
our world-picture – that is, changes in our certainties – are possible. 
 
 
2.6.1 The riverbed 
 
The riverbed metaphor is encapsulated in two fairly short remarks, at On Certainty 
§97 and §99. They are here rendered in full. 
 
§97 The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-
bed of my thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the 
movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; 
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 
 
§99 And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject 
to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which 
now in one place now in another gets washed away or deposited. 
 
There are two distinctions being made in §97 and §99. In §97, the distinction is 
between the riverbed and the waters, i.e., between certainties and empirical 
investigations.
111
 The other, in §99, is between different degrees of hardness in the 
bed itself; some certainties are more deeply embedded and less prone to change than 
others. Our empirical investigations are subject to rapid change: updated statistics, 
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 There is an argument to be made that the water indicates far more than our 
empirical investigations, and in fact could encompass all the sorts of activities listed 
in PI §23, and even more. For the sake of simplicity, I will here only distinguish 
between certainties and empirical investigations, as this is the distinction with which 
On Certainty is predominantly concerned.  
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fresh hypotheses, and ingenious new experiments to test those hypotheses. Certainties 
change gradually, in the way that the bed of a river shifts gradually over time, grain of 
sand by grain of sand. Some ways of acting last perhaps only a few centuries or even 
decades; others are deeper in the riverbed, and erosion might take thousands of years, 
if it happens at all. 
 
The riverbed, according to Shiner, provides ‘fixed points of reference in terms of 
which we are able to interpret what is not fixed,’ in the same way that the shape of the 
riverbed determines where the waters above it may flow.
112
 On the other hand, what 
may, at one time, function as a point of reference need not do so eternally, just as the 
route of a river shifts gradually over time. Although we do distinguish between the 
empirical propositions and the certainties that provide a framework for them, ‘there is 
not a sharp division of the one from the other’ (OC §97). Whilst, as Schulte notes, it 
is:  
 
quite possible to draw a general distinction between these different 
levels, a sharp distinction between rules etc. on one hand and 
empirical propositions on the other is just as impossible to make as a 
clear-cut division between the waters on the river-bed and the shift of 
the bed itself.
113
 
 
The metaphor also illustrates how changes in a world-picture are incremental. The 
entire Western scientific world-picture – the one that encompassed Wittgenstein’s 
certainty that space travel was impossible – did not change beyond recognition as 
soon as humans first achieved space flight. One certainty, or perhaps a handful, 
shifted, but the vast majority of our certainties – and therefore our world-picture – 
remained intact. Even radical changes to a few certainties might entail only small 
changes to the world-picture – that is, to the network of our ungrounded ways of 
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acting – as a whole. Nevertheless, over time, a world-picture may become 
unrecognisable from its own precursors, just as the flow of a river’s waters over 
thousands of years can come to bear little relation to what was once its route. 
 
The riverbed metaphor is compelling, and prevents, on Wittgenstein’s account, our 
inherited world-picture from being eternally fixed. It would be an unsatisfying 
account if it could not explain how it is that our world-picture differs so greatly from, 
say, that of the Ancient Greeks. However, if our inherited world-picture can change in 
this manner, we are presented with other concerns. Notably, the riverbed metaphor 
raises the prospect of alternative world-pictures. At the moment, the discussion has 
only raised the prospect of gradual changes to a single world-picture. Wittgenstein 
claims that his world-picture prevents him from taking space travel seriously. Had he 
lived another twenty years, his world-picture would undoubtedly have changed. In the 
interim, there were people, perhaps at one point in roughly equal numbers, with 
mutually exclusive certainties regarding space travel. Their world-pictures would 
have been different from one another. Two principle questions emerge: a) what is the 
nature of the process that resulted in a change in world-picture for each individual, for 
the change did not happen universally and simultaneously, and b) how was 
communication affected between those of Wittgenstein’s conviction and those who 
deemed space travel possible? 
 
To begin the process of answering these questions – those of communication and 
conversion, the key concerns of this thesis – Chapter 4 will introduce the philosopher 
of science Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Recent scholarship 
is very much aware that Wittgenstein influenced Kuhn, and that there are links to be 
made between the work of the two. I will explore these established links, but only 
briefly. More interesting, for our purposes, and currently unexplored in the literature 
to my knowledge, is the extent to which Kuhn’s work can provide a template for our 
understanding of what it is for two world-pictures to come into contact and conflict. 
Chapter 4 will first establish some aspects Kuhn and Wittgenstein share in their 
methodology, in particular Wittgenstein’s concept of perspicuous representation 
(covered in §1.4.1). The discussion will then proceed to an examination of the 
importance of rules in Kuhn’s conception of the history and progress of science. The 
last but most substantial section will cover the links between Kuhn and On Certainty, 
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paving the way for a discussion in Chapter 5 of Kuhn’s concept of 
incommensurability and how it will be a useful tool in examining world-picture 
conflict and communication. Before this process can begin, Chapter 3 will examine a 
final point of purely Wittgensteinian exegesis, regarding the similarities and 
distinctions between the terms ‘form of life’ and ‘world-picture’.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has established a basic interpretation of On Certainty. Taking Moore’s 
two papers as a starting point, Wittgenstein noted that the Moorean propositions had a 
unique role to play in our lives, but took issue with Moore’s claims to know them. In 
drawing a distinction between knowledge and certainty, Wittgenstein describes the 
Moorean propositions as certainties.  
 
We learn certainties indirectly and demonstrate our certainty of them in our actions. 
We could not justify them in the manner of ordinary empirical propositions, because 
a) we never learned them explicitly, and b) whilst they may have propositional 
counterparts in exceptional circumstances, their role is not propositional. They are 
neither true nor false, but instead provide us with a framework, within which 
ascriptions of true or false can be made to empirical propositions. As such, they are 
rules, providing the description of the logic of our language-games. Attempting either 
to affirm or deny them in propositional form, as Stroll’s concept of negational 
absurdity shows, leads to a form of nonsense, whereby the speaker is presumed either 
to be deluded or to be making a joke.  
 
In describing certainties as hinges, Wittgenstein draws attention to the relative 
immobility of our certainties in relation to our frequently shifting practices of 
enquiring and asserting. We simply cannot investigate everything, and so the hinges 
stay in place whilst the tumult of hypotheses and investigations takes place within the 
scaffolding of certainties. The acceptance of hinges is not like resting content with an 
assumption or being thoroughly persuaded of them. Choice, and therefore the 
weighing of evidence for or against, has no place in our acquisition of hinges. We 
acquire them as children, as part of our inherited background, like a mythology. We 
do not learn that there are objects in the world, but rather we learn to interact with 
those objects. 
 
Moyal-Sharrock’s and Stroll’s views, whilst slightly different, agree that Wittgenstein 
debated with himself in On Certainty whether hinges are propositional or non-
propositional. I rejected this aspect of both of their interpretations, claiming instead 
that Wittgenstein always regarded hinges as having only a non-propositional role. The 
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confusion we see in the text is a symptom of hinges’ propositional counterparts: 
situations in which expressions that might, in another context, be a clumsy attempt at 
putting a hinge into words do sometimes appear in identical form in contexts in which 
their expression as a straightforward empirical proposition has a role. 
 
Our certainties make up our world-picture. A world-picture is neither true nor false, 
being made up of a collection of ungrounded ways of acting, which are neither true 
nor false themselves. Our world-picture provides a frame of reference; a system or 
structure within which all other activities can take place. Over time, as the riverbed 
metaphor illustrates, some certainties might shift, resulting in incremental changes to 
the overall world-picture. Chapter 2 closed by presenting some future questions. If 
world-pictures can change in the manner described in the riverbed metaphor, to what 
extent are people from different world-pictures who come into contact rightfully 
regarded by each other as talking nonsense, i.e. deluded or making a joke? Chapter 4 
will begin the process of answering questions like these – the task for the rest of the 
thesis – by drawing comparisons between Wittgenstein and Kuhn. 
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Chapter 3 – The form of life and the world-picture 
 
3.1 An intermediary link: language-games 
  
3.2 ‘This is simply what I do’ 
 3.2.1 Philosophical Investigations 
 3.2.2 On Certainty 
 
3.3. Form of life to world-picture: development of the thought 
 
3.4 Distinctions between world-picture and form of life: depth and breadth 
 3.4.1 The two versions of form of life 
 3.4.2 Acquiring and losing features of a form of life; acquiring and losing 
certainties 
 3.4.3 Concluding the distinction between the world-picture and the form of 
life 
 
 Conclusions 
 
 
3.1 An intermediary link: language-games 
 
The term form of life was introduced in §1.5.6 as something to which we can point 
when our justifications run out and we have ‘reached bedrock’, where we are 
‘inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”’ (PI §217). In Philosophical 
Investigations, the concept mutually supports that of the language-game. Even to 
‘imagine a language means to imagine a life-form’ (PI §19), for it indicates a network 
of customs within which linguistic activity takes place and derives its meaning.  
 
On Certainty, on the other hand, features just one – very debatable – reference to the 
term form of life.
114
 Yet there are similarities between the form-of-life concept and 
that of certainties; or, perhaps more accurately, between the form-of-life concept and 
the world-picture constituted by certainties, as explored in §2.3. That section 
investigated uses of the concept of certainty in Philosophical Investigations and 
related them to the way it is used in On Certainty, indicating a point at which further 
justification is impossible and doubt and mistake become meaningless. Clearly there 
                                                 
114
 The one exception appears at OC §358, but, for good reasons discussed later in this 
chapter in §3.4, it should be discounted. Wittgenstein himself explicitly states 
concerns about his use of it in the passage in question. 
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are similarities between the two concepts, but it is also significant that form of life 
does not appear as a term at all in On Certainty, and certainty or certainties only 
infrequently in Philosophical Investigations. Developing the connection between 
forms of life and certainties further, then, will require an intermediary conceptual link. 
Language-games are a feature of both Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.  
 
This chapter will begin by developing the connections between the form of life and 
certainties with reference to the way that both underpin linguistic use. The latter 
stages of this chapter will investigate the ways in which the form of life and the 
world-picture are not equivalent, proposing what I term the breadth-depth distinction. 
The form of life indicates the breadth of practices; how widespread they are, who 
engages in them, and their role across a community. The certainties comprising the 
world-picture, conversely, indicate depth in a person’s life in the sense that they 
provide and structure our standards for judging and asserting. Whereas the form of 
life indicates traditions and customs that can be gained or lost with no great effect, 
certainties are ways of acting that are so deeply rooted that to doubt one plunges 
everything into chaos (OC 613) and to change one has radical consequences for one’s 
life. 
 
Together, the form of life and the world-picture form an axis of breadth and depth. 
The tendency in Wittgensteinian scholarship has been to speak of one and not the 
other, depending on whether Philosophical Investigations or On Certainty is the 
primary concern, as if the world-picture displaced the form of life in Wittgenstein’s 
thought. Stroll (1994), for instance, despite providing an incisive and wide-ranging 
commentary on On Certainty, makes no mention of the form of life whatsoever. 
Moyal-Sharrock (2007), also primarily concerned with On Certainty, does make 
frequent reference to the form of life, but only in a very limited sense to indicate a 
human form of life as opposed to a non-human form of life.
115
 This in turn is essential 
to her support for the idea of universal certainties within a grander taxonomy of 
certainties that she proposes; a position we will reject in §6.4. For now, though, in 
order to construct the breadth-depth axis constituted by the form of life and the world-
                                                 
115
 §3.4.1 will examine the two senses of form of life in Philosophical Investigations, 
of which Moyal-Sharrock’s preference is the more limited, less interesting version.  
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picture, we must first look at the ways the concepts are related in order to justify our 
eventual yoking them together.  
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3.2 ‘This is simply what I do’ 
 
3.2.1 Philosophical Investigations 
 
The opening passages of Philosophical Investigations inform us that any sort of 
linguistic practice in which humans engage, any language-game, is ‘part of . . . a life-
form’ (PI, §23). Even to ‘imagine a language means to imagine a life-form’ (PI §19). 
When pressed for a justification for our conviction that we are following a rule, or for 
behaving in a particular way, Wittgenstein exhorts us to recognise when our ‘spade is 
turned’ (PI §217). The response suggested is variously expressed as ‘This is simply 
what I do’ and – said with emphasis in the original – ‘this language-game is played’ 
(PI §§217, 654). These two responses may, on the surface, appear different from one 
another. The first appears to point to an action specific to the question directed at 
whoever responds with this expression, whereas the second seems to point to 
something less precise. However, unpacking the concept of the language-game brings 
the expressions closer together. The very ‘term language-game is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a life-
form’ (PI §23).  
 
We ought to distinguish here between a linguistic action and any other sort of action. It 
would be odd if, when questioned why I kiss the photo of a loved one when they are 
absent, to point to a language-game, that is, a set of linguistic practices, and say ‘this 
language-game is played.’116 It is not a linguistic action that is under scrutiny here, but 
a non-linguistic one. Responding instead with ‘This is simply what I do’ would be 
more appropriate, provided we are satisfied that Wittgenstein is right in thinking that 
explaining or justifying certain practices is futile. But if I were to be asked why at 
school we called lined paper for writing notes in class ‘block’, pointing to any action – 
or even the action of calling lined paper ‘block’ itself – might be confusing, whereas 
saying instead ‘this language-game is played’ makes far more sense. It suggests a 
wealth of linguistic practice, the esoteric and semi-secretive sort often practiced by 
schoolchildren, which only makes sense in the form of life we would recognise as 
inhering in a school environment. The argot might differ from school to school, but the 
                                                 
116
 For this example, see RFGB, p. 4. 
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concept of small communities, each with their own terms and uses for words providing 
meanings that might make little sense to those not of that community, would be 
familiar. 
 
If a little generosity of interpretation is permitted for each of the apparently disparate 
expressions – fusing their meanings somewhat – the dissimilarities seem not so stark. 
If, when an action of ours is questioned, Wittgenstein suggests we say ‘This is simply 
what I do,’ we might add to the end of that sentence ‘in this community.’ Broadening 
the scope of the response, placing it as an action amidst a network of other actions and 
customs, sharpens the import of the expression. It suggests that seeking further 
justification is pointless. I kiss the photo of a loved one not for any explicit reason I 
can articulate, but because it is simply what one sometimes does when one misses 
someone and has a photograph of them near to hand. It is what we do in this 
community; it is part of our form of life. 
 
Similarly, applying the reverse procedure to ‘this language-game is played’ sharpens 
that expression, too. If, when asked why they call their lined paper ‘block’, the 
schoolboy might – with a little Wittgensteinian education – respond ‘when this 
language-game is played we call it block’. Further justification is, again, pointless, but 
rather than broadening the scope of Wittgenstein’s original suggestion, we have 
narrowed it, to focus on the particular confusion in question. The focus is drawn to a 
linguistic custom placed in the nexus of other linguistic customs, all of which take 
place in the context of a given community. 
 
Nothing substantial has been added to either expression, and the context in which 
these expressions might be used would probably render the additions superfluous. But 
here, where the context is not so readily apparent, the additions serve to bring out what 
the context would otherwise provide. Once this is done, the expressions function in 
very similar ways. Both seek to situate an action – one linguistic, the other non-
linguistic – in the context of a community’s wider practices. In the ‘block’ example, 
this makes sense of one of the few explicit references to forms of life in Philosophical 
Investigations: to ‘imagine a language means to imagine a life-form [form of life]’ (PI 
§19). The language-game, and the rules and practice contained therein, make sense 
only against the backdrop of a form of life.  
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A further purpose is served by drawing these expressions closer together. If the 
response to a request for justification for an action – whether linguistic or non-
linguistic, calling lined paper ‘block’ or kissing a photo – is the same, then non-
linguistic actions also depend upon placing them in a form of life if we are to make 
sense of them. The term language-game restricts our attention to the linguistic 
practices of communities, which only make sense within the respective forms of life 
of those communities. Our non-linguistic practices also only make sense within a 
form of life. Anything from kissing a photo to driving on the left or shaking hands 
depends on a form of life if they are not to seem utterly bizarre. Certainties underpin 
various ways of acting. They, too, on the one hand make sense only within a form of 
life, but they are on the other quite different from, say, driving on the left or shaking 
hands; they are more fundamental to our lives. Whereas kissing a photo, driving on 
the left, or shaking hands are a part only of some forms of life – in others one might 
touch a photo, drive on the right, and bow as a greeting – the examples Wittgenstein 
gives in Philosophical Investigations of things we are certain about seem to be much 
more universal. 
 
 
3.2.2 On Certainty 
 
The certainties to which Wittgenstein draws attention in Philosophical Investigations 
do not seem as if they would vary across communities in the way that language-games 
do. The certainties that the book will fall if one drops it (PI §324) and that the fire can 
injure a living human body (PI §474) are unlikely to be held – or, rather, practiced – 
by one community and incomprehensible to another.
117
 Yet this does not make the 
comparison between language-games and non-linguistic-games invalid. The examples 
of certainties Wittgenstein uses in Philosophical Investigations are, indeed, probably 
near universal, at least contingently. By the time of On Certainty, however, the 
examples present certainties that are often radically different from one group of people 
                                                 
117
 Q.v. §2.3.2. As we will see in §6.5, however, this does not mean that any 
certainties are universal or necessary, as Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll have argued.  
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to another.
118
 The previous chapter introduced the possibility of such cases with 
reference to the riverbed metaphor of OC §§97-99. The best example – and one which 
will feature repeatedly in this thesis – is that of Moore meeting a king who has been 
brought up to believe that the world began with him
119
: 
 
Men have believed that they could make the rain; why should not a 
king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if 
[G.E.] Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore 
really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore 
could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of 
a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a 
different way. Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the 
correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e., these are 
what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says 
something like: "That's how it must be." (OC §92) 
 
Whilst Moore and the king probably shared certainties about gravity and the damaging 
effect of fire, others were radically different. They possess different world-pictures. 
Communication between the two would be rendered difficult unless one party was 
converted and could ‘be brought to look at the world in a different way’ (OC §92). 
The language-games of Moore’s would be familiar enough to people like us. The 
language-games of the king’s would have incorporated uses of terms – presuming for 
now that they both spoke English – utterly alien to us. For example, uses of terms 
idiosyncratic to the community of that kingdom like ‘parents’, ‘geology’, ‘history’, 
‘weather’, and so on. The language-games in which those terms are used in such a way 
could only make sense against the backdrop of the king’s world-picture. The king’s 
conviction that the world began with him has never been proven to him, and Moore 
could not provide a proof that would shake this certainty. Any conversion would be 
one of ‘a special kind,’ whereby he would be brought to look at the world in a 
                                                 
118
 We will consider an opposing point of view to this reading in §6.6, when we look 
at Coliva (2010) and her claims that there are no alternative world-pictures. 
119
 We will use this example frequently in this and later chapters. To avoid creating 
unnecessary extra examples, we will henceforth take this example to present a king 
who holds both that the world began with him and that he can make it rain.  
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different way, perhaps ‘convinced of the correctness of [the] view by its simplicity or 
symmetry’ (OC §92). 
 
We can envisage, roughly, what the language-games in that community might be like, 
where certain incompatibilities with our own might lie, how particular terms might 
function given their peculiar usage. In On Certainty, these differences are put down to 
differences in certainties, or, as a conglomeration of them, the world-picture. But if On 
Certainty is to be compatible with Philosophical Investigations, then the claim in 
Philosophical Investigations must still stand: to ‘imagine a language means to imagine 
a life-form’ (PI §19). And where the king’s subjects are in agreement with the king 
and disagreement with Moore about what is true or false, about the origins of the 
Earth, how rain is made, ‘[t]hat is not agreement in opinions but in form of life,’ for it 
is only ‘what humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use’ 
(PI §241). 
 
On the surface, the form of life and the world-picture have a lot in common. It seems 
that they may both be invoked in similar situations, in much the same manner, to 
indicate a point at which justification for a particular linguistic or non-linguistic 
action can go no further. Both terms provide the possibility of pointing to something 
beyond one’s own behaviour, something that is as brute a fact as any available when 
asked for justification for our practices, and saying ‘Look, this is how things are done 
around here.’ If asked why he acts as if he can make it rain, the king could, on the one 
hand, point to his community of subjects, the form of life that surrounds him, and tell 
Moore to note how they submit to him and ask for him to make it rain. Similarly, 
invoking something like a certainty, the king could simply tell Moore that everything 
he has experienced, all the education and background he inherited, informs him that 
he can make it rain. This process might be indirect, in the sense that he does not learn 
it explicitly, but due to the fact that he was taught a particular rain-making ceremony 
that only he was allowed to perform, or other similar rituals. That is to say, he learnt it 
as the axis at the centre of a network of other practices.
120
  
 
                                                 
120
 Cf. OC §152. 
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It would appear that the form of life and the world-picture serve much the same 
function, in the sense that both indicate a point at which reasons give out, a point at 
which one says ‘This is simply what I do.’ However there are crucial differences in 
the terminology that may not be so readily apparent. We will argue that a proper 
separation of the two terms is essential to a thorough understanding of the world-
picture. Once properly separated, the two concepts can be used in conjunction with 
one another, mutually supportive, as part of the same axis. 
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3.3 Form of life to world-picture: development of the thought 
 
In §3.2, emphasis was placed on the way we can draw upon either our form of life or 
our world-picture to indicate that no further justification for the way we act is 
available. If one side questions the other, and the response draws upon either the form 
of life or the world-picture to indicate that rational grounds for argumentation and 
persuasion have given out, then this is a disagreement unlike an ordinary empirical 
disagreement. Whilst the focus in Chapter 2 was on the role this type of situation 
plays in our understanding of On Certainty, it in fact has its origins earlier in 
Wittgenstein’s thought. Exploring this line of enquiry provides the starting point for 
differentiating the form of life from the world-picture. 
 
The idea that certain types of disagreement about seemingly empirical statements are 
not ordinary disagreements at all but something more fundamental is a recurring theme 
in the later Wittgenstein. In the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein 
describes Frazer’s mistake as characterising past cultures’ actions as bad science and 
error-strewn thinking about the causal effects of their actions. Wittgenstein’s response 
is that these people did not hold that their actions, which we call magic or ritual, really 
had the causal effects Frazer was so keen to point out were impossible. Those rituals 
were simply part of their form of life. ‘The characteristic feature of primitive man,’ 
Wittgenstein suggests, ‘is that he does not act from opinions he holds about things (as 
Frazer thinks).’121 In the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief there is the example of Wittgenstein’s refusal to say that he 
straightforwardly disagrees with a man who believes in the Last Judgement even 
though he, Wittgenstein, does not.
122
 In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
remarks that ‘What people accept as a justification shows how they think and live’ (PI 
§325), as well as insisting that we ‘Ask, not: “What goes on in us when we are certain 
that . . . . ?”— but: How is “the certainty that this is the case” manifested in human 
action?’ (PI, p. 191). On Certainty §92 suggests that if Moore and the king were to 
meet, these aspects of the king’s view of the world such as his rain-making abilities or 
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 RFGB, p. 12. It is interesting that the rest of this passage details an example 
Wittgenstein found in Frazer’s Golden Bough, featuring a rain-making king to whom 
the people only prayed ‘when the rainy season comes’ Frazer (1923), p. 77. This is 
perhaps the origin of the example Wittgenstein uses at OC §241. 
122
 LC, p.53. This example will receive detailed attention in §5.2. 
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that the earth began with him are not points subject to a rational argument with which 
Moore could change the king’s mind. If a change were to happen, it would be a 
conversion, akin to a religious one. The king’s world-picture would change as 
particular certainties changed, and his whole way of living would change too. We can 
imagine that, were the king to be converted in this manner, his language-games would 
have to change accordingly, for his old concepts and uses of terms like history, 
ancestry, and meteorology would no longer fit in his post-conversion world-picture. 
 
This roughly chronological tracing of a strand of Wittgenstein’s thought reveals a shift 
in his preferred terminology.
123
 Consistent throughout is the emphasis on a contrast 
between objects of knowledge – about which it makes sense to speak of empirical 
propositions and justifications, evidence, and verification – and certainties or ways or 
acting that are not based on opinions and not subject to those activities we might call 
providing a proof. Between the Remarks and On Certainty – respectively the earliest 
and latest writings of this selection – there is no significant difference in the way the 
examples of these sorts of certainties are described. Wittgenstein does not change his 
mind on the things he takes to be certain and different from empirical knowledge. For 
instance, the certainty that one can continue a mathematical series and that a dropped 
book will fall (PI §324), that one’s hand will be burnt if placed in the fire (PI §474), 
that there are physical objects (OC §34), and so on. However, Philosophical 
Investigations introduces the term form of life. Linguistic and non-linguistic activities 
make sense only against the backdrop of a form of life. Although the term is only 
introduced in Philosophical Investigations, around 1945, it could retrospectively be 
applied to the examples of the primitive cultures discussed in the Remarks and the 
religious examples of Lectures on Religious Belief, particularly the Last Judgement 
example (LC, p. 53).  
 
In On Certainty, form of life appears only once, and world-picture is used, but with a 
slightly different emphasis. In Philosophical Investigations, the examples of 
                                                 
123
 The dates of writing – as opposed to discovery or publication – of these texts is, 
roughly, as follows: Part I of RFGB, 1931; the lectures on religious belief, 1938; 
Philosophical Investigations Part I, by 1945; Philosophical Investigations Part II, 
1947-1949; On Certainty, 1949-1951. All of these dates are taken from the 
approximations of editors and translators in the prefaces and introductions of the 
respective publications from the same editions as those listed in the bibliography.  
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certainties – gravity, the dangerousness of fire, basic arithmetic and mathematics – are 
widespread, almost universal. As the examples are developed throughout the later 
work, there develops an awareness that there are other types of certainties – for 
example those of different primitive tribes in the Remarks – that might differ from 
culture to culture. By the Lectures on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, 
examples introduce the idea of people living in broadly the same community with a 
mostly unified form of life who might still differ in their respective religious 
certainties. Finally, in On Certainty the concept of the certainty is more nuanced, with 
detail on how certainties might change (OC §§97-99) and the effects conversions 
might have (OC §§92, 612).  
 
The core difference, §3.4 will argue, is that the form of life places greater emphasis 
on breadth – the size and nature of the community in question – of a practice or 
network of practices. Certainties and the world-picture emphasise instead the depth of 
practices in people’s lives, the role they play, how deeply they are embedded, and the 
manner in which the deeper practices structure those nearer the surface of the riverbed 
or in the waters of the river itself. As we will see, different world-pictures can be 
present in the same form of life.  
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3.4 Distinctions between world-picture and form of life: depth and breadth 
 
The form of life is a broader concept than that of the world-picture. It encompasses the 
entire network of practices of a community. The world-picture as described in On 
Certainty is specific to certainties, although certainties are not sharply delineated from 
subjects and practices suitable for empirical (or other) investigations. Nonetheless, 
when Wittgenstein uses the term world-picture, he does so only to refer to that which 
is ‘the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting’, rejecting the question as to 
whether a world-picture is ‘true or false’ (OC §162). Although when we try to isolate 
specific certainties it might be difficult to distinguish between the hard rock and the 
movement of the waters, at least in principle the hard rock does not include things 
which do not form the substratum of all – or at least some of – my enquiring and 
asserting. 
 
Form of life encompasses all the customary practices of a community: every ritual, 
tradition, ceremony, convention, institution, myth, superstition, and piece of folklore. 
The term can do this because it is left so vaguely defined in Philosophical 
Investigations. The world-picture encompasses only the underlying, enacted 
certainties, for certainties are all that comprise a world-picture. Certainties are not 
traditions or myths or conventions; certainties are that upon which all such features of 
life depend. Where there is a tradition of ancestor-worship, there is a certainty 
underlying that tradition that the earth is very old, at least older than the king whom 
Moore encounters would have it. But the tradition and the certainty – and therefore the 
form of life and the world-picture – are not interchangeable terms.  
 
There is one potentially confusing passage in On Certainty, which appears to 
contradict this distinction and equates certainties with a form of life: 
 
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to 
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly 
expressed and probably badly thought as well.) (OC §358) 
  
Two features of this passage suggest that we should be cautious about taking it at face 
value. First, that it is the only instance of form of life throughout On Certainty. As a 
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text compiled from notes after Wittgenstein’s death, we are already on guard for 
repetitions and poor formulations. That this idea is not developed further, and 
Wittgenstein questions both the thought and its expression within the passage itself, 
indicates that he was trying something out which, ultimately, didn’t work.  
 
Further, I agree with Moyal-Sharrock, who, pointing to the following passage – 
 
But that just means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond 
being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal. (OC 
§359)  
 
 – suggests that what ‘Wittgenstein has been attempting to say is not that 
objective certainty is a form of life, but that it is akin to something nonpropositional, 
such as a form of life.’124 It would, therefore, be a mistake to fail to note the different 
roles the two concepts play based on this one passage; a passage which Wittgenstein 
himself criticised at or around the time of writing it. Provided this small concern may 
be set aside, the distinction between form of life and certainty may continue, but still 
requires further elaboration. Certainties have already been described as part of the 
riverbed, and their depth referred to. However, it is not yet clear how this contrasts 
with features of a form of life. Some illustrative examples will help clarify this aspect 
of the distinction.  
 
 
3.4.1 The two versions of form of life 
 
Various customs are a feature of every community: for example, in England, eating 
goose or turkey on Christmas Day with family and listening to the Queen’s speech 
afterwards. Whilst this is a recognisable feature of the English form of life – and if 
asked to justify why we do it, pointing to something like the ‘English form of life’ 
would probably do – it would be odd to describe this as a certainty. Nothing else 
seems to depend on it. It does not provide standards for proof, justification, 
verification, or generally what counts as true or false for anything else. It can be 
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spoken of freely with no danger of negational or assertoric absurdity, in the way that 
certainties were characterised earlier.  
 
Necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be drawn up for certainties, and so this 
particular tradition cannot be discounted as a certainty on the basis that it does not 
fulfil such conditions. Yet, it does not play the fundamental role in our lives we would 
expect of a certainty. Were we to include it as one we might also have to include other, 
similar, relatively unimportant but widespread traditions that would also seem strange 
if described as certainties, even though they are clearly a part of a particular 
community’s form of life. Such traditions, we might say, lack the depth of a certainty 
in terms of the role they play in our lives. Conversely, we can say of the traditions and 
customs we associate with a form of life that they are shallower than certainties. That 
still leaves the question of what, on that higher, shallower strata, is being distinguished 
between when we delineate one form of life from another.  
 
There are two discernable ways, in this regard, that the form-of-life concept is 
deployed in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein described the form of life as 
‘complicated’ in a passage in which the ‘phenomena of hope’ is being discussed (PI, p. 
148). Drawing distinctions between emotions we might ascribe to an animal and ones 
we might ascribe to a human, he suggests that it only makes sense to make these 
ascriptions to beings with a certain form of life – i.e., in this case, human life – just as 
‘if a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings 
that do not write’ (PI, p. 148). The practice of hoping is not a feature of non-human 
life. Gertrude Conway marks this particular usage as one of two ways in which 
Wittgenstein uses the term. This broader use effectively marks humans off from other 
animals, covering ‘basic patterns of behaviour that come naturally to human 
persons.’125 Humans alone ‘speak, hope, question, grieve, fear, build, remember, play, 
and so on.’126 There might be some animals which engage in something resembling 
one or more of these activities, but, taken as a group – and we can imagine many other 
actions we might include – the amalgamation is something recognisably and 
distinctively human. The broader conception of form of life, distinguishing the human 
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from the non-human, is present in Wittgenstein’s thought, but is largely trivial, and 
will not be investigated further here. 
 
However, the form-of-life concept is not used only to differentiate human from non-
human forms of life. If we are correct in taking the Remarks as providing prototypical 
examples of what Wittgenstein takes to be different forms of life, then distinctions are 
also being drawn between different human forms of life. Conway, too, thinks that this 
narrower conception of the term tends towards depicting differences of culture, 
perhaps eventually narrowing so far as to include distinctions such as those of ‘race, 
class, and gender’, as Duncan Richter suggests.127 It is the narrower conception that 
interests us here, and a promising way of exploring it will be to contrast what is to 
acquire or lose features of a form of life with what it is to acquire or lose certainties.  
However, for now, it will be more useful to focus not quite so narrowly – Richter’s 
distinctions suggest divisions within what we might normally term a single culture 
(e.g., that of the English) – and seek differences chronological and geographical 
instead. Subdivision to the extent proposed by Richter – and indeed somewhat further 
– will be addressed in Chapter 6, but with emphasis placed on the world-picture rather 
than the form of life.   
 
 
3.4.2 Acquiring and losing features of a form of life; acquiring and losing certainties 
 
In the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein criticises Frazer’s inability to 
see beyond his own form of life, one in which he ‘cannot imagine a priest who is not 
basically an English parson of our times with all his stupidity and feebleness’ (RFGB, 
p. 5). He makes this criticism in light of Frazer’s failure to understand the pre-Roman 
tribe at Nemi’s form of life – which incorporates the killing of the priest-king as part 
of the process of succession – on its own terms. Wittgenstein also mentions: the 
Beltane fire-festival custom practiced in Perthshire up until the eighteenth century; 
practices whereby an adopted child is pushed through the clothes of the mother in a 
pseudo-birth; burning in effigy or kissing the photo of a loved one.
128
 All of these 
customs have roles to play in the forms of life of one or more cultures. The variety of 
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practices and forms of life is almost endless. ‘One could well imagine primitive 
practices oneself,’ says Wittgenstein, ‘and it would only be by chance if they were not 
actually to be found somewhere’ (RFGB, p. 5). The two practices of the last example – 
burning in effigy and kissing a photo – still take place in various parts of the world. 
 
Given Frazer’s description of the practices of other past cultures as being examples of 
bad science, we might expect him to attribute the British practice of burning an effigy 
of Guy Fawkes on bonfire night, November 5
th
, each year as wrongful thinking about 
causation, perhaps as a misguided effort to physically protect the Palace of 
Westminster from coming to harm. Wittgenstein’s response in an effort to make sense 
of this annual ritual would be to place the practice within the context of the form of 
life that supports it, even if the original reasons for burning the effigy have been 
largely forgotten.  
 
We must consider this as part of the English form of life, because even an annual 
festival like Guy Fawkes (or Bonfire) Night, with all its concomitant traditions of 
fireworks, bonfires, burned effigies, and communal gatherings, cannot be regarded as a 
certainty. We might be sure that we will celebrate it this year, as we have every other 
year, and about the correct date and manner on and in which it ought to be celebrated. 
But that is nothing like the certainty that if I drop the book then it will fall or that if I 
put my hand in the fire it will be burned. Guy Fawkes Night could disappear as a 
practice universally and instantaneously from our form of life and nothing – except the 
night itself and perhaps the sales of fireworks and tinder – would change. The same 
could not be said if the whole community suddenly lost their certainty about the earth 
being very old or the influence of gravity. 
 
We might also consider the loss of a tradition as compared to loss of a certainty in the 
case of one individual, rather than as a whole community. If one person forgets or 
chooses not to engage in a feature or tradition of a form of life like Guy Fawkes Night, 
there are no serious ramifications. Other members of the community might cajole, 
bully, or threaten that person in order to persuade them to re-engage in the traditional 
practice. As nothing in the substratum of enquiring and asserting of the Guy-Fawkes-
Night apostate has changed, that process, whether successful or not, is a 
straightforward one. However, were someone to cease to be certain of gravity – and 
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this would be revealed in his actions – we would regard him as mad or deluded. 
Rational argumentation would get us nowhere in bringing him round, as already for 
this person ‘everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it’ (OC §4). This person 
requires medical attention: psychotherapy or an antidote to the hallucination-inducing 
drug he has ingested. One can weigh up the benefits of different features of a form of 
life and rationally choose which to engage in, but one either inherits or is converted to 
particular certainties and an overall world-picture. 
 
Examining the ways in which language-games might change upon the loss or 
acquisition of a certainty or a feature of a form of life is a useful method for furthering 
the distinction between the world-picture and the form of life on the basis of depth. 
Our everyday language – about gravity in particular, but also about a range of other 
things – would no longer make sense to this man who has lost the certainty of gravity 
in his actions. Even as early as Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein recognises 
that ‘The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game’ (PI, p. 191). If a certainty for 
an individual changes or is lost, his language-games change too. Some aspects of his 
new language use will be incompatible both with his own old linguistic practice and 
with that of those who have not suffered the same delusion as him.
129
 The change in 
certainty need not be a delusion or hallucination; we have already seen how adopting 
new religious certainties can have similar effects, or how the king, were he to be 
converted by Moore, would find problems in conversing with his former subjects. 
Acquiring and losing features of a form of life entails a different process and 
difference consequences from acquiring or losing certainties.  
 
 
3.4.3 Concluding the distinction between the world-picture and the form of life 
  
The distinction has been made between the world-picture and the form of life based on 
the crucial role certainties play in comprising a world-picture. If a certainty changes 
for a particular person, whole swathes of her most basic actions as well as her 
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language use changes. On the other hand, if a component of a form of life such as a 
particular tradition changes for that same person, there are not the same ramifications. 
Her language use is not radically altered or hard to understand to others with whom 
she could previously communicate easily, and her behaviour is unlikely to seem 
absurd or creating a need for medical help. For a form of life to change, a tradition or 
custom must be altered across a whole – or significant portion of – a community. A 
world-picture, however, can change for an individual. An individual can undergo a 
world-picture conversion, and can ‘be brought to look at the world in a different way’ 
(OC §92).  
 
One cannot be converted to a form of life in the manner of a gestalt switch, because 
the term encompasses a loose amalgamation of practices. These practices are of 
insufficient depth to constitute – if we were to change them – anything like a gestalt 
switch. The schoolboy who learns the new slang of a school, and perhaps some other 
traditions of the community which he has not previously engaged in, can assimilate 
into the new form of life in which he finds himself without having his perspective of 
the world – the scaffolding of his thoughts – radically altered. His behaviour might 
change in accordance with the practices of his new community, but not in a 
fundamental, unrecognisable way. He still goes home and converses with his family as 
usual, and even teaching them the new slang he has picked up at school is a trivial, 
familiar, undaunting activity, one for which no conversion or gestalt switch is 
required. The king, on the other hand, in undergoing a world-picture conversion at 
Moore’s persuasion, has undergone a radical transformation in how he sees the world. 
But the form of life he has now left behind – for he could not continue acting as he 
used to in all sorts of respects – has been left unchanged. Perhaps the people will 
choose one of the previous king’s descendents as their new king, but their form of life 
– and petitioning of the king to make the rain – remains intact.130 
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 That is not to say that forms of life are immutable. They do, of course, change too. 
The king’s conversion to a Moorean, (i.e. Western, scientific) world-picture might 
eventually cause the subjects of his kingdom to radically change their way of life, but 
that is due to his role as the figurehead of the community. Were an ordinary subject of 
the king’s to undergo a conversion at Moore’s hands, there is no reason to think that 
the form of life of which he was originally a part would undergo any significant 
changes.  
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The chronological development of the terms form of life and world-picture described 
earlier are helpful here. Form of life encapsulates all practices of a community, 
although the boundaries of the practices to be included in a given form of life will 
blur, as the boundaries of communities are rarely precisely distinct.
131
 Wittgenstein 
gestures in the Remarks towards some practices raised by Frazer as being of great 
importance to certain communities’ forms of life. However, it is not until the concepts 
of the world-picture and the certainty in On Certainty that recognition is given to the 
scaffolding role that some practices or ways of acting play in the lives of different 
communities (OC §211). The form-of-life terminology is mostly blind to the differing 
role of practices, and simply says: ‘These things happen’. The terminology of the 
world-picture and certainty, on the other hand, is highly conscious of what acts as a 
substratum (OC §162); how some seemingly empirical propositions become calcified 
into the riverbed (OC §97-99), and what it takes for that sediment to be dredged up 
and investigated on empirical terms once more (OC §97). The form of life is still 
present, implicitly, as a concept in On Certainty, but the contours of the topography 
have now been mapped, rather than seeking a perspicuous representation of 
unvariegated terrain. 
 
The contours in question are to do with depth. In the example of lined paper being 
called ‘block’, whilst unquestionably the case when I was at school, that particular 
jargon, like all slang, is apt to change. If that particular use has not disappeared by 
now, it would be surprising had it not in a few decades’ time. In terms of the role it 
played in our lives, it was not a deep, foundational one, any more than any slang ever 
is. Guy Fawkes Night is a relatively long-standing tradition, but even so it is only just 
over four hundred years old. Just as we practice few traditions now that were present 
eight hundred years ago, it would be surprising if Guy Fawkes Night is still celebrated 
four hundred years from now, at least in relation to what will by then perhaps seem an 
insignificant episode of history, rightly forgotten or at least absent from any November 
5
th
 festivities involving fireworks. 
 
If questioned by an outsider to our community about either of these practices, it would 
make sense to point to our community, its practices and traditions, and say ‘this is 
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simply what we do.’ In the Guy Fawkes Night example, we might supply a bit of the 
historical background, even though the original cause of the celebration has been 
largely forgotten. Not that that diminishes the effect of pointing to the form of life that 
contains these practices, any more than noting that our purpose in shaking hands as a 
greeting is no longer that of displaying the fact that we are unarmed and not 
dangerous. Neither of these practices – Guy Fawkes or shaking hands – runs 
particularly deep in our lives. Certainties, though, are part of the riverbed: calcified, 
subject to change only rarely, and, when so, with dramatic consequences. Were 
someone to ask us why we hold things carefully as if we expect them to fall, we would 
be baffled. Pointing to a communal custom of responding to gravity is not as 
straightforward as indicating an annual cultural tradition or piece of localised slang. 
Whatever we try to say in defence of our gravity-based actions will sound strange, 
even to us. 
 
Learning a new tradition or custom is fairly easy. On moving to a new school, small 
pieces of slang can be picked up within a couple of days. If someone immigrates to 
England in early November, by late December Guy Fawkes Night and Christmas Day 
celebrations and traditions will not seem overly mysterious. Forms of life can be 
adopted or left behind, amended or forgotten in a short space of time and with relative 
ease. Certainties are embedded far deeper in a person’s life. A change is usually 
cataclysmic – like a religious conversion – and hard to effect. Customs and traditions 
make up a form of life; certainties comprise a world-picture. The ingredients in each 
case differ, as we have seen above, and so the end results – the form of life and the 
world-picture – differ from one another correspondingly. It has already been noted, in 
§3.2.2, that pointing to a world-picture to justify a particular action is more difficult 
and less effective than pointing to a form of life. The features of a form of life are 
broad, spread out across a community and readily apparent in that community’s 
actions. All that we need to perceive is immediately set before us in the shape of the 
features – customs, traditions, and so on – of that form of life. Perceiving the 
certainties comprising a world-picture is a more complex task. 
 
First, we must consider that the ‘propositions which stand fast’ for someone are not 
learned ‘explicitly’ (OC §152). We cannot just ask someone what stands fast for them 
and expect a straightforward answer, for they have not learned certainties as 
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propositions. So simply asking what’s going on and why they act this way – in the 
way that we could of someone on November 5
th
 in England if we saw people gathered 
around fireworks and burning effigies – will be fruitless. Even were someone to have 
a good grip on what stands fast for them – perhaps they have some Wittgensteinian 
training – expressing it in the form of a proposition will still be problematic. 
Certainties are ways of acting, and verbal attempts to express them frequently sound 
‘odd’ (OC §389), or even absurd.132 Even though I have ‘known something the whole 
time . . . there is no meaning in saying so, in uttering this truth’ (OC §466) because 
there is no role for such expressions in our lives. 
 
Our response, then, might be to observe, and see if we can perceive for ourselves what 
lies at the root of the practices that confuse us. Again, the breadth on show in a feature 
of a form of life is easy to perceive – the fireworks and the burning effigies – but the 
depth is not. We must be conscious that we will only discover a certainty ‘like the axis 
around which a body rotates,’ by perceiving the ‘movement around it’ (OC §152). If 
nothing else, this requires more detailed and varied observations than perceiving a 
feature of a form of life. Let us say, though, that we somehow manage to get a good 
understanding of what kinds of things stand fast for someone, by observing the 
practices of theirs that confuse us. If we have accurately picked out the appropriate 
level of depth to constitute a certainty of a person, we would like to think that this 
certainty applies across the form of life on which we have been making our 
observations. This would be an error, a symptom of the ‘craving for generality’ (BB, 
p. 17) Wittgenstein cautions against from the Blue Book onwards.
133
 For although 
some certainties might happen to apply across the whole gathering of people on Guy 
Fawkes Night – say gravity, and the age of the earth – it is unlikely that all will be 
uniform. There will be atheists, Christians, Buddhists, and Jains, neo-Nazis, Marxists, 
pacifists, vegetarians and moral nihilists – each with very different certainties relating 
to matters spiritual, metaphysical and ethical – all engaging in a single feature of the 
same form of life. The lists of both participants and types of certainties could be 
extended almost indefinitely.  
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Chapter 6 will resume this line of thought and explore the non-uniformity of 
certainties, even across what we might think to be a single world-picture.  
This reading will reject the claim that we can readily assume identical world-pictures 
for two or more people, however similar their form of life, and suggest a variety of 
axes along which we might distinguish between different world-pictures. For now, 
though, the distinction between the form of life and the world-picture is sufficient, and 
this concludes the basic exposition of the later Wittgenstein and in particular On 
Certainty. Chapter 4 begins the process of extrapolating from On Certainty in order to 
examine the effect a thorough understanding of the world-picture has on 
communication and conversion. We begin this task by drawing parallels with Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter sought to construct a breadth-depth distinction between the form of life 
and the world-picture. We began by drawing together the two concepts. Each belongs, 
for the most part, to a particular work of Wittgenstein’s, form of life to Philosophical 
Investigations and world-picture to On Certainty. However, the world-picture did not 
displace the form of life, and points of crossover were demonstrated for each. Both 
indicate a point at which further rational argumentation gives out, but with different 
emphases. Form of life points to the breadth of practices across a community, whereas 
a world-picture and its certainties are deeply embedded in a person’s life, structuring 
all sorts of standards for making assertions, judgements, and investigations. The 
features of a form of life one engages in can be chosen rationally, and one can pick up 
or depart from such customs at will (although, if one were to choose to drive on the 
right in England, there would be a penalty to pay). Certainties cannot be picked up and 
put down so cursorily.  
 
The different emphasis of the interrelated terms reflects the primary concerns of the 
respective works they come from. On Certainty is, at least initially, interested in 
epistemology and an analysis of why the expressions Moore proposed are so 
compelling and yet not proper candidates for knowledge. Wittgenstein was interested 
just how deep the features of our lives indicated by the Moorean propositions go, and 
the extent to which they structure our other practices. Philosophical Investigations was 
primarily concerned with language, seeing connections, but also perhaps more 
importantly noticing dissimilarities as part of overthrowing the Augustinian picture; 
not all uses are identical, and in order to recognise this we need to be aware of just 
how far and to whom one use of a word stretches and where a different use takes over. 
Breadth and depth are, first, key features of the form of life and the world-picture, but 
also core themes of the works from which each term hails. By relating the two 
concepts in the manner proposed here we do not just demonstrate the deep links 
between On Certainty and Philosophical Investigations. We also carry with us into 
future chapters a powerful tool for examining both the breadth and depth of practices 
in human lives, creating a fuller picture with which to plot the concerns of 
communication and conversion.  
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4.1 Encountering other world-pictures 
 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein several times uses the example of no human ever 
having been far from the surface of the Earth or never having been on the Moon.
134
 
The idea in the 1950s of sending a human to the Moon – outside of a group of very 
forward-thinking astronomers – was, as the eminent British astronomer Sir Patrick 
Moore once noted, ‘regarded as little more than a music-hall joke.’135 When 
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Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty in 1950-1 he was among the majority who 
considered it impossible.
136
  
 
The suggestion by Patrick Moore that the idea of space travel was so absurd as to be 
funny echoes Wittgenstein’s comments about the affirmation or negation of 
certainties seeming a joke or insane at OC §§106, 463, 467 and 468.
137
 Wittgenstein 
makes many other references to the impossibility of a human visiting the Moon. In 
each instance, he regards the notion that we could reach the Moon as absurd, pointing 
out that ‘our whole system of physics forbids it’ (OC §108) and ‘it is as sure a thing 
for me [that no one has been on the moon] as any grounds I could give for it’ (OC 
§111).  
 
At some point, the widespread conviction that our whole system of physics forbids 
space travel changed. At about the same time that Wittgenstein was writing On 
Certainty and rejecting the possibility of space flight, Patrick Moore and a few other 
astronomers were considering its possibility. Had Wittgenstein and Patrick Moore met 
and discussed space flight in 1950-1, Wittgenstein may well have considered Patrick 
Moore insane, or to be telling a joke.
138
 
 
Although the possibility of space travel is now recognised, there was clearly a time 
when there where separate communities with different fixed points of reference on 
this matter, exemplified by Wittgenstein and Patrick Moore.
139
 Not only do changes 
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 There are still those who proclaim all reports of space travel to be an elaborate 
multi-government-sponsored deception, initially as part of Cold War propaganda, 
ranging from Yuri Gagarin’s first flight to all the later NASA Moon landings. These 
people largely publish their thoughts only on little-read Internet message boards, and 
so no scholarly references are available. Nonetheless, that there exists such a 
community holding one or more certainties radically different from the majority 
should not be ignored or passed off as irrelevant. It is also interesting to note that first-
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in certainties reflect incremental change in a world-picture viewed as a whole, but 
also suggest that changes to individual certainties occur incrementally themselves. 
People who once considered ‘our whole system of physics [to] forbid’ (OC §108) 
space travel were converted one by one, even though we might, retrospectively, be 
tempted to think of this change as happening en masse. 
 
Doubtless, some of the people instrumental in the pioneering efforts of putting 
humans in space inherited as children the same world-picture as Wittgenstein, one 
that precluded the possibility of space travel as a fundamental part of their inherited 
mythology. At some point, their world-picture in relation to this particular certainty 
regarding space travel must have changed. The riverbed metaphor illustrates how 
world-pictures can change in relation to the faster-flowing waters of empirical 
investigation, but it also raises fresh questions. What is it for two or more different 
world-pictures to come into contact with one another, and how do conversions in 
certainties and world-pictures happen? If Patrick Moore and Wittgenstein were to 
have met in 1950 and discussed the possibilities of space travel, would their claims 
have made sense to one another, or would communication be utterly impossible?  
 
The themes of communication and conversion run throughout On Certainty. At stake 
is a re-evaluation of the work of Philosophical Investigations – in particular the 
concept of language-games – when positioned against the backdrop not of the 
homogeneous ‘common behaviour of mankind’ (PI, §206), but rather against a variety 
of world-pictures. Wittgenstein’s investigation into different world-pictures is limited 
in On Certainty, but I suggest that close textual analysis reveals a clear trajectory of 
his thought to indicate this as a valid avenue of exploration.  
 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was influenced by 
Wittgenstein’s later work, and Kuhn had definitely read both The Blue and Brown 
Books and Philosophical Investigations by the time he came to write The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions
 
.
140
 Kuhn even quotes Wittgenstein’s concepts of language-
                                                                                                                                           
time visitors to these virtual forums who are not part of the space travel-denying 
community often post messages querying whether the websites are intended in jest. 
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games and family resemblance (SSR, pp. 26, 41, 56-7, 201).
141
 The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions investigates what it is for a scientist to change his ‘matter-of-
course foundations for his research’ (OC §167), an event Kuhn terms a ‘paradigm 
shift’ (SSR, passim). He discusses how such conversions take place and what happens 
to communication between members of the old and the new paradigm. We will note 
parallels between Wittgenstein’s and Kuhn’s respective concepts of the world-picture 
and the paradigm. Our aim in this chapter is primarily to explore whether Kuhn’s 
concept of incommensurability between paradigms can be of use in investigating 
comparable circumstances between world-pictures. 
 
§4.2 will begin with a brief overview of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
noting some important features of recent scholarly interpretation. §4.3 will continue 
by focusing on Kuhn’s method of providing several historical examples of scientific 
practices, and drawing parallels between this method and Wittgenstein’s of 
perspicuous representation. §4.4 examines Kuhn’s conception of the role of rules in a 
scientific paradigm, also drawing comparisons with Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules 
and rule-following in Philosophical Investigations. We will also note similarities 
between the understanding of the logical priority of paradigms and world-pictures to 
rules. §4.4 also introduces Kuhn’s use of the term ‘established bases’, which make up 
a paradigm, and how they are both distinguished from and shape the role of rules. 
 
§4.5 takes deeper the investigation into established bases. In order to grasp precisely 
what they are and how they are inherited, we will look at On Certainty, relating 
established bases to the certainties that make up a world-picture in that they are 
ungrounded, cannot be justified, and are logically prior to everyday scientific 
investigation. By the end of §4.5, we will have a clear outline of Kuhn’s work, and 
deep comparisons with Wittgenstein will already have been drawn regarding the use 
of perspicuous representation, rules, and an ungrounded way of acting lying at the 
bottom of our practices.  
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 Henceforth, when referencing quotations from The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn (1970), the book will be abbreviated to SSR in brackets within the 
main text. 
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§4.6 will explain just how deep these comparisons run, and begin to explore what we 
can learn from Kuhn’s discussion of paradigm clash and take with us in the 
examination of world-picture conflict. Two themes will emerge: crisis, when one’s 
paradigm or world-picture encounters a challenge it cannot readily accommodate; and 
persuasion, whereby non-rational means are the only ones available to effect a 
conversion of paradigm or world-picture. The final section of this chapter, §4.7, will 
introduce Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability, preparing the way for a detailed 
investigation in Chapter 5. First, in §4.2, we turn to The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 
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4.2 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
 
Until Kuhn’s challenge in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it was generally 
presumed that science is a progressive enterprise.
142
 As Kramnick states in his 
introduction to the Enlightenment Reader, science ‘fuelled millennial fervor in the 
Enlightenment. It was the basis for an unbounded faith in progress, a belief in 
perfectibility and the imminent elimination of pain and suffering.’143 As we conduct 
more experiments and verify more theories, we are acquiring more truths and our 
theories are becoming more precise. Science, on this view, is cumulative, and it is a 
result of the method of science – of hypotheses, testing, refining apparatus for more 
accurate results – that this effect is guaranteed. A commitment to, as Naugle puts it, 
‘epistemic realism, a universal scientific language, and the correspondence theory of 
truth’ were more or less mandatory requirements for this positivist conception of 
science.
144
 Mandelbaum, somewhat similarly, describes how positivism was ‘widely 
espoused in the nineteenth century’ and was characterised by ‘first, a rejection of 
metaphysics; second, the contention that science constitutes the ideal form of 
knowledge; third, a particular interpretation of the nature and the limits of science 
explanation.’145 Our path to perfect knowledge of the physical world seemed 
inexorable. Crucially, in the words of Mary Hesse, ‘man as scientist is regarded as 
standing apart from the world and able to experiment and theorise about it objectively 
and dispassionately.’146 
 
There were other accounts of science and nature prevalent before the twentieth 
century. Kant’s thought enjoyed a resurgence amongst neo-Kantians like Eduard 
Zeller and Kuno Fischer in the later nineteenth century, particularly in Germany as an 
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 This view was especially powerful in the post-war period before Kuhn published 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1970, especially as espoused by those 
associated with logical positivism, such as Carnap (1950) and Popper (1959). 
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 Kramnick (1995), p. xiii. 
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alternative to the debates between idealists and materialists.
147
 Although neo-Kantian 
influence has now diminished, Oberheim detects neo-Kantian strains in Kuhn’s 
contemporaries and successors, in particular Feyerabend.
148
 Mandelbaum also claims 
that it was ‘to Kant and Hume that [the later positivists] tended to trace their lineage,’ 
even though there was also an anti-Kantian reaction in the work of those such as 
Helmholtz, Spencer, Huxley, and DuBois-Reymond.
149
 The history of pre-twentieth-
century science and philosophy of science is a complex and engaging area of debate. 
For our purposes, it is enough to note that positivism, albeit in various forms and with 
a tangled network of allegiances and lineages, was a dominant trend in pre-twentieth-
century philosophy of science.
150
 
 
Kuhn sought ‘a quite different concept of science’: dynamic, shifting, and untethered 
from the yoke of the prevailing, ideal image of science as relentlessly cumulative 
(SSR, p. 1). Science, Kuhn claims, proceeds through two different phases, the normal 
and the revolutionary. Normal science ‘is cumulative’ (SSR, p. 96). Research is 
carried out ‘firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, 
achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as 
supplying the foundation for its further practice’ (SSR, p. 10).  
 
Kuhn likens normal science to ‘puzzle-solving’, in an effort to convey the impression 
that the scientist, like the cruciverbalist, has a high expectation of success (SSR, p. 
35). Rather like a crossword, the boundaries as to what is permissible – the edges of 
the box – are already drawn. These are defined by the underlying assumptions to 
which the community of scientists adheres. What is left for the scientists is to fill in 
the blanks. These blanks encourage very little novelty, for no fundamental laws of 
science as held by the community can be broken. Instead, scientists work at refining 
their theses on an increasingly minute and esoteric level of detail. The findings of any 
experiment are largely anticipated to a high degree of precision. Often, what proves so 
interesting to scientists is ‘achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the 
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 See Mandelbaum (1971), p. 20. See also Skorupski (1993), p. 120, where he notes 
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solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles’ 
(SSR, p. 36). The adept scientist is a proficient puzzle-solver. 
 
Revolutionary science seeks a new understanding of the basic laws assumed to hold 
by the scientific community. In revolutionary science, the crossword box is re-drawn. 
Scientific revolutions are ‘inaugurated by a growing sense . . . that an existing 
paradigm has ceased to function adequately’ (SSR, p. 92). When the prevailing model 
of normal science – Kuhn calls such models ‘paradigms’ – fails to account for one or 
more observed anomalous phenomena, a period of crisis ensues. It may be that, with 
further testing or a novel explanation, the phenomenon can be absorbed seamlessly 
into the old paradigm. However, when this is not possible, the model that previously 
dictated the terms of research for normal science is violated by this new phenomenon. 
A new paradigm must be constructed, with a new set of fundamental assumptions, in 
order to accommodate the anomalous phenomenon. If the old paradigm were retained, 
the anomaly would remain an unexplained and unexplainable phenomenon.  
 
In order to appeal to scientists in a time of crisis, the new paradigm must perform 
most of the explanatory work of which the old paradigm was capable. Some 
hypotheses might be lost, no longer compatible with the new paradigm, and certain 
phenomena left unexplained. This has become known – though not labelled so by 
Kuhn himself – as ‘Kuhn-loss’.151 Kuhn notes that scientific revolutions are ‘those 
non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in 
whole or in part by an incompatible new one’ (SSR, p. 92). The Kuhn-loss stems from 
the fact that the new paradigm is incompatible with the old one. This ought not be 
surprising. ‘Obviously,’ says Kuhn, ‘there must be a conflict between the paradigm 
that discloses anomaly and the one that later renders the anomaly lawful’ (SSR, p. 
97). Just what this conflict and incompatibility amounts to and entails will form a key 
focal point of the later parts of this chapter and the whole of the next when we come 
to look at the concept of incommensurability. 
 
 
4.2.1 Interpretations of ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ 
                                                 
151
 It is generally agreed that the term was first introduced by Heinz Post, and 
thereafter widely adopted by subsequent scholars. See Post (1971), p. 229. 
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Kuhn’s work has been both influential and divisive. Hoyningen-Huene’s 
Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions provides a thorough survey of Kuhn’s thought 
and is commendable for reintroducing The Structure of Scientific Revolutions into 
mainstream attention, but tends not to get too involved in ‘reviewing criticisms of 
Kuhn to date’ or the complexities of various interpretations.152 Some, such as Michael 
Friedman (2001) have viewed The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a work of 
historiography and as concerned primarily with the ‘theory of the nature and character 
of scientific revolutions.’153 Alexander Bird in Thomas Kuhn has characterised The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions as an unsuccessful attempt to provide a hypothesis 
to explain the phenomena of scientific change.
154
  
 
Closer to our own interests for this thesis, lies Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific 
Revolution, by Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read, who class Kuhn’s work as 
‘overwhelmingly philosophical’.155 Perhaps this is unsurprising given that Sharrock 
and Read are both philosophers, and may want to claim Kuhn for one of their own. 
However, although they profess to having ‘largely kept [their] own – Wittgensteinian 
– views in check’, they do find Kuhn most plausible when he can be read in a way 
which seems of a therapeutic nature.
156
 This depends in great part on their own stance 
on Wittgenstein and the nature of his work. In general, both Sharrock and Read lean 
heavily towards the therapeutic side of Wittgenstein interpretation.
157
 Importantly, 
they neglect and misconstrue the aspect of Kuhn’s use of historical examples, 
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regarding their purpose as being only ‘to exemplify and dramatize the progress of 
philosophical revolutions – but that is perhaps their only philosophical relevance.’158  
 
Vasso Kindi suggests a more plausible reading.
159
 She sees parallels between the 
deployment of historical examples in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and 
Wittgenstein’s use of language-games in Philosophical Investigations. Kindi suggests 
that just as Wittgenstein pursued an anti-essentialist approach to language, Kuhn 
‘attacks an essentialist view of science.’160 Kuhn presents three core arguments 
against the ideal image of science. We will look at the first two briefly here, leaving 
the third, about lexical change, for §4.3. The first asserts that to turn an anomalous 
result from an experiment into a normal phenomenon – that is, to prevent it from 
remaining an unexplained anomaly – a new paradigm is required if the old one cannot 
be modified to accommodate it. The new paradigm has to be capable of explaining 
this anomaly, as well as carrying a great deal of the explanatory value of the old 
paradigm, Kuhn-loss notwithstanding.
161
 The result of Kuhn’s method instead, as 
Kindi suggests, ‘is an “open concept” of science, characterized not by delimiting 
necessary and sufficient conditions, but by a complicated network of similarities and 
dissimilarities.’162 
 
The second argues that if science were cumulative then any anomaly could be 
explained away as a special case, specific to the precise circumstances in which the 
experiment that revealed the anomaly took place. Taken this way, the anomaly no 
longer threatens the normal-science law it apparently breaks. Instead, that law 
develops a sub-law, which permits such an anomaly under certain specifications: 
those specifications being the circumstances under which the experiment took place. 
There are three important consequences of this. One is that any theory of normal 
science is no longer applicable when experiments are conducted in a new area of 
enquiry pertaining to it, as these new areas will warrant their own special-case sub-
laws. This would also apply if the research were being conducted in a previously 
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examined area, but with greater precision than ever managed previously. A second 
consequence is that normal science would stop, as there would no longer be a 
paradigm to govern further research. It is essential that the ‘commitment [to a 
paradigm] must extend to areas and to degrees of precision for which there is no full 
precedent. If it did not, the paradigm could provide no puzzles that had not already 
been solved’ (SSR, p. 100). Finally, the nature of science would be radically altered, 
for ‘the mechanism that tells the scientific community what problems may lead to 
fundamental change [would] cease to function’ (SSR, p. 101). Science would not 
undergo revolutions, not because it is progressing cumulatively on an endless 
trajectory, but rather it because it would stagnate entirely, producing only an ever-
increasing number of sub-laws and special cases. 
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4.3  Perspicuous representation in Wittgenstein and Kuhn 
 
4.3.1 Kuhn’s use of historical examples 
 
Whilst the two arguments above are important to Kuhn’s conception of paradigms 
and scientific revolution, the third argument interests us most here. That argument is 
about meaning or lexical change across different paradigms, which is itself the second 
of three arguments posited about incommensurability.
163
 To understand Kuhn on 
lexical change, however, we must address the importance of the historical examples 
used by Kuhn. There is, as was briefly outlined earlier, a tension in recent scholarship. 
Its nature may be best summarised by Kuhn’s own comment on this topic, several 
years after The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in The Road Since Structure: ‘many 
of the most central conclusions we drew from the historical record can be derived 
instead from first principles.’164 
 
Just what this means is the topic of some debate. If the historical examples used are 
not needed for most of the conclusions, which can instead be derived from first 
principles, why are they there at all, and why do they seem such an integral part of the 
book? The key is to see the purpose of the historical examples as setting out an 
approach or a method, rather than constituting an argument in themselves, in the same 
way that Wittgenstein uses language-games as his examples. Without this method in 
place, the actual arguments, in particular the third argument against science as 
cumulative, that of lexical change, would encounter great difficulties, possibly 
insurmountable ones. 
 
In §1.4 we examined Wittgenstein’s desire for a perspicuous representation of our 
linguistic practices, achieved by seeing connections between instances of language 
use. Sometimes, it helps to provide ‘intermediate cases’ (PI §122) supplied by the 
construction of fictional language games in order to draw attention to particular 
aspects of actual language use. Wittgenstein described this process of seeing 
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connections as being akin to seeing family resemblances (PI §167).
165
 This method – 
as opposed to a theory – is one of anti-essentialism, placing a focus on the variety of 
use and thereby combating our ‘craving for generality’ (BB, p. 16-20).  
 
In order to understand Kuhn’s claim that ‘many of the most central conclusions we 
drew from the historical record can be derived instead from first principles’ we ought 
to view Kuhn’s examples of past paradigms and revolutions in the same way 
Wittgenstein’s method encourages us to view language-games.166 On the one hand, 
Kuhn does present arguments, couched in propositions, and with justifications, 
reasons, and conclusions. It is probably true that his conclusions do not require the 
historical examples. In that sense, Sharrock and Read were close when they asserted 
that the purpose of the historical examples is to ‘exemplify and dramatize the progress 
of philosophical revolutions’.167 However Kindi is far closer when she states that: 
 
Just like language games “are meant to throw light on the facts of our 
language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities” 
(PI §130), Kuhn’s historical cases are supposed to show (not in the 
sense of prove) how varied things have been and can be in the 
future.
168
 
 
Wittgenstein, in setting out various examples of language use, hopes that the 
representation of the facts will persuade us that one instance of a word or a phrase or a 
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concept does not prescribe its appropriate uses in all other contexts. Words do not fit 
into an ideal image, where meaning is fixed independently of use. Kuhn, in 
displaying, for example, the difference between the Ptolemaic and Copernican 
conceptions of the solar system, indicates that the chronologically prior theory – the 
Ptolemaic – did not set permanently the concept of orbits of celestial bodies.169 In the 
Ptolemaic conception, the Earth sits at the centre, beyond which, in ascending order 
of orbiting distance from the Earth, lie the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, 
Jupiter, and Saturn. Kuhn, once the difference between this and the now-familiar 
Copernican/Galilean conception of the solar system has been laid out, does not 
proceed to a rigorous proof of his thesis (SSR, p. 69). At this stage, he is content to let 
the multiplicity of scientific views over time reveal itself. 
 
This may not be wholly surprising. No one asserts that all the views held by past 
scientists are held to be equally true by those of today. But as the discussion in 
Chapter VII of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions progresses, and Kuhn 
elaborates on the concept of crisis brought about by the clash of two incompatible 
theories, it becomes clear that the differences between the two theories are not 
reconcilable in a manner that could give equal weight to both and find a suitable 
synthesis. For one to find favour the other must be dismissed utterly, so fundamental 
are the grounding assumptions each builds upon. Ultimately, this required Kepler’s 
analysis proposing elliptical – rather than strictly circular – orbits, and Galileo’s 
conjectures about the role of friction on a moving object, to draw out the fundamental 
differences between the two.  
 
At this stage, Kuhn has simply presented two theories which the modern reader, with 
a very basic understanding of science, can see differ in content. By examining the 
similarities and dissimilarities, we can note the incompatibility of the two for 
ourselves. The grip of the ideal image of science as perennially cumulative has 
already been loosened, even though no hypothesis has yet been advanced. The 
Ptolemaic conception cannot be preserved once the Copernican has been adopted. 
Wittgenstein wants us to see the similarities and dissimilarities between language 
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usages; Kuhn wants us to see the similarities and dissimilarities between different 
scientific modes of thinking. 
 
Kuhn has presented us with the potential for a certain way of seeing. By setting out 
various examples of one scientific model superseding another, the groundwork is laid 
for the positive theses he wishes to propose. These theses may well be capable of 
some serious work without this way of seeing – a worthy discussion of whether this is 
indeed the case is far beyond the remit of this thesis – but their force would certainly 
be substantially diminished.  
 
 
4.3.2 Lexical change 
 
Before we considered Kuhn’s use of perspicuous representation, the argument about 
lexical change had been introduced, and we return to this now. Kuhn argues 
persuasively that Newtonian dynamics cannot be derived from relativistic dynamics 
(SSR, pp. 101-3). These two theories, he states, ‘are fundamentally incompatible in 
the sense illustrated by the relation of Copernican to Ptolemaic astronomy: Einstein’s 
theory can be accepted only with the recognition that Newton’s was wrong’ (SSR, p. 
98). The prevailing view of Kuhn’s time was that Newtonian theory could be 
preserved as a special case of the Einsteinian (SSR, p. 98). The problems of this 
approach, for Kuhn, have already been detailed above. Where two theories conflict, 
but one or the other is preserved as a special case, science is reduced to sub-laws that 
deny the possibility of refutation. What the discrepancy between the two theories 
comes down to is that ‘unless we change the definitions of the variables in the 
[statements embodying Newtonian theory], the statements we have derived are not 
properly Newtonian . . . we have had to alter the fundamental structural elements of 
which the universe to which they apply is composed’ (SSR, p. 102).  
 
As Read and Sharrock note, ‘the last point is crucial. Kuhn argues that Newton and 
Einstein take the universe to be populated by different fundamental entities. There is 
no way . . . for one to intertranslate between the two without obliterating this vital 
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fact.’170 If one sticks faithfully to the meanings of terms like ‘mass’ and ‘motion’ as 
they are used in Newtonian theory, then one cannot use them in the same way in 
association with Einsteinian theory. The concepts are wholly distinct and cannot be 
reconciled such that they mean the same thing. What we are being deceived by, 
Wittgenstein might say, is the apparent uniformity of language. The words as they are 
written or spoken are the same but their meanings are not. We can tell this simply by 
examining the way in which they are used, their context. Kuhn, like Wittgenstein, 
notes that linguistic use is inextricably linked to the practices of a community. 
Newtonian scientists didn’t use the terms ‘motion’ or ‘mass’ in the same way as 
Einsteinian scientists because the practices of their respective communities differ so 
greatly. So, the scientific community, who, shortly after Newton’s time, adopted his 
theory of dynamics, did not use the concepts in the same way as Einstein, and so the 
concepts themselves are different. In fact, that is precisely why Einstein’s theory 
superseded Newton’s: it was able to provide explanatory power in certain areas that 
Newton’s lacked. If all the concepts associated with all the words used by Newton 
had been identical with Einstein’s, there would have been no advantage in adopting 
Einstein’s theory. 
 
With this fact in mind, Kuhn’s argument about lexical change looks somewhat 
Wittgensteinian. Here we have the example of the same term being deployed in 
different contexts. The difference in the context is separated chronologically, rather 
than amongst different language-game-playing tribes, but this does not matter at all. 
An identical term is used in two different contexts with two wholly different 
meanings. If the meanings of terms were fixed in the way that Russell, Frege, or even 
the early Wittgenstein claimed, serious problems would be posed for Kuhn’s analysis 
of the Newton-Einstein dispute.
171
 If mass means one particular thing, an eternal, 
mind-independently fixed meaning, there are only two possibilities. Either Newton’s 
and Einstein’s theories must tally, and the one be derivable from the other; or one 
must be declared as wrong, as not giving a true – that is, on a firmly realist conception 
– description of mass. 
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Kuhn has shown that the two theories do not entail the same results; their conclusions 
are not co-extensive. Even the positivists only claim that the same results can be 
produced by the two at low relative velocities (SSR, p. 102). On the other hand, one 
theory cannot be declared wrong, as a simple case of refutation, for this would wholly 
conflict with the essential thrust of Kuhn’s work. One would have to make several 
ontological commitments, ultimately entailing a realist conception of truth, with the 
added proviso that one of these theories – whichever is to be deemed correct – has hit 
just such a mark. If even the most basic of Kuhn’s idea are to be preserved, a fixed-
meaning account of language must be ruled out. 
 
Not only does Kuhn’s use of historical examples bear similarity to Wittgenstein’s use 
of linguistic examples, Kuhn’s ideas depend on the view that perspicuous 
representation produces. That is not to say that Kuhn’s work is a direct derivation of 
Wittgenstein’s work. However, the fundamental principles on which Kuhn’s 
investigation is based bear certain similarities with Wittgensteinian’s, not just in the 
similarity of their structure and methods used, but also, at least in part, in terms of the 
conception of language deployed. Without this background work, where we are 
presented with a fresh way of seeing, it is difficult to see how the first principles 
would lead anywhere at all. The ideal image of science must first be escaped before a 
new picture can be presented, and that is the role of the historical examples. 
 146 
4.4 Kuhn and rules 
 
Any account claiming to bear parallels with Wittgenstein’s conception of language 
would be incomplete without a discussion of rule-following. There are three points of 
comparison to be made between Wittgenstein’s and Kuhn’s respective understanding 
of the role of rules in human activities (Kuhn’s being limited to scientific practices). 
In both their conceptions, they:  
a) reject a more traditional assumption that these rules are somehow 
metaphysically real, absolute, and mind-independent,  
b) describe rules as being established by practice and custom, and  
c) describe rules as governing human activities, but with variation in rules 
across different communities. 
 
In Chapter IV of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a discussion of rules 
comprises a crucial part of Kuhn’s exposition of normal science as a puzzle-solving 
activity. Rules in Philosophical Investigations were covered in depth in §1.3. In this 
section, we will focus primarily on Kuhn’s exposition so as not to reiterate the points 
on Wittgenstein already made, drawing attention to the three points of comparison in 
Philosophical Investigations and occasionally On Certainty via footnotes where 
relevant.  
 
Kuhn begins by noting that: 
 
If it is to classify as a puzzle, a problem must be characterised by 
more than an assured solution. There must also be rules that limit both 
the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are to 
be obtained . . . Similar restrictions upon the admissible solutions of 
crossword puzzles, riddles, chess problems, and so on, are readily 
discovered (SSR, p. 38). 
 
Within scientific practices, it is not a case of any solution to a puzzle goes. Rules 
delimit what sort of methods and results would be acceptable, much as the 8x8 board 
and rules on movement of different pieces determine which solutions to a complex 
chess problem are permissible. At once, Kuhn strips science of the grander claims 
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made by the ideal image of science, because the rules with which he draws 
comparison are not mind-independently created. They are anthropocentric in origin, 
and exist because a custom exists behind them.
172
  
 
Kuhn refers to Wittgenstein’s conception of family resemblance in order to explain 
the diversity of rules in what seems at first to be a ‘single monolithic and unified 
enterprise’ (SSR, p. 49).173 There are several sub-disciplines within science. The most 
obvious lines we could draw might be between physics, chemistry, and biology, 
although these distinctions are somewhat crude. Each sub-divides further into highly 
specialised fields and cross-disciplines within those sub-disciplines. Speaking of 
various research problems and techniques, Kuhn suggests that:  
 
What these have in common is not that they satisfy some explicit or 
even fully discoverable set of rules and assumptions that gives the 
tradition its character and its hold upon the scientific mind. Instead, 
they may relate by resemblance and modelling to one or another part 
of the scientific corpus which the community in question already 
recognises as among its established achievements (SSR, pp. 45-6).
174
 
 
Different scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines within a shared paradigm engage in 
different activities; each activity has its own set of rules. Where there are differences 
in rules within a shared paradigm, there will be a family resemblance between the 
rules. As Ian Hacking puts it: 
 
Is science then one kind of thing at all? There is no set of features 
peculiar to all the sciences, and possessed only by sciences. There is 
no set of necessary and sufficient condition for being a science. There 
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opposed to metaphysical ‘rails laid to infinity’ – see PI §§212-225, and in particular 
§218. Regarding b) on rules as established by customary practice, see PI §198: ‘a 
person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a 
custom.’ 
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 Q.v. §1.4 on family resemblance. 
174
 Regarding c), rules govern human activities, but with variation in rules across 
different communities, see PI §§23, 24, 53, and p. 191. 
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are a lot of family resemblances between sciences. Importantly, there 
are quite different kinds of “unifiers”.175 
 
Different rules govern different activities and create different language-games, where 
lexical meaning differs slightly across different sections of the broader community. 
However, rules do not govern only language use in scientific activity. They also 
provide ‘conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological’ guidance, and 
‘tell the practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his science are like 
[so that] he can concentrate with assurance upon the esoteric problems that these rules 
and existing knowledge define for him’ (SSR, p. 42). If normal science is a puzzle-
solving activity – or rather, several different puzzle-solving activities related to one 
another by family resemblance – then the rules complete the metaphor, delimiting the 
possibilities for each individual puzzle.  
 
 
4.4.1  The Priority of Paradigms 
 
Rules, whilst essential in order to make clear to scientists what challenges they face 
and how they ought to go about solving them, are not the primary source of coherence 
for a scientific research tradition. Separate from rules, Kuhn also identifies ‘quasi-
metaphysical commitments’ held by scientists (SSR, p. 41). We ought to think of 
these quasi-metaphysical commitments as convictions about, for example, the 
‘fundamental structural elements of which the universe . . . is composed’ (SSR, p. 
102).  
 
In the seventeenth century it was widely assumed that the most basic physical 
material was that of microscopic corpuscles. The influence of Corpuscularianism 
ranged from Descartes through to Robert Boyle and John Locke. Any natural 
phenomena, it was thought, could be explained via reference to the movement, shape, 
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 Hacking (1996), p. 68. Hacking goes on to list some unifiers that have been 
proposed, and notes that mathematics is often cited as the ‘common denominator’. 
This only works, though, because of ‘Wittgenstein’s phrase, “the motley of 
mathematics” . . . it is just because mathematics is such a motley that it does such a 
good job of making science look as if it were one unified activity: if we can apply 
mathematics to it,’ he finishes sarcastically, ‘it must be one thing!’ Ibid. 
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or interaction of these corpuscles. There were two facets to this assumption: the 
metaphysical and the methodological. 
 
As metaphysical, it told [scientists] what sorts of entities the universe 
did and did not contain: there was only shaped matter in motion. As 
methodological, it told them what ultimate laws and fundamental 
explanations must be like: laws must specify corpuscular motion and 
interaction, and explanation must reduce any given natural 
phenomenon to corpuscular action under these laws. More important 
still, the corpuscular conception of the universe told scientists what 
many of their research problems should be. (SSR, p. 41) 
 
The distinction between rules and the quasi-metaphysical commitments of a paradigm 
is important. ‘Rules,’ Kuhn suggests, ‘derive from paradigms, but paradigms can 
guide research even in the absence of rules’ (SSR, p. 42). Kuhn describes the quasi-
metaphysical commitments as ‘less local and temporary [than rules], though still not 
unchanging characteristics of science’ (SSR, p. 41). So rules occur within a paradigm, 
which itself is structured by quasi-metaphysical commitments and these in turn 
present methodological and metaphysical – in terms of to what fundamental entities 
theories ought to reduce – guidance for research and hypotheses. 
 
Having presented four arguments for the priority of paradigms, Kuhn concludes by 
describing paradigms as having ‘a status prior to that of shared rules’ (SSR, p. 49).176 
Further, he asserts that it is the ‘established bases of their field’ that make up 
scientists’ paradigms, for the established bases form a ‘historically and pedagogically 
prior unit,’ which present methodological and metaphysical guidance for scientists 
even in the absence of the lower-level and more local rules (SSR, p. 46). These 
established bases – I will henceforth use this term instead of quasi-metaphysical 
commitments, simply because it is shorter – do differ depending on the scientist’s 
specialisation. Kuhn provides an intriguing illustration of the effects – both 
methodological and metaphysical – different established bases reveal: 
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 Also throughout SSR Chapter V – The Priority of Paradigms. 
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An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists 
took the atomic theory to be asked a distinguished physicist and an 
eminent chemist whether a single atom of helium was or was not a 
molecule. Both answered without hesitation, but their answers were 
not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule 
because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. 
For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom was not a 
molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably 
both men were talking of the same particle, but they were viewing it 
through their own research training and practice. Their experience in 
problem-solving told them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly 
their experiences had had much in common, but they did not, in this 
case, tell the two specialists the same thing. (SSR, pp. 50-1) 
 
Crucially, for our purposes, Kuhn describes this as a case of ‘consequential paradigm 
differences’ (SSR, p. 51). Not only are the established bases prior to rules, but, where 
there are differences, they entail a difference in paradigm, even though in this case the 
difference is probably rather slight, and certainly not as stark as between, say, a 
Ptolemaic and a Copernican astronomer.  
 
Exactly what is the nature of this priority or of the established bases has not yet been 
fully investigated, nor whether Wittgenstein considers world-pictures prior to rules 
and language-games in a comparable way. We are still to understand fully the 
established bases that make up paradigms, how they are generated, inherited, and 
what impact they have on practice and rules. §4.5 will examine these issues, drawing 
on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, and claim that the established bases of a paradigm 
are inherited by scientists in the same manner in which we acquire certainties: as part 
of our upbringing or education and unconsciously, i.e. indirectly. These claims open 
up the possibility that paradigms themselves cannot be justified and are ungrounded, 
just as one cannot provide a justification for one’s world-picture. Once we are in a 
position to make this claim, in §4.6 we can progress to examining what might 
persuade a scientist to change his paradigm, or a person to change his world-picture. 
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4.5 On Certainty and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
 
This section explores three core concepts that have already been addressed in relation 
to On Certainty. These are: (i) the unjustifiable nature of certainties, for they are an 
ungrounded way of acting and, except in very specific circumstances, non-
propositional; (ii) the difficulty in articulating certainties, for they are liable to sound 
insane or a joke; (iii) the riverbed metaphor, which describes the slow-changing 
certainties as both opposed to and delimiting the possibilities for all other 
investigations and empirical propositional claims.  
 
We return to these familiar themes in order to see whether comparisons made with 
Kuhn in these regards are sustainable. If they are, then not only will we have acquired 
an alternative angle from which to consider On Certainty, but we will also be able to 
introduce the concept of incommensurability and apply it to cases of world-picture 
conflict. The section will conclude that strong parallels can be drawn in all three 
respects. There is substantial textual evidence from The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions to back these claims. In short, we wish to be able to substitute 
‘certainties’ with ‘established bases’ in all three of the above statements. Each sub-
section will begin with a brief re-statement of the relevant conclusions drawn from On 
Certainty in Chapter 2, followed by analysis of comparisons with Kuhn.  
 
 
4.5.1 (i) The unjustifiable nature of certainties and established bases 
 
Recap:  Wittgenstein considers certainties to be unjustifiable because they are 
ways of acting (OC §110), and because they provide the very standards and methods 
by which we define our practices of justification. We learned these indirectly (OC 
§152) as part of our upbringing (OC §7), and so when we learned these practices no 
justification was provided. There is no role in our lives for certainties to be treated as 
empirical propositions (OC §§308, 347), for doubt or mistake (OC §138), and so 
evidence cannot be provided either way (OC §§4, 191). Justification must reach an 
end, and ‘at some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description’ (OC 
§189). 
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Kuhn’s description of a paradigm suggests a similar willingness to respect the end of 
possibilities for justification. He notes that: 
 
The shared paradigm [is] a fundamental unit for the student of 
scientific development, a unit that cannot be fully reduced to logically 
atomic components which might function in its stead’ (SSR, p. 11).  
 
This sounds like the point at which Kuhn reaches ‘bedrock’ (PI §78). For if we have 
reached a fundamental stage, there can be no evidence lying below it that might 
justify the fundamental stage itself. He goes on to claim that the reasons for this 
inability to justify paradigms involve paradigms’ enacted nature and role in a 
scientific education. His point can be broken into two parts. First, he notes that one 
aspect of the difficulty in picking out and justifying the logical rules that make up a 
paradigm is that the ‘difficulty is very nearly the same as the one the philosopher 
encounters when he tries to say what all games have in common’ (SSR, p. 46).177 By 
this he means that even the constituent logical rules of a paradigms – the established 
bases – bear only a family resemblance to one another. There is no single feature 
common to all, and therefore isolating a single aspect of the paradigm – its ‘logically 
atomic components’ – is an especially tricky task. 
 
Kuhn’s second point is deemed a ‘corollary’ to the first, but in fact might be better 
described as an explanation of it (SSR, p. 46). ‘Scientists’, Kuhn is at pains to point 
out, ‘never learn concepts, laws, and theories in the abstract and by themselves’ (SSR, 
p. 46). These ‘intellectual tools are from the start encountered in a historically and 
pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and through their application’ (SSR, 
p. 46). Concepts, laws, and theories are mere formulations of ways of acting. In time, 
a new theory may become accepted into scientific textbooks. But even there, a pupil 
discovers the meanings of the terms involved ‘less from the incomplete though 
sometimes helpful definitions in his text than by observing and participating in the 
application of these concepts to problem-solution’ (SSR, p. 47). If they do ‘learn 
abstractions at all, they show it mainly through their ability to do successful research’ 
(SSR, p. 47).  
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 Note the reference to ‘a philosopher’ and ‘games’; this follows Kuhn’s citation of 
Wittgenstein’s influence on the two preceding pages, pp. 44-5. 
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These two points made by Kuhn exemplify several connections with On Certainty. 
The components of a paradigm are logically, historically, and pedagogically prior to 
the theories a science student learns. The paradigm is constituted from several ways 
of acting, which cannot in themselves be justified. When students are indoctrinated 
into a paradigm, they do not learn about it directly, but indirectly, through 
participating in scientific activities. They must also demonstrate a skill successfully in 
order for it to be said that they have learned the abstract concepts of theories and 
terminology, just as in order to be said to be literate or numerate, one must be ‘master 
of a technique’ (PI §199). 
 
Kuhn advances his point about how we inherit an understanding of the established 
bases of a paradigm: 
 
Science students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, 
not because of evidence . . . the applications given in texts are not 
there as evidence but because learning them is part of learning the 
paradigm at the base of current practice (SSR, p. 80). 
 
The examples in textbooks are part of the practice required to acquire the established 
bases of the paradigm, but, as we have seen, in order to be a well-regarded scientist 
one must demonstrate one’s understanding in practice. Given that this is science we 
are discussing, it would be reasonable to ask how these theories achieved such 
dominance and universal acceptance in the first place. Kuhn answers this question by 
pointing out that, at various times, various texts have been taken to ‘expound the body 
of accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful applications, and compare 
these applications with exemplary observations and experiments’ (SSR, p. 10). Kuhn 
lists some examples: 
 
Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia and 
Opticks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisier’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s 
Geology – these and many other works served for a time implicitly to 
define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for 
succeeding generations of practitioners (SSR, p. 10). 
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Whilst Aristotle, Ptolemy, Newton, Franklin, Lavoisier, and Lyell, when engaging in 
the research that led to these works, were tackling very real, open questions and 
testing empirical propositions, at some point, their work became part – perhaps even 
the embodiment – of a widespread scientific paradigm.178 To compare this with 
Wittgenstein: what were once empirical propositions – open to debate, doubt, and 
amassing of evidence for and against – become ‘hardened’ (OC §96) and form part of 
the scientist’s ‘frame of reference’ (OC §83). 
 
Although the established bases of a paradigm were once tested and found persuasive 
as empirical theories, that is no longer their role. They have become part of the 
‘matter-of-course foundations for . . . research’ (OC §167), and ‘define the legitimate 
problems and methods of a research field for generations of practitioners’ (SSR, p. 
10). Formerly empirical propositions that have become embedded as established bases 
cannot any longer be doubted at will. To do so would put one at odds with the rest of 
one’s scientific contemporaries. There is no role for justification in the case of 
established bases, though they may once have been open to empirical investigation. 
 
 
4.5.2 (ii) Difficulty in articulating certainties and established bases 
 
Recap:  Wittgenstein offers a range of features that distinguish certainties from 
knowledge (OC §1), describing them as belonging to different categories (OC §308). 
Due to the fundamental status they hold in our lives (OC §137), doubt and mistake are 
logically meaningless when it comes to certainties (OC §504). Everything speaks in 
their favour and nothing against (OC §4). Consequently, affirming a certainty is likely 
to sound like a piece of superfluous information (OC §460) and the person who 
affirms it is liable to be thought ‘insane’ (OC §467) or making a ‘joke’ (OC §463). 
Although the same proposition we might express in an attempt to verbalise a certainty 
might have an application in a different circumstance, with a different use, certainties 
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 Not simultaneously, we ought to add. Some of these works and the paradigms they 
exemplify are incommensurable. This term, ‘incommensurable’, will be given greater 
attention in the next chapter. For now we can think of it as roughly meaning 
‘incompatible’. Kuhn himself occasionally describes it as such. See, for example, 
SSR, p. 92.  
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– those particular ways of acting – are non-propositional (OC §347). Those attempts 
to make a certainty fit into a proposition are the expressions Wittgenstein ‘should like 
to expunge from philosophical language’ (OC §31). 
 
Kuhn’s argument begins from what seems to be anecdotal experience: 
 
Though many scientists talk easily and well about the particular 
individual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current 
research, they are little better than laymen at characterising the 
established bases of their field. (SSR, p. 47)  
 
Kuhn recognises the difficulty in verbally establishing what lies at the root of 
scientific practice. Rather than attempt to express such abstract ideas, scientists ‘show 
it mainly through their ability to do successful research’ (SSR, p. 47). Were a scientist 
suddenly to stop acting in accordance with these ineffable bases, his actions would 
change. Given that scientists can ‘agree in their identification of a paradigm without 
agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalisation of 
it,’ we can assume that a scientist acting according to a different set of bases would be 
quickly noticed by his colleagues regardless of whether he or his colleagues could 
articulate precisely where is he has gone wrong (SSR, p. 44). They, too, might think 
his new way of acting queer or a joke, or worry that he was insane, or simply be very 
confused as to what is going on.  
 
It is through performing actions – carrying out experiments and analysing the results 
in certain ways – that fit the paradigm into which he is being inducted that a science 
student is proclaimed to be proficient. A student must master several techniques in 
order to become part of the scientific community, and permitted to teach others the 
appropriate skills. As Kindi puts it: ‘There always remains something which cannot 
be fully and explicitly put into words since it is the outcome of nonlinguistic 
activities.’179 
 
Paradigms are articulated by procedures other than attempting to express verbally the 
                                                 
179
 Kindi (1995), p. 78. 
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established bases of a field. Kuhn lists ‘three normal foci for factual scientific 
investigation’ (SSR, p. 25). Determination of scientific fact involves improving the 
scope and accuracy of very specific facts, such as, in chemistry, ‘boiling points and 
acidity of solutions’, and in physics, ‘electrical conductivities and contract potentials’ 
(SSR, p. 25). A somewhat rarer second category of comparing facts with paradigm 
predictions would involve comparing, say, Einstein’s general theory of relativity 
directly with nature. Such processes are rare because theories are often highly abstract 
and mathematical in nature, rendering the construction of useful experiments difficult.  
 
Finally, Kuhn notes a third category: ‘empirical work undertaken to articulate the 
paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the 
solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention’ (SSR, p. 27). 
Empirical work undertaken to articulate a paradigm ‘proves to be the most important 
of all, and its description demands its subdivision’ (SSR, p. 27). Kuhn describes three 
of these subdivisions: experiments ‘directed to the determination of physical 
constants’ (e.g. attempts to determine the universal gravitational constant after 
Newton’s Principia); experiments aimed at quantitative laws (e.g. Boyle’s Law 
relating gas pressure to volume, experiments for which were inconceivable until a 
change in the paradigm emerged to recognize air as ‘an elastic fluid’); and finally 
experiments exploring the best way to apply a paradigm to new areas of interest (SSR, 
p. 27-9). 
 
All of the initial three categories represent the everyday work of scientists. All three 
also involve the testing or refining of the paradigm. The first two are somewhat more 
likely to leave the paradigm unchanged, and are more concerned with refinement and 
confirmation of the inherited paradigm. The third – empirical work undertaken to 
articulate the paradigm theory – looks to be more likely to present an opportunity for 
the established bases of a paradigm to be verbalized. For when Kuhn notes in the third 
subdivision of this third category that the aim is the exploration of the best way to 
apply a paradigm to new areas of interest, it would appear that the scientist must have 
a pretty clear idea of what she is applying to a new area of interest. Nonetheless, the 
scientist does not need to be aware of the ‘particular abstract characteristics’ that 
characterize a paradigm in order to decide upon its appropriate future application, for 
scientists can:  
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agree in their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or 
even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of 
it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules 
will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research (SSR, p. 44).  
 
In other words, even to carry out some of the most theoretical, exploratory work a 
scientist can engage in – determining what new areas might be useful or reasonable 
future projects for the existing paradigm – no rationalization or linguistic expression 
of the paradigm is necessary, let alone for the more mundane processes of the first 
two categories. 
 
This understanding, Kuhn points out in a footnote, is presented similarly by Polanyi, 
when he argues that a ‘scientist’s success depends upon “tacit knowledge”, i.e. upon 
knowledge that is acquired through practice and cannot be articulated explicitly’ 
(SSR, footnote to p. 44). In all three of the categories mentioned above, Kuhn is clear 
that he is describing different sorts of experiments. Their aims are different, but they 
are all – as we would expect from scientists – empirical research. Scientists inherit 
their paradigm from their mentors, and as long as they have mastered the techniques 
to set up and perform their experiments, no articulation of the established bases that 
ground their paradigm are required. The articulation of a paradigm consists in just 
those nonlinguistic activities described by Kindi. 
 
The ability that science students acquire can, says Kuhn, be understood ‘without 
recourse to hypothetical rules of the game’ (SSR, p. 47). It is a crucial feature of the 
priority of paradigms that a paradigm can guide research without the ability to put 
into words the logical rules that comprise it. Kuhn’s established bases of a paradigm 
share an ineffable nature with Wittgenstein’s certainties. For instance, compare 
Kuhn’s comments about scientists being able to be inducted into – and their practice 
governed by – a paradigm without recourse to hypothetical rules of the game with 
Wittgenstein’s that certainties ‘can be learned purely practically, without learning any 
explicit rules’ (OC §95). In both, the individual ineffable ways of acting are 
constituent parts of a logically prior unit – a network of various actions – that 
provides a structure for all our ‘enquiring and asserting’ (OC §162). All that is needed 
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to express and recognise a paradigm is to master the various techniques whose 
possibilities are delimited by it. Actions – not words – express a paradigm. 
 
 
4.5.3 (iii) The riverbed metaphor 
 
Recap:  In the riverbed metaphor, Wittgenstein indicates that whilst certainties 
are what ‘stands fast’ for us (OC §116), they are not immutable. The metaphor 
describes the riverbed and the water flowing over it. The riverbed represents our 
certainties, and the water our empirical investigations (OC §97). He draws two 
distinctions. The first is ‘between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the 
shift of the bed itself’, which he qualifies by noting that ‘there is not a sharp division 
of the one from the other’ (OC §97). Whilst slower to shift than the waters of 
empirical investigation, the ‘mythology may change back into a state of flux, the 
river-bed of my thoughts may shift’ (OC §97); certainties change, but gradually, 
almost imperceptibly. The second distinction is between the different depths at which 
our certainties are held, their respective propensities to shift: ‘the bank of that river 
consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, 
partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away or 
deposited’ (OC 97).180 Some certainties are more deeply embedded and less prone to 
change than others. 
 
In §4.4.1 we noted Kuhn’s description of the established bases of a paradigm as ‘less 
local and temporary [than rules] though still not unchanging characteristics of 
science’, where he described Corpuscularianism and contrasted it with modern 
scientific paradigms incorporating atomic theory (SSR, p. 41). Kuhn’s point was that 
although established bases are broader in scope and may shift slowly, they are not 
eternally fixed, and this movement is distinguished from the faster-moving currents of 
theories and rules. Historical study – with the method of perspicuous representation – 
shows this clearly enough on its own. Corpuscularianism is now obsolete, yet for 
decades it defined vast areas of scientific practice and theorising. 
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 Q.v. §6.4.3 where further justification for this interpretation of OC §99 is 
provided, contra Moyal-Sharrock’s reading that certainties stand equally fast. 
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Kuhn’s process of historical analysis alone indicates that such radical paradigm shifts 
– like the demise of Corpuscularianism and rise of the atomic model – are rarer than 
changes to theories. Kuhn regularly uses the example of the conversion from the 
Ptolemaic to the Copernican astronomical paradigm. The former, geocentric model, 
dominated for at least a millennium and a half, and the latter, heliocentric model has 
been the almost-universal paradigm for over four hundred years. By contrast, the 
measurement of the speed of light grew in precision regularly over the course of the 
twentieth century. Each refinement resulted in no changes to the paradigm, but rather 
developed the puzzle-solving proficiency of the investigators.
181
  
 
Consider again Wittgenstein’s comments about the impossibility of putting a man on 
the Moon. Written in 1950, this was soon to be falsified, in 1969. Yet, for thousands 
of years of human history, this was a certainty. The root of that certainty might have 
shifted over the years – past cultures may not have considered the Moon to be a 
physical satellite of Earth – but the core of this hinge, that no one can visit the Moon, 
remained intact for centuries. Was Wittgenstein, and all who preceded him, wrong? 
We can comfortably say yes. Should he have doubted this particular hinge? 
Absolutely not, and Wittgenstein is exceptionally clear about this: 
 
If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has 
ever been on the moon. (OC §108) 
 
This body of knowledge has been handed on to me and I have no 
grounds for doubting it, but, on the contrary, all sorts of confirmation. 
(OC §288) 
 
Everything in Wittgenstein’s world-picture reinforces his conviction that space flight 
is impossible, even though later generations would come to find this ridiculous. This 
is a sentiment echoed by Kuhn in The Road Since Structure, when he claims that 
children’s picture of the world is imparted: 
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 Between 1907 and 1983, six different techniques presented increasingly refined 
results of the speed of light with decreasing ranges of uncertainty, ranging from 
299,710km/s (30) to 299,792.458. See Essen and Gordon-Smith (1948), passim, and 
Jennings (1987), p. 11. 
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indirectly, by inheritance, embodying the experience of their 
forebears. As such it is entirely solid, not in the least respectful of an 
observer’s wishes and desires; quite capable of providing decisive 
evidence against invented hypotheses which fail to match its [own] 
behaviour. Creatures born into [any paradigm or picture of the world] 
must take it as they find it. They can of course interact with it, altering 
both it and themselves in the process, and the populated world thus 
altered is the one that will be found in place by the generation that 
follows.
182
 
 
One cannot doubt one’s own paradigm at will, and the paradigm provides a basis on 
which to reject incompatible hypotheses. The paradigm can change, but slowly, 
through sustained human interaction, and not at once in the face of an alternative 
proposition. Although Wittgenstein’s widely held certainty about the Moon changed, 
it would have happened slowly – as plans and ideas were drawn up for a possible 
manned mission to the moon – and it would not have been a meaningful doubt to 
question that certainty until this process started happening. It also required something 
truly exceptional to shift this certainty, an actual manned Moon landing. So, too, for 
the established bases of Kuhn. In Kuhnian terms – though this example is rather more 
stark than most we might expect to find in the sciences – an anomaly, that of a Moon 
landing, was needed to shake this certainty. Everything that we have seen in this 
chapter about established bases indicates that they are acquired by scientists and have 
a similar effect at directing enquiry as certainties like ‘it is impossible for humans to 
visit the Moon’. That particular hinge once defined the terms of reasonable enquiry, 
but does not any longer. Corpuscularianism also once dictated which sorts of puzzles 
might be investigated scientists and possible methods for their solution, but does so 
no longer, as the riverbed has shifted over time.  
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4.6 Crisis and Persuasion 
 
§4.5 described three links between The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and On 
Certainty. These drew specific parallels between established bases and certainties, 
pointing to more general similarities between the logically prior conceptions of 
paradigms and world-pictures. In the case of Kuhn, this is restricted to scientific 
practice, in Wittgenstein’s, the scope is more general, encompassing everyday life. In 
both, this priority is difficult or impossible to express in propositions as it indicates an 
ungrounded way of acting, inherited from a community. The ways of acting are not 
eternally immutable, but they change more slowly or more rarely than the practices 
that they govern. Some of these ways of acting are more deeply embedded than others 
and are less prone to change.  
 
§4.6 poses two questions following from the comparisons made above. What happens 
when, for whatever reason, one of the established bases or hinges that constitute a 
paradigm or a world-picture is cast into doubt? Metaphorically, we can think of this as 
an instance when part of the riverbed is washed up and deposited elsewhere. In literal 
terms, just what happened when something like the certainty that no one could ever 
visit the Moon changed, or when Corpuscularianism gave way to modern atomic 
theory? 
 
The second question stems from the non-rational manner in which we acquire 
certainties, and the consequence that they cannot be expressed or justified in the 
manner of an ordinary empirical proposition. It has already been noted that changes to 
certainties do not happen immediately and in a flash across the entire community that 
holds them. How, then, do such changes happen in individuals, if standard, rational 
means of argumentation are unavailable in these cases, and how might we go about 
convincing someone to change their deepest-held convictions? As we will see, Kuhn 
and Wittgenstein have remarkably similar things to say about these processes, as both 
emphasise the non-rational aspects of such conversions. In the following sub-section, 
we will draw parallels between Kuhn’s concept of scientific crisis and Wittgenstein’s 
use of the word ‘chaos’ (OC §613). In the §4.6.2, we will explore what Kuhn and 
Wittgenstein mean when they suggest that non-rational means of persuasion are 
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needed to effect a conversion. By demonstrating these parallels, we can introduce the 
concept of incommensurability to world-picture considerations in §4.7. 
 
 
4.6.1 Chaos and crisis 
 
A period of crisis in science was in §4.2 defined as happening when the prevailing 
paradigm fails to account for one or more observed phenomena. It occurs, says Kuhn: 
 
with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature 
has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern 
normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended 
exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the 
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become 
the expected (SSR, p. 53). 
 
When an anomaly that cannot be explained by the current paradigm comes to light, 
there are three possibilities for resolution: ‘sometimes normal science ultimately 
proves able to handle to handle the crisis-provoking problem’; occasionally, the 
problem is deemed irresolvable, and the particular field of research is deemed to have 
reached a dead end; finally, revolution occurs, and a new paradigm is proposed, and 
there ensues a ‘reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals . . . [changing] the 
field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm 
methods and applications’ (SSR, p. 84-5).  
 
It is the last of these three possibilities with which Kuhn is primarily concerned in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the revolutionary possibility. When the established 
bases of a field, the ‘fundamentals’ of a paradigm as Kuhn puts it – either 
methodologies or quasi-metaphysical commitments – can no longer provide a 
structure within which explanations of anomalous phenomena can be produced, crisis 
ensues. Kuhn examines a famous case of anomalies leading to crisis and thence to a 
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paradigm shift: the movement from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy.
183
 Ptolemaic 
astronomy, for a millennium and half, was ‘admirably successful in predicting the 
changing positions of both stars and planets’ (SSR, p. 68). Its success was furthered 
by later astronomers’ ability to add complexity in order to accommodate what were 
initially seen as minor discrepancies between the model’s predictions and their actual 
observations. As Kuhn notes in The Copernican Revolution, ‘Ptolemy’s successors 
added epicycles to epicycles and eccentrics to eccentrics, exploiting all the immense 
versatility of the Ptolemaic technique.’184 
 
Eventually, however, the anomalies built up and were widely recognised, partly 
because the instruments used for observing the night sky became more advanced, and 
partly because the spread of printing improved scientists’ ability to communicate and 
compare results.
185
 It became clear that the puzzle-solving capabilities of the 
Ptolemaic model had fallen behind the capabilities of up-to-date observation methods. 
The Ptolemaic predictions were increasingly shown to be inaccurate, and the 
contortions of scientists in their attempts to accommodate these anomalies within the 
existing paradigm ever more complex and unsatisfactory. A period of scientific crisis 
developed, ending only when Copernicus’ heliocentric model gained widespread 
favour.
186
  
 
For our purposes, the key understanding is that an anomaly exists only in relation to a 
paradigm, never in isolation. Without the Ptolemaic paradigm (or another similar set 
of established bases) to govern what astronomers expected to see, there would have 
been no anomalies, only observations without a framework. When compared with 
                                                 
183
 Kuhn also examines the crises following discovery of irreconcilable anomalies in 
relation to phlogiston theory leading to Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen (pp. 70-2) 
and the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics (pp. 72-74). That there is a 
wealth of historical evidence is important to Kuhn’s case, and worth recognising. 
However, the Ptolemaic-to-Copernican shift is by far the easiest to understand, and 
therefore the only one used for this illustration.  
184
 Kuhn (1990), p. 73. 
185
 Kuhn (1990), pp. 68-9. 
186
 Sharrock and Read suggest three compelling reasons for the delay in rejecting the 
Ptolemaic model: ‘no one had proposed a comparably impressive alternative’; the 
Ptolemaic scheme was ‘interwoven with the mightily prestigious physics of 
Aristotle’; and ‘the anomalies seem[ed] to require only minor – albeit elusive – 
modifications to accommodate them’. Sharrock and Read (2002), p. 74. 
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Wittgenstein, this point is of great importance. It is when a certainty of our world-
picture is questioned that Wittgenstein thinks chaos ensues. Certainties do not exist in 
isolation. There are several things about which we are certain, revealed in the way we 
act, and these form the ‘scaffolding of our thoughts’ (OC §211). If we remove a piece 
of the scaffolding, the whole structure is liable to fall apart: 
 
[W]hat could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom 
I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything 
with it and plunge it into chaos (OC §613). 
 
Doubting something like recognising a friend whom one has known for years calls 
into question far more than a person’s identity. Recognising a friend is an everyday 
activity, and we might think of it as requiring several certainties or convictions in 
order for us to rely on it so readily. Whilst these are not easily expressed, we might 
include convictions regarding: our own memory; reliance on one’s own sensory 
apparatus; the memory of our friends; that humans’ appearances do not spontaneously 
change so that what seems to be my friend is in fact someone altogether different; the 
custom of naming; and so on. Doubting whether a friend whom I have known for 
years really is the person I think him to be is not like doubting whether this book I am 
holding is mine or someone else’s. 
 
An event like this is comparable with an anomaly in Kuhn’s terminology. The 
anomaly might be seamlessly absorbed into the old world-picture. Perhaps it turns out 
that I have for the first time encountered my friend’s identical twin of whose 
existence I was unaware, or that I have unwittingly ingested a hallucinogen, or 
someone is testing out an experimental hologram using my old friend as a model and I 
have subconsciously noticed some small discrepancy. Failing a mitigating 
circumstance like this, though, my whole system of judging and perceiving is thrown 
into doubt. 
 
To illustrate this point, recall again Stroll’s concept of negational absurdity and 
consider what would actually happen were you to doubt the identity of a friend you 
have known for years. At first, your questioning and uncertainty might be taken as a 
very poor joke. If persisted with, concerns would likely be raised about your mental 
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health, or whether you were intoxicated. If you could brush off the attentions of your 
supposed friend and go someplace else, how would your other actions be affected? 
You would probably begin to doubt your own identity, or where you lived and all 
manner of other usually commonplace and unremarkable aspects of your life. If a 
doubt like this is sincere, chaos ensues in every aspect of one’s life.187 
 
For Wittgenstein, the denial of something so certain as this is absurd, an aberration 
rather than a mistake, and leads to chaos. Kuhn, discussing the domain of highly 
specialised scientific research, speaks of an academic crisis and an uncertainty 
regarding to what our best scientific theories ought to reduce (for example, corpuscles 
or atoms; a heliocentric or a geocentric model of the solar system). Crisis and chaos 
are both induced by anomaly. Both demand an amendment to – or complete overhaul 
of – the existing paradigm/world-picture to remedy the anomalous phenomenon. 
 
 
4.6.2 At the end of reasoning comes persuasion 
 
When anomalies build up, the old paradigm becomes less and less attractive. Several 
nascent paradigms, seeking to explain the anomalous phenomena as well as retaining 
much of the explanatory power of the old paradigm, may well emerge, competing, via 
their respective supporters, for supremacy. Kuhn provides an example of this 
phenomenon when he notes that due to ‘the rise of pneumatic chemistry and the 
question of weight relations’ the standard analysis of the composition of air prevalent 
before the mid-eighteenth century became unsatisfactory (SSR, p. 70). However: 
 
[b]y the time Lavoisier began his experiments on airs in the early 
1770’s, there were almost as many versions of the phlogiston theory 
as there were pneumatic chemists. That proliferation of versions of a 
                                                 
187
 That the example of Wittgenstein’s is localised is not a problem, partly because it 
is only an illustration, but also because Kuhn, too, notes that not all crises are 
comprehensive cross the whole of science. For instance, he notes paradigm shifts 
‘somewhat smaller’ than the Ptolemaic to Copernican because they were ‘more 
exclusively professional’ – i.e. related to a specialised branch of science – like the 
‘wave theory of light, the dynamical theory of heat, or Maxwell’s electromagnetic 
theory’ (SSR, p. 66).   
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theory is a very usual symptom of crisis. In his preface, Copernicus 
complained of it as well (SSR, p. 70-1). 
 
During a period of crisis like this, scientists do not automatically ‘renounce the 
paradigm that has led them into crisis,’ for ‘the decision to reject one paradigm is 
always simultaneously the decision to accept another’ (SSR, p. 77). It is not the 
anomaly alone, and the original paradigm’s comparison with the world that makes 
scientists renounce an old paradigm. The decision to adopt a new paradigm over the 
old one ‘involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other’ 
(SSR, p. 77).  
 
Kuhn terms the response to a period of crisis precipitated by the discovery of 
unaccountable anomalies as revolutionary science. He justifies the use of the 
metaphor by comparing the process to that of political revolutions. Although there are 
‘vast and essential differences between political and scientific development’, both are 
‘inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political 
community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems 
posed by an environment that they have in part created’ (SSR, p. 92).  
 
Kuhn also notes that what counts as a revolution may depend on one’s perspective; 
events often only seem revolutionary to those affected by them. Thus, just as ‘the 
Balkan revolutions of the early twentieth century [to outsiders] seem normal parts of 
the developmental process,’ to astronomers the discovery of X-rays could be taken ‘as 
a mere addition to knowledge, for their paradigms were unaffected by the existence of 
the new radiation’ (SSR, p. 93). On the other hand, ‘for men like Kelvin, Crookes, 
and Roentgen, whose research dealt with radiation theory or with cathode ray tubes, 
the emergence of X-rays necessarily violated one paradigm as it created another’ 
(SSR, p. 93). This example further justifies Kuhn’s earlier claim that he does not wish 
‘to imply that normal science is a single monolithic and unified enterprise that must 
stand or fall with any one of its paradigms as well as with all of them together’ (SSR, 
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p. 49). Therefore the process of persuasion leading to a paradigm shift need not occur 
simultaneously across all scientific fields.
188
 
 
We must also be wary, as Kuhn noted thirty years after The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions in The Road Since Structure, of ‘treating groups or communities as 
though they were individuals-writ-large.’189 Looking back, historians ‘regularly 
experience as a single conceptual shift a transposition for which the developmental 
process required a series of stages.’190 The rejecting of an old paradigm in favour of a 
new one happens to individuals. Whilst we might, in hindsight, wish to characterise 
the shifted allegiances of a number of individuals as a group shift en masse, this can 
blur the incremental nature of the process. Whilst Kuhn uses the term ‘gestalt switch’, 
he recommends that we consider it to be metaphorical, and to pay attention to the 
‘microprocesses by which change is achieved.’191 We must note, therefore, that whilst 
retrospectively we might characterise a community as having undergone a paradigm 
shift or a revolution, this is an amalgamation of several individuals’ persuasion and 
conversion.  
 
To illustrate the nature of revolutionary science, Kuhn draws further parallels with 
political revolutions. Take two or more ‘competing parties or camps, one seeking to 
defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new 
one’ (SSR, p. 93). Ultimately, because ‘they acknowledge no supra-institutional 
framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference, the parties to a 
revolutionary conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often 
including force’ (SSR, p. 93). Three things are revealed here. First, there are 
significant similarities in the way Kuhn has characterised the evolution of sciences 
with that of politics. Second, although the use of force is generally impermissible and 
probably rare in scientific conflict, we must note the non-rational behaviour that 
comprises part of the persuaders’ armoury.192 Finally, we should note the lack of 
                                                 
188
 We’ll return to this idea in relation to world-pictures in §6.3 with the introduction 
of the concept of restricted domains. 
189
 Kuhn (2000), p. 88. 
190
 Kuhn (2000), p. 88. 
191
 Kuhn (2000), p. 88. 
192
 In a footnote, Kuhn mentions a case of a scientist’s reputation – a decidedly non-
rational consideration – affecting the degree to which his work received influence and 
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acknowledgement of any supra-institutional framework. This applies equally for 
scientific revolution, and has important consequences. For when ‘paradigms enter, as 
they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each 
group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigms’ defense’ (SSR, p. 94).  
 
The established bases that make up a paradigm have been characterised as being to a 
large degree ineffable and ultimately unjustifiable. With no higher arbiter for 
adjudication, reasoned argumentation has nowhere to turn. Kuhn explicitly makes this 
very point: ‘The superiority of one theory to another is not something that can be 
proved in the debate. Instead . . . each party must try, by persuasion, to convert the 
other’ (SSR, p. 198). That is not to say that reasons are not given. Kuhn is not 
suggesting that when an area of science enters a period of crisis scientists abandon 
their logical methods and engage in pure propaganda. However, whatever the 
arguments put forward, ‘the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle 
that can be resolved by proofs’ (SSR, p. 148). One needs to undergo a conversion in 
order to find the arguments as compelling as they are for those already within the 
paradigm.
193
 
 
What, though, does a conversion of this sort amount to? Consider again the starting 
point for this chapter: Wittgenstein’s pronouncements in 1950 on the impossibility of 
space travel compared with the contemporaneous account of Sir Patrick Moore’s and 
a handful of other astronomers’ convictions that it was not out of the question. Had 
Wittgenstein lived another twenty years, he would doubtless have altered his 
conviction. Although he did not have the opportunity to examine this particular case 
of world-picture conversion retrospectively – and thereby compare competing world-
views – he presents a fictional one of his own: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
dissemination: ‘For the role of reputation, consider the following: Lord Rayleigh, at a 
time when his reputation was established, submitted to the British Association a paper 
on some paradoxes of electrodynamics. His name was inadvertently omitted when the 
paper was first sent, and the paper itself was at first rejected as the work of some 
“paradoxer.” Shortly afterwards, with the author’s name in place, the paper was 
accepted with profuse apologies (R. J. Strutt, 4th Baron Rayleigh, John William 
Strutt, Third Baron Rayleigh [New York, 1924], p. 228)’ (SSR, p. 153, fn. 10). 
193
 Cf. SSR, p. 94. 
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Men have believed that they could make the rain; why should not a 
king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if 
[G.E.] Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore 
really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore 
could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of 
a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a 
different way. Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the 
correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i. e., these are 
what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says 
something like: "That's how it must be." (OC §92) 
 
Here, we are presented with two world-pictures. Ostensibly, these are the king’s and 
Moore’s, but in fact these represent the king’s whole community of subjects on the 
one hand, and our familiar Western world-picture on the other.
194
 We hold it as a very 
deep conviction that the Earth (or world) is very old. No one has needed to tell us this 
explicitly, but it is bound up in the education we have inherited. We talk about our 
ancestors, investigate historical, archaeological, or paleontological sites, and debate 
causes and effects of political machinations past. Everything in our lives reveals our 
conviction that the Earth is very old. Whilst it is hard to imagine just what the king’s 
world-picture or particular certainty about the origin of the Earth might be like, it 
must be relatively free of troubling anomalies. We would also expect, as with any 
certainty, for the king to struggle to articulate or justify his conviction, despite being 
just as sure in them as Moore is in his. Risible as we might find the king’s 
convictions, he would doubtless respond to Moore’s claims with equal incredulity.  
 
The tactic Moore ought to take perhaps seems at first relatively straightforward. 
Surely he can just point to some things obviously older than the king is himself, and 
the king could not help but be persuaded by the logic of Moore’s arguments. The 
difficulty in such cases, though, is that their respective notions of logic radically 
differ. A world-picture is logically prior to the investigations that happen within it, 
                                                 
194
 As we will see in Chapter 6, there may well be no such thing as a homogeneous 
Western world-picture. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this particular discussion it 
does no harm to use the term. Enough of the deeper aspects of the rivberbed (OC 
§§97-99, and q.v. §2.6 of this thesis) are held in common to justify the use of the 
phrase here.  
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and Moore, were he to proceed along such a line of argumentation, would be arguing 
from the position of his own world-picture and therefore his own logic. As Kuhn 
points out in relation to paradigm conflict, ‘[e]ach group uses its own paradigm to 
argue in that paradigms’ defense’ (SSR, p. 94). The king, evidently, has been 
indirectly inculcated with a system of logic whereby he can make the same 
observations as Moore but draw very different conclusions, all of which accord with 
his own world-picture.
195
 
 
In the absence of any supra-world-picture arbiter, Wittgenstein, does not think Moore 
could ‘prove his belief to be the right one’ (OC §92). Instead, considerations of 
‘simplicity or symmetry’ will have a role if the king is to be converted. Kuhn makes a 
similar point, remarking that ‘even today, Einstein’s theory attracts men principally 
on aesthetic grounds, an appeal that few people outside of mathematics have been 
able to feel’ (SSR, p. 158). Simplicity and symmetry are aesthetic, not rational, 
considerations. So persuasion involves presenting something appealing without 
recourse to logic and reason. Logical arguments might be the vehicle of such aesthetic 
considerations – as in the case of Einstein mentioned by Kuhn, perhaps the elegance 
contained within the mathematical proof – but the arguments themselves are not the 
persuading force. In a separate passage, Wittgenstein considers the same idea again: 
 
I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances 
and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and 
therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long... 
etc. - We should be trying to give him our picture of the world. This 
would happen through a kind of persuasion (OC §262). 
 
                                                 
195
 If the king’s world-picture seems outlandish, we would do well to draw parallels 
between the king and modern Creationists who, on what they claim to be a literal 
interpretation of the Christian Bible, declare the Earth to have been created by God 
within the last 10,000 years. All artefacts that we might point to as evidence for our 
world-view are taken equally as evidence by the Creationists for God’s existence and 
his wish to test our faith. The same evidence appears rather different depending on the 
logical structure – i.e. the certainties and world-picture – with which one approaches 
it. It is worth nothing that Creationists make up a sizeable proportion of Christians, 
particularly in North America. Not that we ever should do such a thing, but writing 
them off as a deluded minority sect is clearly inappropriate. 
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We would not be trying to convince this man – call him the same king from OC §92 – 
of a proposition. It is not that the king and Moore disagree on an ordinary empirical 
propositions, but rather than they have different world-pictures. Moore, if he is to 
convert the king, would be neither trying to change the king’s mind on a proposition, 
nor to shift the king’s conviction on a single certainty. He would be ‘trying to give 
him our picture of the world’, to effect a gestalt switch or conversion that might 
encompass most or even all of his certainties. 
  
The language used here – of persuasion and conversion – is markedly religious in 
tone. Wittgenstein compares the conversion process with ‘what happens when 
missionaries convert natives’ (OC §262). The following passage from Kuhn reveals a 
similar theme: 
 
The man who embraces a new paradigm . . . [must] have faith that the 
new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that 
confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a 
few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith (SSR, p. 158). 
 
Further, says Kuhn, ‘men have been converted by [personal and inarticulate aesthetic 
considerations] at times when most of the articulable technical arguments pointed the 
other way’ (SSR, p. 158). This is sometimes a necessary feature of driving the 
progress or uptake of a new paradigm. If a new idea is to gain ground and compete for 
paradigm status, ‘it must first gain supporters, men who will develop it to the point 
where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied’ (SSR, p. 158).  
 
Until such a conversion can take place, however, there is an impasse, whereby 
Moore’s arguments by the power of their logic alone will do nothing to persuade the 
king, and vice versa. The conversion in question is about the very ‘scaffolding of our 
thoughts’ (OC §211). The question of what is to count as evidence, correct 
methodology, rules of inference, or ‘an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic’ 
(OC §82). What counts as our system of logic comes down to ‘an ungrounded way of 
acting’ (OC §110). If the king – or anyone – is to be converted, significant parts of his 
everyday practices must change. He could not go on as before. For the scientist who 
undergoes a paradigm shift, his apparatus, language, methods of experimentation, and 
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ultimately the fundamental constituents to which he seeks to reduce his theories must 
change. A conversion entails that one’s life changes, not one’s mind on a single, 
empirical proposition.   
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4.7 Incommensurability introduced 
 
In the next chapter, the focus will be on what is happening when attempts at 
conversion take place. In particular we are concerned with what sorts of obstacles 
might stand in the way of conversion, and even more specifically the nature of 
linguistic concerns that might hinder communication between members of two or 
more world-pictures. Kuhn, in relation to paradigms, refers to these as 
‘incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it’ (SSR, p. 
4). Although unfamiliar at the moment, we can acquire a sense of what the term 
means from the context of Kuhn’s claim that the ‘normal-scientific tradition that 
emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually 
incommensurable with that which has gone before’ (SSR, p. 103).  
 
In relation to Moore and the king, were a conversion to happen, we would think of the 
king’s post-conversion life and practices as incommensurable with his life and 
practices pre-conversion. Thinking of incommensurability as being along the lines of 
incompatibility, despite Kuhn’s warning, is a good place to start. The next chapter 
will explore this concept further to understand just why Kuhn draws the distinction he 
does. We will largely from this point on, though, leave Kuhn to one side. This chapter 
has drawn several parallels between Wittgenstein’s and Kuhn’s respective concepts of 
the world-picture and the paradigm, with the aim of preparing the ground for the use 
of the incommensurability concept in relation to Wittgenstein’s thought on conflict of 
world-pictures.  
 
The next chapter will take up this challenge, beginning by going deeper into the 
analogies already drawn between world-pictures and aspects of religious faith and 
conversion. Wittgenstein made repeated use of religious examples, particularly in the 
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief. 
Religious world-pictures provide easily recognisable and distinguishable templates of 
world-pictures, and are therefore ideal for the early stages of exploring the idea of 
incommensurability. 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has developed links between The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and 
On Certainty. In the broadest terms, Kuhn’s anti-essentialist stance towards science 
mirrors Wittgenstein’s towards language. However the similarities run deeper than an 
anti-essentialist approach. Kuhn and Wittgenstein make liberal use of examples, 
which not only illustrate the points they are making but actually constitute them as 
well. On this point, I differed with Bird (2000) and Sharrock and Read (2002) – who 
both saw the examples presented by Kuhn as primarily illustrative – but aligned my 
position more closely with Kindi’s (1995, 2005), though she perhaps does not 
emphasise this point enough either. 
 
The use of examples presents the chance for a perspicuous representation of the 
material, enabling us to see dissimilarities and similarities between paradigms, and 
providing a method for combating our craving for generality. Perspicuous 
representation of his historical examples allowed Kuhn to note the lexical 
discrepancies between different theories. A term such as ‘mass’ may well have a 
different meaning in different scientific traditions, for example in Newtonian and 
Einsteinian physics. Kuhn’s point that the different meanings can only be recognised 
with an awareness of the contexts in which the word is used finds great sympathy in 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning in Philosophical Investigations. 
 
Rules play an essential role for Wittgenstein and Kuhn. Both make three central 
claims about rules. They a) reject a more traditional assumption that these rules are 
somehow metaphysically real, absolute, and mind-independent, b) describe them as 
being established by practice and custom, and c) describe them as governing human 
activities, but with variation in rules across different communities. They also both 
distinguish the rules that govern everyday or scientific practice from the logically 
prior world-picture or paradigm, and their constituent certainties or established bases. 
 
Three preliminary parallels were drawn between On Certainty and The Struture of 
Scientific Revolutions. Having established a world-picture or paradigm as both 
logically prior to rules and investigations and composed of ungrounded ways of 
acting, their conclusions about the nature of these ways of acting are remarkably 
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similar. Both hold that they are: difficult to formulate into propositions; unjustifiable, 
partly because they are not propositional, and partly because we learned them only 
indirectly in the first place; and that, whilst not immutable, they are slower and less 
prone to change than that for which they delimit the logical possibilities.  
 
Finally, the twin themes of crisis and persuasion were introduced. Anomalies that 
cannot be accounted for precipitate scientific crisis, whereupon new paradigms vie for 
superiority via their supporters. As there can be no objective grounds for arbitrating 
between competing paradigms – and their constituent parts were not acquired and 
cannot be expressed propositionally – rational grounds give out. At this point, both 
Kuhn and Wittgenstein emphasise that it is non-rational persuasion and a measure of 
faith that can effect a conversion. Neither world-pictures nor paradigms can be 
decided upon fully rationally. Such a conversion has widespread effects upon one’s 
life, be it in everyday actions for the king, or one’s experiments and investigations for 
a scientist. The term ‘incommensurability’ has been introduced in relation to 
paradigm or world-picture conflict, awaiting fuller exploration in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – Incommensurability 
 
 
5.1 Making Use of Kuhn 
 
5.2 Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 
5.2.1 The Last Judgement 
5.2.2 Belief in religious propositions does not entail religious belief 
5.2.3 The propositions of religious belief are the culmination of a form of 
life 
 
5.3 Radical vs. Weak Incommensurability 
 5.3.1 Clash and incommensurability 
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5.3.3 Incommensurability of actions 
 
5.4 A middle way: dynamic incommensurability 
 5.4.1 General comparisons 
 5.4.2 Nuanced comparisons 
 
5.5 Clash reveals dissonances 
 5.5.1 The realities of communication 
 
 Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Making Use of Kuhn 
 
Chapter 4 expanded on the concept of the world-picture by drawing parallels with 
Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm. This process clarified the nature of the world-picture by 
providing real-world analogies – Kuhn’s paradigms – and introduced situations in 
which world-pictures change and come into contact with one another. 
Incommensurability is Kuhn’s term for the situation when paradigms are – roughly 
speaking – incompatible with one another. This chapter explores the concept further, 
first by creating examples of incommensurability in relation to Wittgenstein’s thought 
on religious belief, and then progressing to a detailed examination of just what 
incommensurability entails for communication and conversion.  
 
Although there is no suggestion from either Kuhn or Wittgenstein that persuasion and 
conversion are necessary aspects of a response to world-picture or paradigm clash – 
the opposing parties may simply decide to drop the dispute and go their separate ways 
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– both agreed that a rational proof of the validity of any such system of reference is 
impossible.
196
 That both talk about conversion – as opposed to proof – indicates 
recognition of the importance of non-rational persuasion, demonstrating clear 
parallels with religious conversion. 
 
Wittgenstein does not use the term ‘incommensurable’, or any derivative thereof. 
However his remarks in Culture and Value and Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief about there being a lack of genuine 
conflict between the believer and the non-believer can be related to Kuhn’s use of the 
concept in the sense that Kuhn speaks of different paradigms talking ‘always slightly 
at cross-purposes’ (SSR, p. 112). In the previous chapter, Kuhn’s established bases of 
a paradigm were likened to the certainties of a world-picture. In this chapter, in §5.2, 
we will undertake the same process for religious world-pictures.  
 
Wittgenstein’s conception of a genuine religious belief requires some investigation. In 
various writings he demonstrates an affinity with Kierkegaard and Tolstoy, 
emphasising that a genuine religious belief requires ‘a passionate commitment to a 
system of reference [Bezugssystem]’ (CV p. 73), one that informs and guides all of 
one’s deeds. Parallels will be drawn between Wittgenstein’s conception of a world-
picture in general as the ‘scaffolding’ (OC §211) of our thoughts and his 
understanding of a true religious belief which might contain something like a 
conviction in the Last Judgement. Such a conviction provides ‘guidance for [the 
believer’s] life . . . Whenever he does anything, this is before his mind’ (LC, p. 53). 
The fact that such propositions like ‘I believe in the Last Judgement’ are expressed by 
believers – and are apparently received without confusion or concern – might at first 
lead us to the conclusion that these cannot play the role of certainties of a religious 
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 A note on terminology: We use ‘clash’ to indicate two or more incommensurable 
world-pictures coming into contact with one another; for example, a Christian 
meeting an atheist in a context in which the differences in their world-pictures are 
apparent. ‘Conflict’ will be used in a specialised way, as will become clear when we 
address Wittgenstein’s non-conflict position in the case of, for example, propositions 
of religious belief. Conflict between propositions can only occur when there is broad 
agreement in a world-picture. When a Christian and an atheist discuss, for example, 
whether there will be a Last Judgement, there is not genuine conflict, because it is 
certainties – not empirical propositions – that are clashing. §5.3 will address this 
concern and make clearer the distinction outlined here.  
 178 
world-picture, given the claim made in §2.3.3 that they tend to sound absurd. 
Wittgenstein’s claim that such propositions arrive as the culmination of a form of life 
(LC, p. 58) coupled with his non-conflict position on religious language will be 
explored and will resolve this apparent tension. The non-conflict position will be 
explained as indicating incommensurability between two world-pictures. 
 
From §5.3 onwards we will take up the challenge of fully explicating Kuhn’s concept 
of incommensurability. Having already drawn parallels between paradigms and 
world-pictures and now in §5.2 having introduced religious aspects of world-pictures, 
we have plenty of material from which to draw examples. Some commentators of 
Kuhn have claimed incommensurability to entail total untranslatability, a position that 
will here be referred to as radical incommensurability. A parallel of this view is what 
has been called Wittgensteinian fideism, which precludes any meaningful 
communication with members of any form of life of which one is not an active 
participant.
197
 This position will be contrasted with what will be called weak 
incommensurability, which entails unproblematic communication across all world-
pictures. Both these positions will be rejected, and in §5.4 a more nuanced, moderate, 
and dynamic interpretation of incommensurability will be proposed. Dynamic 
incommensurability will build on the suggestion by Wang (2007) that speakers of 
different languages – and for reasons that will become clear we extend this beyond 
natural languages to linguistic differences created by different world-pictures – can 
engage in dialogue via a constant back-and-forth movement, establishing similarities 
and points of contact.  
 
On the dynamic interpretation, incommensurability will be shown not to entail total 
untranslatability. Instead, the possibilities for communication between adherents of 
two world-pictures will be argued to be flexible, depending primarily on the similarity 
of the two world-pictures in a state of clash.
198
 Where the world-pictures bear more in 
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 The original formulation of Wittgensteinian fideism uses form of life. §5.3, 
drawing on Chapter 3, will explain why we are justified in substituting world-picture 
for form of life in some instances.  
198
 There are other factors in the possibilities for communication, but these are usually 
less influential than the similarity of the world-pictures in question. I will gesture 
towards these other factors where appropriate, but the focus will remain on world-
pictures throughout. 
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common with each other in terms of practice – and, consequently, in terms of 
vocabulary – there will be a greater degree of possible communication. In cases where 
there is a greater possibility of meaningful cross-world-picture communication, the 
task of locating the exact points of irreducible clash will be easier and more precise. 
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5.2 Wittgenstein and religious belief 
 
Although it is Wittgenstein’s philosophy rather than his life that is under consideration 
here, knowledge of a few aspects of his biography sets the scene for our understanding 
of his thought on religious belief, particularly as he wrote very little technical 
philosophy explicitly about it. Wittgenstein’s obsession with Tolstoy’s The Gospel in 
Brief, reading it in the trenches of World War I and regularly making gifts or 
recommendations of it to friends, informs us of a great deal about his conception of 
what proper religious belief is like.
199
 Central to Wittgenstein’s conception is that 
religious belief must affect all aspects of one’s life, and not be reduced to 
philosophical arguments or dutifully attending church. Tolstoy wrote the book – a 
reinterpretation of the four New Testament gospels to include only the words and 
actions of Jesus, and no dogma or scripture propounded by the organised church – 
with the aim of dispensing with all the arguments for faith, and presenting ‘a solution 
of the problem of life, and not of a theological or historical question.’200 One phrase of 
Tolstoy’s reinterpretation in particular bears significant echoes of Wittgenstein’s own 
words: ‘Do not believe this, but change your life.’201  
 
Reducing religious belief to philosophical arguments was an approach Wittgenstein 
particularly reviled. For example, Wittgenstein, in conversation with Drury, criticised 
Father Coplestone for his part in a radio debate with A.J. Ayer on the existence of 
God as having ‘contributed nothing to the discussion at all’, as he attempted to ‘justify 
the beliefs of Christianity with philosophical arguments.’202 Similarly, in Culture and 
Value, Wittgenstein said that ‘If Christianity is the truth, then all the philosophy about 
it is false’ (CV p. 89). These biographical remarks demonstrate his hostility to the sort 
of religious belief constituted solely by attending church and producing 
rationalisations. If Wittgenstein’s personal idea of religious belief is somewhat austere 
– in the sense that it seems implicitly to criticise self-declared believers who lack 
what he calls a passionate commitment – it is nonetheless important to our 
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 See Monk (1990), pp. 115-7, 132, 136, 213. 
200
 Tolstoy (2008), p. 7, Author’s Preface, and also pp. 22, 44, 47-8. 
201
 Tolstoy (2008), p. 26. Compare this with CV p. 61: ‘I believe that one of the things 
Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your 
life. (Or the direction of your life.)’ 
202
 Monk (1990), p. 453. 
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understanding of what Wittgenstein would consider to be a religious world-picture or 
frame of reference.
203
 Belief in religious propositions alone does not entail the sort of 
religious belief that Wittgenstein considered to be authentic.
204
 
 
 
5.2.1 The Last Judgement 
 
In his writings on religion, Wittgenstein frequently used the example of someone 
declaring their belief in the Last Judgement. This example demonstrates what we will 
refer to as Wittgenstein’s non-conflict position on religious belief: 
 
Suppose that someone believed in the Last Judgement, and I don’t, 
does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won’t 
be such a thing? I would say: ‘Not at all, or not always.’ 
 
If some[one] said: ‘Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?’ I’d say: 
‘No.’ ‘Do you contradict the man?’ I’d say: ‘No.’  
 
Would you say: ‘I believe the opposite’, or ‘There is no reason to 
suppose such a thing’? I’d say neither (LC, p. 53). 
 
Wittgenstein’s claim that he neither states the opposite – at least not always – nor 
contradicts the man seems odd. Were the same construction of proposition and 
response drafted in other circumstances, we would expect contradiction. Consider, 
                                                 
203
 Indeed, I would say that it is extremely difficult fully to grasp Wittgenstein’s 
conception of religious belief without having read The Gospel in Brief – a book 
impossible to paraphrase at all, let alone in a footnote – and there are deep parallels to 
be drawn regarding an insistence not to look everywhere for proofs (see for example 
Tolstoy, 2008, pp. 56, 75). However, a deeper discussion of Wittgenstein’s 
association with this book would be beyond the remit of this thesis. References to it 
will occasionally be made throughout this chapter where pertinent. For an excellent 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s religious beliefs in relation to his own philosophy and to 
Tolstoy, see Plant (2004). 
204
 Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by Kierkegaard on this point: ‘Wisdom is 
passionless. By contrast Kierkegaard calls faith a passion’ (CV, p. 61). Cottingham 
also notes that ‘Wittgenstein shared with Kierkegaard the view that passionate 
commitment is central to what makes someone religious.’ Cottingham (2013), p. 5. 
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instead of belief in the Last Judgement, a proposition like ‘I believe that NASA will 
put a human on Mars before 2050’. I might believe the same or the opposite, accord 
with or contradict the man who said this statement. Like the example of the Last 
Judgement appears to be, this example is concerned with a future event about which 
each person makes a prediction. However, Wittgenstein thinks that something else is 
going on in the example of the Last Judgement, and he explores the idea again in a 
later passage on the same page: 
 
Suppose you were a believer and said: “I believe in a Last 
Judgement,” and I said: “Well, I’m not so sure. Possibly.” You would 
say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he said “There is a 
German aeroplane overhead,” and I said “Possibly. I’m not so sure,” 
you’d say we were fairly near (LC, p. 53). 
 
Differing on the Last Judgement is nothing like differing on something 
straightforwardly empirical, like the nationality of an overhead aeroplane or the future 
winner of an election. There is a ‘gulf’ between the believer and the non-believer. On 
deciding on the nationality of the aeroplane, both agree exactly what sort of evidence 
would count in favour or against the proposition that it is German. Perhaps a different 
angle as it flies over will afford a clearer view of the tail fin and its markings. The 
standards for what counts as evidence, and roughly how much evidence is required to 
change one’s mind, is agreed upon by both parties. Wittgenstein and the other person 
are ‘fairly near’. 
 
The gulf between Wittgenstein and his friend on the topic of the Last Judgement 
exists because their respective standards of enquiring and asserting differ. Although 
propositions are put forward – ‘I believe in the Last Judgement’ and ‘No, (I don’t 
believe in the Last Judgement)’ – in neither case do they function as genuine 
propositions. As Wittgenstein notes, ‘Anything that I normally call evidence wouldn’t 
in the slightest influence me here’ (LC, p. 56). The believer has taken his belief in the 
Last Judgement as ‘guidance for this life . . . Whenever he does anything, this is 
before his mind’ (LC, p. 53). It has the function of a rule for the believer, and rules 
are neither true nor false. 
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The remark that the Last Judgement provides guidance for his life prefigures On 
Certainty’s themes of certainties providing the ‘scaffolding of our thoughts’ (OC 
§211) and the ‘foundation for all judging’ (OC §614).205 Wittgenstein denies that he 
and the believer contradict each other because their expressions are not genuine 
propositions. They instead indicate their different frames of reference. Differences in 
their deepest convictions, their certainties, are revealed, and certainties are not 
‘subject to testing’ (OC §162). ‘There will be a Last Judgement’ is a certainty for the 
believer. It is not subject to standards of proof, enquiring, and asserting for belief in 
the Last Judgement sets those very standards. 
 
Why, though, does Wittgenstein equivocate when asked whether he contradicts the 
man, and say ‘Not at all, or not always’? If he does hold a non-conflict position, why 
does he not do so consistently? We ought to consider the multiplicity of uses for such 
a sentence. In the case described here, genuine propositions are not being put forward 
because the expression reflects a non-epistemic certainty. We could, though, imagine 
circumstances in which such a proposition could be a genuine matter for empirical 
debate. For the ‘same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by 
experience, at another as a rule of testing’ (OC §98). Recalling the reading 
encouraged in §2.5.2 regarding the propositionality or non-propositionality of hinges 
explains the equivocation. Wittgenstein is aware of propositional and non-
propositional uses of an expression like ‘I believe in the Last Judgement’. The former 
use occurs in cases where the context indicates that the Last Judgement is being 
debated as an accurate or inaccurate empirical prediction. The latter, non-
propositional use indicates a certainty expressed by a believer.  
 
There is, however, a further problem here. If such expressions are certainties, why do 
they not sound as peculiar as they do when a certainty like ‘The Earth is very old’ is 
expressed? The oddness of such expressions was a key factor in Wittgenstein’s 
critique of Moore’s knowledge claims in On Certainty. Yet, professions of belief in 
the Last Judgement are commonplace amongst religious believers, and their fellow 
believers do not think them queer or a joke, think the speaker insane, or become 
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 The Lectures were presented in 1938. See LC, Editor’s Preface by Cyril Barrett. 
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confused (OC §§463, 467). Can such religious propositions really be indicators of 
certainties? 
 
There are two components to dissolving this tension. First, even belief – that is, the 
ascription of a truth value – in apparently empirical religious propositions does not 
automatically entail what Wittgenstein considers to be religious belief. For 
Wittgenstein, ‘sound [religious] doctrines are all useless . . . you have to change your 
life’ (CV p. 61). Therefore it is not the case that whenever such a proposition is 
expressed it does indicate a religious certainty. Secondly, where such an expression 
does indicate a certainty, the propositions of religious belief are not arrived at in the 
form of a conclusion following the amassing and evaluating of evidence. They are 
instead the culmination of a form of life (LC, p. 58). These two points will be 
addressed in the following two sub-sections. 
 
 
5.2.2 Belief in religious propositions does not entail religious belief  
 
The first point – that one must change one’s life for proper religious belief – finds its 
clearest expression in Culture and Value:  
 
Queer as it sounds: the historical accounts of the Gospels might, in the 
historical sense, be demonstrably false, & yet belief would lose 
nothing through this: but not because it has to do with ‘universal 
truths of reason’! rather because historical proof (the historical proof-
game) is irrelevant to belief (CV p. 32). 
 
Even if the resurrection of Christ or prediction of the Last Judgement could be 
empirically proved false, religious belief (in, for example, Christianity) would lose 
nothing. Conversely, this understanding entails that simply because an individual 
holds to be true such seemingly empirical propositions, that individual does not 
automatically have a religious belief. This point is made explicitly by Wittgenstein 
elsewhere: 
 
 185 
Suppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make 
forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of 
Judgement Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and 
even if it were more convincing than I have described, belief in this 
happening wouldn’t be at all a religious belief (LC, p. 56). 
 
One might believe that Christ was a man who was resurrected two thousand years ago. 
One might also believe that there will one day be a final reckoning of all human lives 
in the form of a Last Judgement. One might even attend church regularly, express such 
doctrines, sing the psalms, and place coins in the collection pot. None of these actions 
or beliefs described above entails a religious belief. Further, propositions like ‘Jesus 
was resurrected’ do not amount to a religious – in particular a Christian – life. They do 
not automatically carry any edicts on how a person ought to live. It is this sort of 
religious life that Wittgenstein considers to be the only indicator of a truly religious 
belief. A Christian life is something that must be expressed through all of one’s 
actions, not solely when engaging in the ritual and dogma of the organised church 
service: 
 
For a sound doctrine need not seize you; you can follow it, like a 
doctor’s prescription.– But here you have to be seized & turned 
around by something (CV p. 61). 
 
If religious belief is not to be like following a doctor’s prescription, it must instead be 
something more like ‘a passionate commitment to a system of reference 
[Bezugssystem]’ (CV p. 73). A passionate commitment to a system of reference is not, 
presumably, something that can be picked up as one enters the nave and relinquished 
upon exit. If one is to orient one’s life by it, the system of reference must have 
permanence in one’s life.206  
 
 
                                                 
206
 When Wittgenstein heard that a student of his, Yorick Smythies, had converted to 
Catholicism, Wittgenstein wrote to him and acerbically declared: ‘If someone tells me 
he has bought the outfit of a tightrope walker I am not impressed until I see what is 
done with it.’ Monk (1990), p. 464. 
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5.2.3 The propositions of religious belief are the culmination of a form of life 
 
§5.2.2 drew a distinction between, on Wittgenstein’s terms, an authentic and an 
inauthentic religious belief. However, even an authentic believer might be found to 
express propositions like ‘I believe in the Last Judgement.’ If we are to maintain that 
such expressions indicate certainties, such expressions must be reconciled with the 
prior understanding that the expression of certainties tends to sound absurd.
207
 
Wittgenstein surely does not want to say that the propositions of religious belief are 
expressed in error; that would render him guilty of the same criticisms he charges 
Frazer with in the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.208 If religious propositions 
neither provide evidence for nor entail religious belief – i.e. their expression does not 
convert people on rational grounds – then what is their role, and why are they uttered 
at all? 
 
Wittgenstein’s insight lies in reversing the chronological roles of religious belief and 
religious propositions. Rather than religious belief being dependent upon and a 
consequence of positive truth-value ascription to the propositions, the propositions are 
instead the product of a religious life: 
 
Why shouldn’t one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a 
Last Judgement? But I couldn’t either say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the 
statement that there will be such a thing. Nor ‘Perhaps’, nor ‘I am not 
sure’ (LC, p. 58). 
 
The first sentence informs us that the form of life precedes the associated 
propositions.
209
 A form of life is a network of ways of acting. A religious form of life 
– i.e. genuine religious belief – is a passionate seizing hold of a system of reference 
(CV p. 73), which provides a particular sort of guidance for acting. A system of 
reference (Bezugssystem) is something by which one can orient one’s life, and some 
systems of reference – or aspects of them – are religious in nature. A person’s 
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 Cf. OC §§348, 460-464. Also, see §2.3.3 of this thesis. 
208
  Cf. RFGB, passim, and in particular p. 5. 
209
 As we saw in Chapter 3, by the time Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty, he may well 
have formulated this in terms of the world-picture rather than the form of life.  
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acquisition of a system of reference ‘is something you might [bring about] by means 
of a certain upbringing, shaping his life in such & such a way’ (CV p. 97). 
Alternatively, someone could be converted to such a way of life.  
 
Whilst religious scholars might construct proofs – for instance, Anselm’s ontological 
argument – ‘[believers] themselves would never have arrived at belief by way of such 
proofs’ (CV p. 97). Anselm was already a Christian when he constructed the 
ontological argument, and intended it to be a documentation of his own understanding 
of God, rather than an attempt to convert others through argument.
210, 211
 He had a 
Christian world-picture that culminated in not just a proposition like ‘I believe in the 
Last Judgement’, but an argument for the existence of God, despite being already 
convinced of it himself. One’s world-picture influences the way one perceives the 
world and acts in reaction to it. Wittgenstein considers this in relation to the Last 
Judgement: 
 
Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life: believing in the 
Last Judgement. Whenever he does anything, this is before his mind. 
In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes this will 
happen or not? (LC, p. 53) 
 
Whether or not the person in question takes the Last Judgement to be a true empirical 
prediction is irrelevant to its ability to guide their life. It here indicates something 
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 Regarding the ontological argument as set out in the preface to his Proslogion, 
Anselm said: ‘I have written the following little treatise on this very conception and 
on certain others, as a person trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God and 
seeking to understand that which he believes.’ Anselm (1977), p. 365. 
211
 Perhaps some people are persuaded to become religious by such arguments. 
Bertrand Russell, in his autobiography, claims that “I had gone out to buy a tin of 
tobacco, and was going back with it along Trinity Lane, when suddenly I threw it up 
in the air and exclaimed: ‘Great God in boots!—the ontological argument is sound!” 
Russell (1967), p. 63. Russell credits this moment with turning him into a Hegelian 
rather than a Christian. Nonetheless, drawing on exposition earlier in this thesis, I 
would argue that he was persuaded of this position by its simplicity or symmetry, or 
other non-rational considerations. Russell notes that it was an argument espoused by 
J.M.E. McTaggart, also in Cambridge at the time and a firm Hegelian, who ‘had a 
great intellectual influence’ on his generation of young scholars, so perhaps personal 
considerations were at play. Russell later came to consider ‘almost all Hegel’s 
doctrines [to be] false.’ Russell (1972), p. 730. 
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deeper, a genuine religious belief, providing structure and context to all their other 
actions, always before their mind in everything they do; an axis around which other 
activities turn (OC §152). A religious belief that holds permanence in someone’s life 
plays the role of the ‘scaffolding’ (OC §211) of a believer’s thoughts, ‘the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false’ (OC §94), and ‘the 
substratum of all my enquiring and asserting’ (OC §162). Wittgenstein makes it quite 
clear, even in work preceding On Certainty, for example here in the Lectures, that he 
does not consider religious beliefs to be at all like ordinary beliefs: 
 
[O]ne would be reluctant to say: “These people rigorously hold the 
opinion (or view) that there is a Last Judgement”. “Opinion” sounds 
queer. 
 It is for this reason that different words are used: ‘dogma’, 
‘faith’. 
 We don’t talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor 
about knowing. 
 In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: “I believe 
that so and so will happen,” and use them differently to the way in 
which we use them in science (LC, p. 57). 
 
Wittgenstein draws a distinction between propositions regarding which we can talk 
about ‘hypothesis . . . probability . . . [or] knowing’ and religious expressions, for 
instance regarding the Last Judgement. If religious expressions are not opinions, 
views, hypotheses, or objects of knowledge, they seem very much like certainties, 
even if this distinction was not developed in his writing for another ten years. This 
point is clarified further when he notes that even though we use seemingly empirical 
propositions like ‘I believe that so and so will happen’, they are not used empirically, 
in the way that we would ‘use them in science’. 
 
In the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein regarded Frazer’s principal 
mistake as deeming religious and magical practices to entail a scientific, empirical but 
false hypothesis on the part of the agent, such that magical/religious ritual x will 
produce desirable effect y. ‘The characteristic feature of primitive man,’ Wittgenstein 
responds, ‘is that he does not act from opinions he holds about things (as Frazer 
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thinks)’ (RFGB p. 12). Just as Frazer incurs Wittgenstein’s scorn for criticising past 
practices as forms of bad science, full of erroneous empirical claims, we ought to 
avoid the same mistake in examining our contemporary religious or ritualistic 
practices. The expressions of religious belief do not belie opinions or knowledge. 
They are subject to standards of enquiring, asserting, and proof very different from 
science, and thus we tend to use different words, like ‘faith’ and ‘dogma’.  
 
Although Wittgenstein offers little explanation of why a religious belief might 
culminate in expressions that seem like empirical propositions, the comparison made 
with the Remarks may provide some clues. Propositions like ‘I believe in God’ appear 
in the Christian creed, in all major church denominations, as does some reference to 
the resurrection of Jesus in the form of a proposition in which the congregation 
express their belief. The formal, communal, and liturgical nature of the area of the 
form of life in which these propositions find their most common expression lends 
itself to a description of these propositions as being a crucial symbol of Christian 
ritual. In which case, we ought to note that a ‘religious symbol does not rest on any 
opinion. And error belongs only with opinion’ (RFGB p. 3). Whilst ritual alone does 
not constitute a genuine religious belief, it can still play a part in it. 
 
The proper way to look at ritual, the Remarks suggest, is simply to say that it is a part 
of a form of life: ‘We can only describe and say, “Human life is like that”’ (RFGB p. 
3). Wittgenstein discourages – for example Frazer’s – attempts to impose a universal, 
explanatory theory or schema onto such phenomena. This perhaps explains his 
reluctance to further analyse his claim that they appear as the culmination of a form of 
life, for ‘Every explanation is an hypothesis’ (RFGB p. 3). Nonetheless, there is no 
reason to consider modern – for example, Christian – religious practices as any 
different from those with which Frazer was concerned: ‘The religious action or the 
religious life of the priest-king are not different in kind from any genuinely religious 
action today, say a confession of sins’ (RFGB, p. 4).212 
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 I take ‘genuinely’ here to mean a passionate seizing hold of a frame of reference, 
as opposed to a someone who attends the rituals but does not take from them guidance 
for his or her life. A good example of this distinction beyond The Gospel in Brief can 
be found in Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Father O’Hara, whom he accuses of ‘making 
it [i.e. religion] a question of science’ (LC, p. 57). O’Hara tries to make his belief 
accord with scientific or empirical standards of reason, yet Wittgenstein ‘would 
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Even if it appears as a part of Christian ritual, ‘There will be a Last Judgement’ is, for 
Wittgenstein, an expression a believer might find himself saying if he was the bearer 
of a genuine, Tolstoyan sort of faith, as part of a passionate commitment to a system of 
reference. Whereas Father O’Hara might introduce an identical expression as part of a 
philosophical argument for the existence of God – a proposition to be proved – it 
would not perform the same function as it would if Wittgenstein or Tolstoy or 
Dostoevsky uttered it, as the culmination of a truly religious form of life.
213
 
 
With this understanding of the role such religious propositions play, the tension as to 
why they do not sound absurd when expressed can be resolved. Wittgenstein is not 
positioned against humans expressing truisms per se, but rather objects to philosophers 
making use of these propositions whilst ignoring their actual non-propositional role in 
our lives, exempt from doubt, mistake, or oversight. He wants these ‘propositions 
which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched—these [he] should like to 
expunge from philosophical language’ (OC §30), but he refuses to interfere with the 
workings of everyday language. So, there are two senses in which one might say ‘I 
believe in the Last Judgement.’ The first is as a commonplace, empirical proposition, 
being debated quite aside from any genuine religious belief as a simple prediction of a 
future event. The second is as the culmination of a religious form of life. In this latter 
instance, it can be expressed as part of the ritual and trappings of a religious life, and 
this, as his investigation into Frazer makes clear, is something Wittgenstein does not 
wish to interfere with. Apropos of nothing, to a fellow Christian, a believer’s simply 
saying ‘I believe in the Last Judgement’ may well sound as queer as Moore’s 
expressions of knowledge (the Moorean propositions). However, in the context of 
such a liturgical setting, even if it indicates a passionate seizing hold of a system of 
reference and represents a certainty, it would not sound queer or a joke to one’s fellow 
                                                                                                                                           
definitely call O’Hara unreasonable. I would say, if this is religious belief, then it’s all 
superstition’ (LC, p. 59). Compare this, too, with the earlier recounted anecdote in 
which Wittgenstein declares Coplestone to have ‘contributed nothing to the 
discussion at all’ by attempting to prove the existence of God with philosophical 
arguments.  
213
 Dostoevsky was another author Wittgenstein greatly admired, in particular The 
Brothers Karamazov. See Monk (1990), pp. 107, 136, 549. For a good discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s thought in relation to Dostoevsky, as well as to Kierkegaard and 
Tolstoy, see Labron (2009), in particular pp. 124-6. 
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believers.  
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5.3 Radical vs. Weak Incommensurability 
 
5.3.1 Clash and incommensurability 
 
We have characterised disagreement over a concern like the Last Judgement as a 
clash of world-pictures rather than of opinions, hence Wittgenstein’s non-conflict 
position.
214
 The clash focuses on a particular aspect of two people’s world-pictures: 
for example the certainty regarding the Last Judgement, held by one but not by the 
other. The terminology used here – distinguishing between ‘clash’ and ‘conflict’ – 
was introduced in a footnote at the beginning of the chapter. Having examined 
Wittgenstein’s non-conflict position, the reasons for this distinction should now be 
more apparent. Something isn’t matching up when Wittgenstein refuses to say that he 
believes in the Last Judgement where the other would, but it cannot be that they 
conflict over their propositions as neither of their expressions are genuine 
propositions. We therefore use the term clash to indicate a mismatch of certainties or 
world-pictures and to describe the state of two incommensurable world-pictures when 
they come into contact with one another. Conflict is propositional; clash is non-
propositional incompatibility of world-pictures. 
 
For the sake of the argument, we shall call the respective positions exemplified in 
Wittgenstein’s Last Judgement scenario Christian and atheist. Their positions may be 
more nuanced than this, but these labels will serve for easy referencing until we 
come to draw finer distinctions in §5.4.2. The Christian and the atheist, in their clash 
over the Last Judgement, reveal themselves to be committed to two different systems 
of reference. The truth of the empirical propositions – there will be or there will not 
be a Last Judgement – has become incorporated into those systems of reference.215 
Any attempt to convert the other will therefore rely on non-rational means of 
persuasion. If the clash leads to a debate, the Christian and the atheist are likely to be 
talking, as Kuhn terms it, ‘at least slightly at cross-purposes’ (SSR, p. 112). 
 
The rest of this chapter will be an investigation into the extent of possible 
communication between the members of two incommensurable world-pictures. 
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Wittgensteinian fideism, as described by Nielsen and Phillips is a position 
maintaining that incommensurability entails total untranslatability, and will be used 
here as an example of a view supporting this entailment.
216
 We call this radical 
incommensurability. On the other end of the spectrum – although no one directly 
claims to hold such a position – would be weak incommensurability. Weak 
incommensurability would hold that cross-world-picture communication is 
unvaryingly unproblematic, and that, for instance, the believer and the non-believer 
encounter no lexical discrepancies between themselves in any discussion they might 
have.  
 
Wittgensteinian fideism is knowingly presented here as a straw-person argument, 
although its parallel in Kuhnian philosophy of science has been supported by, 
amongst others, Putnam and Davidson.
217
 Even D.Z. Phillips, according to Nielsen 
the archetypal Wittgensteinian fideist, has strenuously denied his association with the 
position. Phillips points to several instances of his own work, some of which pre-date 
Nielsen’s article, which indicate that he should not be associated with 
Wittgensteinian fideism, for example: 
 
I am anxious to avoid a position in which religious discourse seems to 
be a special language cut off from other forms of human discourse. 
Religion would not have the kind of importance it has were it not 
connected with the rest of life.
218
 
 
Wittgensteinian fideism’s role in this discussion, therefore, is not so much that of a 
theory to be evaluated, but rather as a comparative position in order to guide a 
reasonable conclusion.  However it is particularly useful because Nielsen’s paper 
focused on religious examples, and in examining Wittgensteinian fideism we can 
therefore draw on the work of earlier in this chapter from §5.2. The final sections of 
this chapter will propose a viable middle way between these two extremes, which we 
will call dynamic incommensurability. 
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5.3.2 Wittgensteinian Fideism 
 
Wittgensteinian fideism is not a position claimed by anyone. Rather, Nielsen in a 
paper called ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’, accuses various Wittgenstein scholars – 
particularly D Z Phillips, Peter Winch, Norman Malcolm, and G. E. Hughes – of 
misinterpreting Wittgenstein in such a way that this becomes their position 
unintentionally.
219
 The position is described by Nielsen as follows: 
 
1. The forms of language are the forms of life. 
2. What is given are the forms of life. 
3. Ordinary language is all right as it is. 
4. A philosopher’s task is not to evaluate or criticise language or the forms 
of life, but to describe them where necessary and to the extent necessary 
to break philosophical perplexity concerning their operation. 
5. The different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life all 
have a logic of their own. 
6. Forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism; each mode 
of discourse is in order as it is, for each has its own criteria and each 
sets its own norms of intelligibility, reality and rationality. 
7. These general, dispute-engendering concepts, i.e. intelligibility, reality 
and rationality are systematically ambiguous; their exact meaning can 
only be determined in the context of a determinate way of life. 
8. There is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher (or for 
that matter anyone else) can relevantly criticise whole modes of 
discourse or, what comes to the same thing, ways of life, for each mode 
of discourse has its own specific criteria of rationality/irrationality, 
intelligibility/unintelligibility, and reality/unreality.
220
 
 
The use of ‘forms of life’ is actually a little unclear. The Wittgensteinian fideist 
position set out by Nielsen focuses on forms of life as it derives its stance from 
Philosophical Investigations; the world-picture is a concept only present in 
Wittgenstein’s writings in On Certainty. Nielsen was writing in 1967; On Certainty 
was not published until 1969. As we saw in Chapter 3, there are good reasons for 
making a clear distinction between these two terms: a form of life encompasses the 
entire breadth of a community’s practices and customs, whereas a world-picture is 
made up only of the deeply embedded actions Wittgenstein calls certainties. Given 
this distinction, we can see that Nielsen’s analysis straddles the two terms somewhat. 
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The targets of Nielsen’s original article were interpretations of Wittgenstein that 
rendered religious belief immune from rational criticism.
221
 Even further, such 
interpretations promote the idea that, for instance, ‘the concept of God's reality is 
only given within and only intelligible within the religious form of life in which such 
a conception of God is embedded.’222 Whilst (1) is correct that language-games (the 
forms of language) are delineated by the forms of life, intelligibility and criticism 
does not happen between forms of life, but between individuals. Those individuals 
are always subscribed to a world-picture. As §4.2 explained, being part of a religious 
form of life – attending church and singing hymns – does not automatically entail a 
genuinely religious belief in the form of a religious world-picture.  
 
The real point of Nielsen’s analysis is that according to a Wittgensteinian fideist 
position, an atheist, for example, cannot understand or rationally criticise the actions 
and expressions of a Christian or any other believer. One must be a part of the 
community in question in order to grasp the particular criteria and norms of 
intelligibility, reality and rationality. In that case, the concern is to do with world-
pictures, not forms of life. Taking part in certain forms of life does not automatically 
entail that one holds particular certainties determining standards for intelligibility and 
rationality, for proof, investigation and assertion. Nielsen is not at fault for the 
blurring of the boundaries between the form of life and the world-picture, given both 
that On Certainty was published after ‘Wittgensteinian fideism’, and that, to my 
knowledge, this particular drawing of the distinction has not been suggested outside 
of this thesis. The term ‘form of life’ is appropriate for numbers (1), (2), (3), and (4), 
but thereafter we should substitute it for ‘world-picture’. The rest of this chapter will 
treat Wittgensteinain fideism as a concern regarding world-pictures rather than forms 
of life. 
 
With this digression now set aside, numbers (1) through (7) are uncontentious, at 
least insofar as the interpretation of Wittgenstein presented in this thesis. Number (8) 
is more complex. The difficulty lies in rejecting fideism – and its conclusions that no 
one can criticise whole modes of discourse on the basis that the ensuing discussion 
would be intelligible only within one’s form of life – without seeking to adopt a 
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position that transcends all modes of discourse or ways of life and thereby takes up 
an objective, Archimedean standpoint. Wittgensteinian fideism is an example of the 
radical interpretation of incommensurability because it does not permit the 
understanding of an alien ‘mode of discourse [with] its own specific criteria of 
rationality/irrationality, intelligibility/unintelligibility, and reality/unreality’.223 
Contrasted with this is the weak interpretation of incommensurability, which would 
allow for unproblematic, smooth understanding between any two or more modes of 
discourse occurring between different world-pictures. This position will not be 
addressed directly here, as it has already been demonstrated that this position is 
incompatible with both Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn noted the impossibility of directly transferring terms 
and concepts from Newtonian dynamics to relativistic Einsteinian dynamics, or from 
Ptolemaic astronomy to the heliocentric Copernican model.
224
 As for Wittgenstein, 
the entire thrust of the Philosophical Investigations was to encourage an 
understanding of language whereby communication is more complicated and 
dependent upon context and use than simply learning the use of a word and assuming 
that it pertains in full generality, as the Augustinian picture of language would 
suggest.
225
 
 
The concept of the weak interpretation of incommensurability is, however, worth 
keeping in mind, as what will be argued for here is a moderate position, lying some 
way between the radical and the weak interpretations. This position will suggest that 
translation between members of different world-pictures is possible, to varying 
degrees. The extent of possible translation is largely dependent on the degree of 
similarity between the two world-pictures in question; where there are many 
similarities, communication is easier than where there are few, and it is also easier to 
pinpoint where the two world-pictures differ. The adoption of this moderate position 
will remain faithful to Kuhn’s intentions for the concept. We will not conduct a 
detailed investigation into the respective merits of Nielsen’s and Phillips’ arguments 
against Wittgensteinian fideism, but, in developing the case for rejection of radical 
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incommensurability and support for a moderate interpretation instead, a rejection of 
Wittgensteinian fideism will be achieved nonetheless. 
 
Kuhn went some way to clarifying his position in The Road Since Structure. In the 
chapter ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’, Kuhn notes that a 
frequent criticism of incommensurability is that ‘if there is no way in which the two 
[languages] can be stated in a single language, then they cannot be compared, and no 
arguments from evidence can be relevant to the choice between them.’226 This 
argument would find sympathy with Wittgensteinian fideism and represents a radical 
interpretation on the grounds that it regards religious language as being incapable of 
being stated in any other language. This criticism, suggests Kuhn, though, depends 
on the assumption that ‘if two theories are incommensurable, they must be stated in 
mutually untranslatable languages.’227 Although there may be other viable methods 
of rebutting Kuhn’s critics – and Kuhn explores some in the chapter surrounding 
these remarks, particularly in relation to Putnam’s criticisms – it is a rejection of this 
particular assumption about the nature of incommensurability that will be most 
useful here.
228
 
 
It is tempting to focus solely on the lexical aspect of incommensurability. When 
engaged in discussion of the possibility and difficulties of communication, it is not 
surprising that we first consider language. But differences in lexicon are only one 
aspect of Kuhn’s analysis of paradigms, and only one consequence of 
incommensurability between them. Kuhn describes the incommensurability of 
standards, of concepts and vocabulary (or lexicon) and apparatuses, and of perceptual 
skills (SSR, pp. 148-150). These, however, are only formulations of the diverse 
practices of scientists, each working in within their respective scientific traditions. 
Even when Kuhn, in the quotation above rebutting Putnam’s criticisms, focuses on 
the assumption about ‘mutually untranslatable languages, we should remember that it 
is paradigms – ways of acting – that are incommensurable with one another, not 
theories or their formulations, although these may be the medium by which we 
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recognise an instance of incommensurability. Similarly, for Wittgenstein, it is not 
language that is our core concern; rather ‘it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of 
the language-game’ (OC §204). Our certainties are revealed by our actions, not by 
any propositions – which will, in most contexts, sound absurd or a ‘joke’ (OC §463) 
– we may utter in trying to express them. We should therefore be aware that critics of 
incommensurability often focus too heavily on the linguistic difficulties of 
translation. Whilst language is certainly a component of the problem, the true source 
of the problem lies in the difficulty in comparing different ways of acting. 
 
 
5.3.3 Incommensurability of actions 
 
Understanding the real source of incommensurability as residing in ways of acting 
provides possibilities for avoiding the charge of total untranslatability. As Kuhn 
notes, ‘different paradigms are always slightly at cross-purposes’ (SSR, p. 112). But 
this does not bar translation totally. Xinli Wang’s detailed study of 
incommensurability in Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication 
addresses this point, and he is suitably wary of the radical interpretation of 
incommensurability. Like Kuhn, he relates incommensurability to incompatible 
metaphysical presuppositions between two languages, which in turn are reflected in 
the practices of a community. Wang cites Gadamer in developing a point bearing 
remarkable similarities to Wittgenstein, for instance when he notes that ‘a whole 
mythology is deposited in our language’ (RFGB p. 10): 
 
‘If every language is a view of the world, it is so not primarily because 
it is a particular type of language (in the way that linguists view 
language) but because of what is said or handed down in this 
language’ (Gadamer, 1989, p. 441) For example, it is not Chinese 
language per se, as a natural language with its unique grammatical 
structure and lexicon, but rather the Chinese cultural tradition 
embodied in it, as handed down linguistically by the Chinese 
language, that constitutes the worldview of the Chinese.
229
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Wang maintains that even when two traditions, as exemplified by the languages they 
use, are incompatible on the grounds of fundamentally different presuppositions about 
metaphysical entities, communication does not have to fail entirely. Whilst Wang (and 
Gadamer) here focuses on natural languages, the thought is equally applicable to the 
lexical differences in which disparate world-pictures are embodied.
230
 Provided that 
we do not ‘allow ourselves to be blinded by the prejudgements . . . coming with our 
own language’, nor ‘bracket all the prejudgements’ of our own language and ‘jump 
into the stream of the other’s experience . . . mutual understanding’ is possible via a 
‘constant movement back and forth between our own language and the other 
language.’231 This method avoids having either to project our own presuppositions on 
to the other language or to wholeheartedly adopt – i.e. be converted to – those of the 
tradition we are trying to understand. By a process of dialogue, some communication 
can be maintained, and this is achieved by making connections with the points both 
sides of the dialectic hold in common.
232
 Wang goes on to describe this as the process 
by which Kuhn eventually came to understand Aristotle’s texts on physics, which 
previously had been so perplexing to him, when ‘suddenly the fragments in [Kuhn’s] 
head sorted themselves out in a new way, and fell into place together.’233  
 
Wang’s analysis establishes the possibility for rebutting radical incommensurability 
in theory, but we ought to return to the practical case of the Christian and the atheist 
in order to see how this might work in practice. In discussing their beliefs they may 
find serious difficulties in understanding and evaluating each other’s claims. Each 
person employs a different vocabulary for some terms, and, even though both use the 
same words, their respective meanings may be wholly incompatible. However, they 
will be able to achieve a degree of communication by comparing their actions. These 
comparisons would have to be non-trivial and related to the matter at hand. If two 
world-pictures are clashing primarily over ethics or politics, a connection on the 
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grounds that both parties wear shoes will likely be irrelevant or unhelpful, whereas a 
common commitment to reducing human suffering might be more productive. The 
Christian and the atheist – particularly if they have both been raised in the same 
country and from similar backgrounds, religious upbringing notwithstanding – are 
likely to behave in similar ways in a variety of respects. For example, responses to 
basic ethical choices – perhaps excluding areas such as abortion which are highly 
contentious due to religious dogma – will likely bear a degree of similarity. These 
similarities may be evident – this generous action, that act of forgiveness – despite 
there not being a single, common link in light of which all the ethical actions of both 
parties could be grouped together. 
 
Consider an even more specific example. The Christian and the atheist are each, 
separately, and without knowledge of each other’s case, presented with the choice 
between killing a man and stealing his money in a situation where they could not be 
caught, or refraining from doing so. Given their near-identical sociological 
backgrounds excepting a religious/atheistic upbringing, we would expect their 
responses to be the same. Both have been brought up to consider murder ethically 
wrong in almost any conceivable circumstances, and certainly where the only upside 
would be personal gain. That is not to say that one or the other will never be tempted 
into failing their own moral convictions, but the conviction itself stands fast 
nonetheless. The similarity of the ethical aspect of their world-picture might be 
attributable to the influence of Christian ethics on secular Western life, law, and 
morality. Far from weakening this position, it strengthens it; the forms of life and 
world-picture shared by the Christian and the atheist are not always radically 
dissimilar, and they do not live their lives in isolation from one another.  
 
If we – and the Christian and the atheist themselves – did notice such similarities, 
what would the consequences be for the charges made against incommensurability? 
We would still have to concede that smooth, unproblematic communication might 
remain impossible; a common, neutral language between two world-pictures is 
probably elusive. But so long as we are prepared to settle for partial translation, 
examining actions rather than words alone provides a promising start. 
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5.4 A middle way: dynamic incommensurability 
 
5.4.1 General comparisons 
 
A focus on actions instead of words permits further possibilities for world-picture 
comparisons. Let us now consider the possibility of comparing several world-
pictures at once.  Let these world-pictures be as distinct as possible in terms of their 
division from one another. We could do this by constructing an axis, with one line 
representing chronology and another representing geography. We could then pick out 
approximate past and present cultures. For example a person’s world-picture living 
in Moscow in the dying days of the Russian Empire, another in the London of Tudor 
England, a further world-picture from Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy I, and so 
on. Given some reliable historical knowledge, we would be able to say that world-
picture x is either more or less similar to world-picture y than to world-picture z. 
Degrees of similarity would be something we would be perfectly comfortable in 
attributing to different world-pictures like these, provided we knew a little of an 
individual’s likely convictions, based on what we know of contemporary accounts of, 
for instance, religion, science, and daily life. Of course, this process might involve 
learning about the forms of life – the breadth of practices – in order to begin 
acquiring a sense of what stands fast for various people in that culture. 
 
We could also draw this axis along slightly different lines, for we might want to 
make more specific comparisons. For instance, in the USA, despite deep political-
party divisions, regional divisions are often more powerful and influential. Thus it is 
frequently said that a Southern Democrat will often have more in common with a 
Southern Republican than with another Democrat from the North, particularly 
regarding deeply held convictions, for instance over gun laws, religion and prayer in 
schools, or the scope of the federal government.
234
 So, too, rather than compare the 
world-picture of a Christian of Tudor England with an atheist of Tudor England, we 
might, in certain respects find more in common by comparing the Tudor Christian 
with a modern Christian. Knowing along what sort of lines we want to make 
communication possible informs the way we go about looking for comparisons. 
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Were we concerned with more trivial matters, we might compare fashion, cuisine, 
and entertainment between different cultures, and this would involve looking at 
different forms of life. But for the more significant aspects of a civilisation, we need 
to look at the deeper convictions of groups of individuals, taking in concerns like 
religion, ethics, science and politics, in order to understand their world-picture.  
 
The more similar the practices relative to and constitutive of one world-picture are to 
those of another world-picture, with relevance to the concern at hand, the greater the 
degree of possible communication. Returning to the Christian and the atheist, their 
actions are not so different as to be wholly incompatible. In fact, Wittgensteinian 
fideism seems to lose sight of real life. Devout Christians and firm atheists live side 
by side in society, despite, in certain respects, very different certainties and world-
pictures. Yet they clearly succeed in at least some degree of communication, as they 
interact coherently on a regular basis. There is enough common ground in their 
practices for them to engage in the back-and-forth movement suggested by Wang in 
order to create a dialogue. For the Christian and an atheist, born of similar 
background aside from their religious upbringing, the degree of difference in their 
practice is relatively slim, and the level of possible comparison and communication 
rather high. 
 
We ought also to bear in mind that Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, 
provides clear indications that similar practices are something we can recognise quite 
easily. In fact, this is the cornerstone of his family resemblances concept: 
 
How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that 
we should describe games to him, and we might add: “This and 
similar things are called ‘games’” . . . We do not know the 
boundaries because none have been drawn. (PI §69) 
 
Recognising where connections lie in the absence of strict criteria for what counts as a 
connection is a skill we are capable of, even if when we make connections we cannot 
subsume them under a neat and immutable category. Practices like games are blurry 
at the edges and resist the drawing of a sharp boundary, but so too are religious, 
political, and ethical practices and the certainties underlying them.  
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5.4.2 Nuanced comparisons 
 
Wittgensteinian fideism proposes that religious world-pictures can be clearly 
demarcated from non-religious world-pictures. That in itself is suspect, because even 
the boundary between a Christian and an atheist is not always clear. However the 
problem is compounded when we take into account further subdividing of the category 
of ‘Christian’. Christianity breaks down into several different denominations and 
traditions: Roman Catholic, Anglican, Greek Orthodox, Lutheran, Episcopalian, 
Evangelical, Baptist and Anabaptist, Quaker, Rastafarian, to name only a few. Some 
of these subdivide even further. Some bear more or less significant similarities to other 
of these denominations. A perspicuous representation of all – perhaps a visit to a 
church service and conversation with some of the congregation of each – would enable 
us to make those connections. Within all the comparisons, we would notice some 
important differences: between suggested methods of prayer; positions on baptism, 
including how and when it should take place; ethical guidance; including tolerance of 
homosexuality; the sorts of medical treatments that are permitted; stance on abortion 
and in what specific circumstances; and so on. There are also some differences 
between them on metaphysical issues, particularly to do with the nature of the Trinity, 
the status of Mary, and, in the case of Rastafarianism, the divinity of Haile Selassie. 
Although there is a sense in which Wittgenstein was antipathetic to scripture and 
church teaching, there is no reason to suppose that being brought up in one of these 
traditions precludes different sorts of authentic religious belief coloured by the 
different certainties and forms of life each denomination suggests. Each presents a 
unique type of religious belief, all of which come under the umbrella term 
‘Christianity’, though there may not be a single common feature that unites them all.  
 
Radical incommensurability in the form of Wittgensteinian fideism presents a 
compartmentalised smoothness of communication: unproblematic if one is willing to 
remain in communication solely with those who share one’s world-picture, utterly 
impossible if one wishes to venture outside of it and encounter alternative ones. When 
we consider all the different variations within Christianity, what is the Wittgensteinian 
fideist to say? He is left with an uncomfortable dilemma: either there is total 
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untranslatability even between slightly different denominations of the same religion; 
or those different denominations amount to no difference at all in terms of practice and 
language. Neither option is reasonable. Clearly, there are very significant differences 
in the lives of genuine religious believers of each denomination; the horn of the 
dilemma suggesting there are no differences is untenable. Yet, they can still – and very 
definitely do – communicate with one another, on matters both religious and secular. 
In some conversations, doubtless, they will be talking at least slightly at cross-
purposes, as Kuhn described it. At this stage, they might well point to their own 
actions and say ‘This is simply what I do in the case of abortion/medical 
emergency/encounters with homosexuality.’ However, that communication is not 
utterly impossible cannot reasonably be denied, and so the other horn of the dilemma 
is also untenable. All that is left is to reject the position that led us to the dilemma in 
the first place, and so we must reject the radical version of incommensurability, 
whether in the form of Wittgensteinian fideism or otherwise.  
 
Dynamic incommensurability accommodates far better than the radical or weak 
versions the subtleties and small variations of actual human interaction. The weak 
interpretation leaves the terrain of cross-world-picture communication impossibly 
smooth, posing no difficulties at all. Either there are no fundamental differences in 
practices and vocabulary (suggesting a homogeneous universal world-picture), or there 
are such differences but communication does not suffer at all. Everyday experience is 
enough for us to find this position unconvincing. The radical interpretation suffers 
from the opposite problem, seeing insurmountable problems for communication where 
either there are none, or those problems are isolated to very specific features of the two 
world-pictures in question. Dynamic incommensurability cannot offer a template for 
where connections can and cannot be made. The circumstances will be different in 
each case, depending both on which world-pictures the individuals trying to 
communicate belong to, and on what matters the sought communication is about. 
However, as a rough guide, dynamic incommensurability proposes at least attempting 
the back-and-forth movement suggested by Wang, spotting points of comparison and 
working onwards from there. Other considerations may play a role. For instance, in the 
case of such a dialogue, communication will be hindered if one party is not interested 
in joining the process of making connections, preferring a closed-minded, isolationist 
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stance, happy to disregard the world-pictures of others and champion only his own.
235
 
Still, the boundaries for communication are set in the first instance by the similarities 
of the world-pictures. However open-minded Moore might be, he would still find 
some of the practices and expressions of the king (OC §92) impossible to understand, 
regardless of how far his humility extends with regard to his own world-picture.  
 
The dynamic interpretation of incommensurability presented in this chapter recognises 
the difficulties of translation and communication but suggests only that it is difficult to 
varying degrees, and certainly not impossible. The degree of difficulty will largely 
depend on the similarity of the two world-pictures of the two or more people trying to 
communicate. Wittgenstein suggests in Culture and Value that ‘what’s ragged should 
be left ragged’ (CV p. 51), and, with regards to cross-world-picture communication, 
that is a sentiment that has been preserved in the dynamic interpretation of 
incommensurability. §5.5 will continue by investigating the points that remain 
impossible to communicate, where, despite the best efforts of both parties, something 
totally incommensurable remains, however much communication surrounding these 
points is achieved.  
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(1997) and (2002), pp. 89-90.  
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5.5 Clash reveals dissonances 
 
Although dynamic incommensurability suggests that it is only in very rare cases that 
no communication will be possible between members of different world-pictures, the 
back-and-forth movement will highlight specific areas where practice and language 
remain incompatible between the two. One effect of successfully making connections 
in the areas surrounding such loci is that it will be easier to spot the irreducible points 
of difference. So, whilst the Christian and the atheist might be able to find common 
ground in practice and linguistic use that matches perfectly in some areas, imperfectly 
but to an extent in others, some points – for instance what is meant by the terms ‘God’, 
‘faith’ or ‘the Last Judgement’ – permit no further translation. We will call such 
irreducible points of clash ‘dissonances’. Where there is much in common surrounding 
a dissonance, pinpointing it and working around it are much easier tasks. Similar 
world-pictures will yield fewer dissonances than dissimilar world-pictures, although 
the extent of the similarity will depend partly on the nature of the clash.  
 
The Christian and the atheist mentioned in previous examples will encounter only a 
few dissonances, and then perhaps only if they clash in a circumstance in which 
religious beliefs are in question or relevant. Wittgenstein’s example of the Last 
Judgement (LC, p. 53), discussed in §5.2, presents such a situation. The fact that 
Wittgenstein could locate the point of dissonance as lying with their respective 
convictions on the Last Judgement suggests that there must have been a great deal of 
agreement between them in other areas. Wittgenstein understands roughly what the 
Christian means by the words ‘the Last Judgement’, and also clearly has some 
understanding of the role it plays in the Christian’s life if he refuses to admit that they 
contradict each other, as he understands that it plays the role of a certainty for the 
Christian. There may be ‘an enormous gulf’ (LC, p. 53) between the two when it 
comes to this feature of their world-pictures, but if the same two characters were 
debating the nationality of an overhead plane or whether NASA will put a put a human 
on Mars before 2050 one would say that they were ‘fairly near’ (LC, p. 53). Just 
because the Christian differs in one aspect of his standards of enquiring and asserting 
does not mean that his entire frame of reference and all his practices of enquiring and 
asserting will be unrecognisable to the atheist. A world-picture provides standards for 
‘enquiring and asserting’ (OC §162), but a single dissonance indicates only a single 
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mismatched certainty.
236
 A world-picture is made up of a whole network of certainties. 
Many of their other certainties – about gravity, the age of the Earth, and so on – are 
held by both. Consequently, many of their standards for enquiring and asserting will 
be identical. Communication is relatively unproblematic. If it is only religious 
certainties that present dissonances between the two, even conversion – for either party 
– might not be too difficult. People convert to Christianity and lose their faith in 
Christianity every day.  
 
Even closer than a Christian and an atheist, we could focus on a Catholic and an 
Anglican. Here, there will probably be even fewer dissonances than between the 
broadly defined Christian and the atheist. Discrepancies between the Catholic and the 
Anglican would perhaps focus on terms like ‘transubstantiation’, ‘the intercession of 
saints’, ‘guilt’ and the importance of confession. Anglicans take the transubstantiation 
metaphorically rather than literally. Anglicans do not pray to specific saints depending 
on the circumstances, believe in original sin, or take confession with a priest. Catholics 
do all of these things.
237
 Nonetheless, crucial terms such as ‘God’, ‘the Trinity’, ‘the 
Messiah’, and ‘the Ten Commandments’ would be entirely interchangeable between 
the two branches of the same faith, and their practices surrounding these terms – both 
the application of the terms themselves and the influence on the way they conduct 
their lives – would be nearly identical. Consequently, a conversion from Anglicanism 
to Catholicism – and we have seen such defections recently amongst the clergy over 
stances on homosexuality and clergywomen, although it has not been uncommon for 
other reasons ever since the Reformation – would be a gestalt switch of a less radical 
kind than if an atheist became a Christian or a Christian lost her faith entirely. Debate 
between Catholics and Anglicans is a common feature of everyday life in the West. 
Their large degree of lexical similarity not only indicates the vast extent of their shared 
practice, it also enables them to pick out with a great deal of precision where 
dissonances occur. Via the back-and-forth movement proposed by Wang, there is 
plenty on either side with which to see and make connections.   
 
                                                 
236
 It is conceivable that a single dissonance might indicate a small network of 
mismatching certainties. However, no strict conditions could be drawn up for this; it 
would be a matter of seeing connections and spotting dissimilarities at the point of 
clash. For the sake of simplicity, we will treat it as a one-to-one relationship.  
237
 Cf. OC §239. 
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On the other hand, in cases where such common ground is harder to find, picking out 
precise dissonances may be a much more difficult task. The case of Moore and the 
king presents such an example. Moore would hardly know where to start with the 
king, for their processes and standards of enquiring and asserting are fundamentally 
different in almost every respect, particularly in relation to the past. Were Moore and 
this king to meet, their conversation would be hampered by fundamental lexical 
differences (assuming for now that they even both spoke English) over the meaning – 
i.e. the correct use – of terms like ‘history’, ‘life’, ‘ancestors’, and so on. These 
lexical differences would belie the dissonances in their certainties and the 
incompatible practices these dissonances entail. Moore would be perplexed by 
several features of the king’s behaviour. Whilst confusions would abound, locating 
the source of the confusion would be challenging. The king would be unable to 
articulate what it is that forms the substratum of all his enquiring and asserting for 
Moore’s benefit, just as Moore could not do the same for the king. As the 
anthropologist Kate Fox notes, in a comment echoing Kuhn’s scientists struggle to 
articulate the established bases of their own paradigm (SSR, p. 47), “those who are 
most ‘fluent’ in the rituals, customs, and traditions of a particular culture generally 
lack the detachment necessary to explain the ‘grammar’ of these practices in an 
intelligible manner.”238 Moore and the king could tell that their world-pictures are 
significantly different, but they could not clearly articulate the certainties that make 
up their own. So numerous and significant are the dissonances that even if they 
choose to engage in the recommended back-and-forth movement, they will find little 
they could call similar in their search for comparisons. That is not to say that 
communication or conversion would be impossible, but the task would be far harder 
than between a Catholic and an Anglican or even between a Christian and an atheist. 
If Moore did manage to convert the king to his world-picture, he would first have 
had to work hard to make some connections in order to understand precisely where 
the dissonances lie. Only then could he know on which matters the king needs to be 
persuaded.  
 
 
5.5.1 The realities of communication 
                                                 
238
 Fox (2004), p. 2.  
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This chapter has focussed on arguing against the fideist or radical version of 
incommensurability. That position extrapolates from a small focal point of 
incompatibility which we have called a dissonance – such as terminology and 
behaviour between a Christian and an atheist regarding a conviction in the Last 
Judgement – and reaches the conclusion that the two world-pictures that give rise to 
these expressions permit no inter-communication whatsoever. They are slightly at 
cross-purposes, as Kuhn notes, but the ease with which they identify this point 
indicates quite the opposite conclusion: that their standards of enquiring and 
asserting bear a great degree of similarity, and partial translation is certainly possible. 
Kuhn’s own comments seem to back this position when he remarks that 
‘communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably partial’ (SSR, p. 149). 
By the revolutionary divide, he means a comparison between an old paradigm and 
the one that succeeds it, but this could work equally well for any clashing paradigms 
or world-pictures. D Z Phillips, denying that he is a Wittgensteinian fideist in the 
face of Nielsen’s claims, suggests an example of possible understanding across the 
world-picture divide: 
 
We say that the later stages of a religion are deeper than the earlier 
stages; we say too that one person’s faith is deeper than the faith of 
another person. These judgements can be made by non-believers, 
which suggests that religious concepts are not inaccessible to non-
religious understanding.
239
 
 
Whilst Phillips’ passage and consideration of the realities of communication suggest 
one should reject radical incommensurability, they also raise further questions. We 
have examined a range of examples in which the similarity of world-pictures and 
consequently the possibilities for communication and conversion vary: Moore and the 
king, a Christian and an atheist, and a Catholic and an Anglican. Phillips, though, 
raises the possibility of different depths of faith even within what might at first seem a 
unified belief system, however far it is already subdivided into Catholicism, 
Anglicanism, and so on. If we take the first half of this chapter into account and 
                                                 
239
 Phillips (1964), p. 411. 
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accept Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief, then this understanding would have 
to take account of differences between the practices of a person with a deep faith and 
those of someone with a less deep faith. Whilst, on the one hand, a non-believer could 
very well note these differences, we are left wondering what differences are faced 
between the deep believer and the other. Is their communication always 
unproblematic, or do they encounter dissonances of their own, however small? 
 
We can take this point in another way, too. Drawing such finely graded distinctions in 
one area – religious belief – suggests that similar distinctions can be made in all 
manner of other features of life and world-pictures. Do these also entail small 
dissonances, and in what sorts of situations might these be revealed? Chapter 6 
continues this line of thought, examining what will be termed the individual world-
picture. There we will argue that even though we can draw rough boundaries – 
believer and non-believer, Creationist or Western scientific – the realities of human 
life do not always lend themselves to such stark contrasts. In Chapter 1, we noted that 
Kripke’s sceptical challenge was responded to by pointing to something 
homogeneous and unified: a form of life in which everyone always means ‘plus’ by 
the ‘+’ sign and not ‘quus’. Although nothing has directly challenged the value of this 
move yet – except for the distinctions drawn in Chapter 3 between the form of life 
(the term used by Kripke) and the world-picture – the idea of a universal, stable, and 
homogeneous set of practices is beginning to fall apart. As the concept of the world-
picture begins to break down, can Kripke’s sceptical solution, or more generally the 
communal view of language, still be maintained? Chapter 6 will investigate the 
possibilities for dissecting the concept of the world-picture further, taking issue with 
Moyal-Sharrock’s proposed taxonomy of certainties and in particular her claim of the 
existence of necessarily universal certainties. Chapter 7 will proceed to re-address 
Kripke’s sceptical challenge and the communal view of language, seeking to re-cast 
Philosophical Investigations in light of the extrapolation of On Certainty carried out 
here.  
 211 
Conclusions 
 
§5.1 began by outlining the ways in which the parallels drawn in Chapter 4 between 
Wittgenstein and Kuhn will be useful when it comes to exploring Wittgenstein’s 
thought on religious belief, providing we can acquire a clear understanding of the 
concept of incommensurability. §5.2 examined some of Wittgenstein’s comments on 
religious belief, informed by a small amount of necessary biographical information in 
order to clarify what Wittgenstein considered genuine faith. Of utmost importance to 
Wittgenstein was the effect such faith must have on one’s life, a ‘passionate 
commitment to a system of reference’ (CV p. 73). This point, coupled with the claim 
that certain expressions arrive as the culmination of a religious form of life, helped to 
make sense of Wittgenstein’s non-conflict position in the example of the Last 
Judgement (LC, p. 53). The non-conflict position was described as due to there being a 
clash of certainties, not empirical propositions, revealed by their claims regarding the 
Last Judgement. By exposing their respective different frames of reference, Kuhn’s 
analysis of talking at cross-purposes becomes relevant, and so we secured religious 
belief as another potential way of exploring incommensurability in world-pictures.  
 
§5.3 investigated possible interpretations of incommensurability. Many of Kuhn’s 
critics claimed that it entailed total untranslatability and a necessary failure of 
communication. This position was compared with an analogous position in 
Wittgensteinian scholarship, that of Wittgensteinian fideism. As a comparison, a weak 
interpretation of incommensurability was drawn up as a counterweight. In §5.3.1 the 
terminology of ‘clash’ was introduced in order to describe the situation when two 
incommensurable world-pictures come into contact. §5.3.2 examined an account of 
Wittgensteinian fideism, taking note of the discrepancy in terminology between form 
of life and world-picture with reference to the distinction drawn in Chapter 3. Whereas 
§5.3.2 focused on the lexical aspects of incommensurability, §5.3.3 drew out attention 
to its deeper features, that of ways of acting. §5.3.3 cited Wang on cross-world-picture 
communication. Wang makes two key proposals. First, that language use indicates 
something deeper deposited within a culture, akin to a mythology. Secondly, that via a 
back-and-forth movement between members of two incommensurable world-pictures 
in a state of clash, a degree of communication is, in theory, possible. 
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§5.4 proposed a moderate, dynamic interpretation of incommensurability, situated 
somewhere between the radical and weak interpretations. In §5.4.1 we took Wang’s 
recommendations and suggested ways such a back-and-forth movement might work in 
practice. We further suggested that seeing connections (as per §1.4) would be 
something we would be comfortable doing between world-pictures, using the 
examples of the Christian and the atheist. §5.4.2 took this process further, looking at 
more nuanced situations, taking as our examples further subdivisions within the 
umbrella term of Christianity. §5.4 rejected radical incommensurability and concluded 
that the dynamic interpretation of incommensurability provided an understanding 
whereby the difficulties of cross-world-picture communication were recognised, but 
not deemed insurmountable.  
 
§5.5 addressed the concern of what is happening when, despite the back-and-forth 
movement suggested by dynamic incommensurability, some points remain irreducibly 
incompatible. Such instances were termed ‘dissonances’. We looked at a range of 
world-picture comparisons, from Moore and the king, to the Christian and the atheist, 
and a Catholic and an Anglican. We concluded that the more similar the world-
pictures in a state of clash, the fewer the dissonances, and the easier the task of 
achieving a measure of cross-world-picture communication. Further, where there are 
fewer dissonances, the remaining dissonances are easier to pinpoint as there is more in 
common between the members of the world-pictures’ standards of enquiring and 
asserting. Where these can be accurately located, if a conversion is sought, it will be 
easier to target one’s efforts of persuasion in order to effect that conversion. Finally, 
§5.5.1 raised Phillips’ distinction between different depths of faith, and posed some 
questions for the final two chapters of this thesis. If such distinctions are reasonable, 
how much further and more finely graded can our distinctions go? The concept of an 
identical world-picture held by several people seems to be breaking down as we 
consider more and more axes along which we can note dissimilarities in world-
pictures.  
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Chapter 6 – Refining the world-picture 
 
6.1 The aims of a refined world-picture 
 
6.2 Certainties of different depths 
6.2.1  Proneness of a certainty to revision 
6.2.2 Consistency of practice according to a certainty 
 
6.3 Restricted domains and Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy 
6.3.1 Justification for the certainties of practices and abilities 
6.3.2 Restricted domains 
6.3.3 More restricted domains 
6.3.4 The activities of restricted domains within Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy 
 6.3.5 Communication and personal-autobiographical certainties 
 
6.4 Problems with universal certainties 
6.4.1 The very idea of a normal individual 
6.4.2 The Pirahã and forbears 
6.4.3 Past and future possibilities 
 
6.5 A dissenting voice 
 6.5.1 There are no alternative world-pictures 
 6.5.2 Alternative world-pictures are inconceivable 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 The aims of a refined world-picture 
 
Chapter 6 will break down the concept of the world-picture further than we already 
have in Chapter 5. Drawing on our understanding of incommensurability as arising 
from dissonances between adherents of different world-pictures – so far introduced in 
terms of examples using Christians and atheists and Moore and the king – here we 
investigate certainties even more idiosyncratic to each individual. It is clear that such 
discrepancies between adherents of different world-pictures can affect possibilities for 
communication and conversion.
240
 We are now interested in seeing whether even 
more finely grained differences will have a similar, albeit possibly less significant, 
effect. This chapter introduces these possibilities, and Chapter 7 will conclude the 
thesis by investigating what effect these considerations have on our understanding of 
language as a communal activity.  
                                                 
240
 Q.v. §5.5. 
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First, we will consider a different variant to world-pictures and certainties. §5.5.1 
introduced a remark from D.Z. Phillips who suggested that the ‘later stages of a 
religion are deeper than the earlier stages; we say too that one person’s faith is deeper 
than the faith of another person.’241 In §6.2 we will explain how these depths of 
religious faith, but also of any aspect of one’s world-picture, can be attributed to 
different depths of certainties in an individual’s life, and just what such different 
depths of certainties entail.  
 
§6.3 introduces the term ‘restricted domains’. Restricted domains indicate aspects of 
an individual’s life – particular abilities or practices – which, whilst structured by 
certainties, have a limited scope of influence, usually only to when engaging in the 
relevant activities. These contrast with the more general certainties we have already 
explored, such as that of gravity or the Last Judgement, which influence nearly 
everything an individual does. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has proposed a taxonomy of 
certainties, divided into four main groups, and then into further sub-groups. The latter 
stages of §6.3 will explore one of these groups and sub-groups – personal, and 
personal-autobiographical certainties – in order to improve upon her commendable 
initial efforts at constructing a taxonomy by fitting the certainties of restricted 
domains into these categories. 
 
Having situated the certainties of restricted domains within Moyal-Sharrock’s 
taxonomy, §6.4 will raise some issues with it. First, we will consider her problematic 
account of universal certainties, suggesting that her justification for their existence is 
unpersuasive, before arguing that, whilst the taxonomy is helpful in getting to grips 
with the complexity of On Certainty, particularly if one accepts the refinements 
proposed in this chapter, it might be too rigid a structure to accommodate the nuances 
of all our practices, and therefore should only be considered a rough guide.  
 
Finally, we will address a dissenting voice. Towards the end of Annalisa Coliva’s 
recent work, Moore and Wittgenstein, she proposes that there are no alternative 
world-pictures, and, further, that alternative world-pictures are inconceivable. It is 
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 Phillips (1964), p. 411. 
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worth engaging with on the basis alone of its status as a thorough and sophisticated 
piece of recent scholarship, but particularly so given that its final pronouncements are 
so distinctly opposed to the arguments presented in this thesis. We will reject her 
claims in §6.5. 
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6.2 Certainties of different depths 
 
§5.5.1 discussed the following passage from D.Z. Phillips: 
 
We say that the later stages of a religion are deeper than the earlier 
stages; we say too that one person’s faith is deeper than the faith of 
another person. These judgements can be made by non-believers, 
which suggests that religious concepts are not inaccessible to non-
religious understanding.
242
 
 
If religious faith can be of different depths, and religious faith belies certainties, does 
it make sense to claim that it is the certainties that are of different depths? There are 
two ways we could consider the same certainty to exist at different depths within a 
world-picture. We could consider, on the one hand, how prone a certainty is to 
revision; that is, to being swept back into the flow of hypothesis and testing and 
subject to doubt and evidence. On the other, we can take into account the consistency 
of practice according to that certainty. Some certainties, particularly religious, ethical, 
or political certainties – all of which a certainty like the Last Judgement could 
encompass – do not function in quite the same way as, say, certainties about gravity 
or the age of the Earth. For whilst a certainty like the Last Judgement structures all 
one’s enquiring and asserting – in essence, much of one’s moral judgements – that 
does not automatically entail that one always acts according to those judgements. 
We’ll return to this shortly, but first we’ll examine proneness to revision.  
 
 
6.2.1  Proneness of a certainty to revision 
 
We noted in §2.6.1 that there are two distinctions made in the riverbed metaphor of 
OC §§97-99: between certainties and hypotheses (the riverbed and the waters); and 
between different depths of the riverbed. The latter distinction was described as 
capturing how some ways of acting last perhaps only a few centuries or even decades 
whilst others are deeper in the riverbed and erosion might take thousands of years, if 
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it happens at all. In Chapter 2, the process of breaking down the world-picture had not 
yet begun, and our focus was with world-pictures on a grand scale. A very basic 
knowledge of history would suggest that, for instance, certainties regarding gravity 
are ancient whereas others have been shorter lived.  
 
When we consider the certainties that have changed, we do so by thinking of the 
aggregate of individuals, even though, as noted in §4.6.2, each individual is converted 
individually, at least until the new certainty is established and becomes part of the 
upbringing of future generations. Yet, for each individual during a period of change – 
for example, the shift from geocentrism to heliocentrism – some people’s certainties 
are more or less likely to be called into question and returned to the flow of empirical 
investigation than others. One would expect, during that period, that members of the 
clergy such as Cardinal Bellarmine, who ordered that Galileo retract his astronomical 
claims on the grounds that they were antithetical to Church dogma, would have found 
it harder to reconsider his certainty on geocentrism due to his position as a religious 
leader.
243
 His religious convictions, as a cardinal, were unshakeable, and Galileo’s 
evidence would not be counted as evidence by an adherent of such a fiercely Christian 
world-picture. For Bellarmine, ‘the world stands firm, never to be moved’, and only a 
conversion away from Christianity (or perhaps to a more Wittgensteinian, less 
dogmatic version of it) could change this for him.
244
 On the other hand, an educated 
person with a faith less deep than Bellarmine’s might have been able to countenance 
Galileo’s heliocentrism. Religious certainties of different depths do seem to be able to 
account for differences of faith, observable in the actions of those individuals. 
 
Whereas the gravity certainty – regardless of whether it would have been labelled as 
such pre- or post-Newton – is probably entrenched equally amongst all humans at all 
times, we would be justified in claiming that a certainty in the Last Judgement is held 
more unshakeably by a member of the clergy than by a layperson; it would take 
something greater to induce a spiritual crisis in the former than in the latter. Similarly, 
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 See Mayer (2010). This could be considered either way. His position might force 
upon him a degree of cognitive dissonance, whereby he is persuaded by Galileo’s 
arguments but unable to recognise this due to the consequences it would have for his 
life and career, or the depth of his faith could be genuine and that is why he holds the 
post. The specifics in this case are irrelevant, but the principle holds in either case.  
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 1 Chronicles 16:30. See also Psalms 93:1, 96:10. 
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in a secular example, the person on the platform in Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park 
proclaiming how evil it is to eat meat holds an ethical certainty less likely to be 
shifted by any argument or evidence than a recent convert to vegetarianism, whose 
convictions so far are less deeply rooted. Neither would be likely to eat meat, but, as 
Phillips suggests in the earlier example regarding the depth of faith, the differing 
fervour of their respective convictions would be just as observable to the non-believer 
or the carnivore as to the insider of either group. This judgement by the outsider could 
be made on the basis of how vociferous they are when their respective turn comes to 
mount the platform; their receptivity to counter-arguments and tendency to re-state 
blunt convictions rather than engage in debate; or, in personal circumstances, how 
likely they are to be tempted and to yield to that temptation to eat meat. So our 
distinction between certainties of the hard rock and of the sand applies not only when 
viewed as an aggregation of many people, but also within individuals.  
 
 
6.2.2  Consistency of practice according to a certainty 
 
The last scenario, introducing temptation, brings us to our second consideration, 
consistency of practice according with a certainty. Religious and ethical certainties 
may structure our judgements, and we may hold these judgements in common with 
those who share this aspect of our world-picture, but this does not guarantee perfect 
adherence for every individual at all times. Apart from exceptional circumstances 
where mitigating factors might conceivably play a part, the thief, fraudster, and 
murderer consider theft, fraud, and murder morally wrong. Falling prey to a vice – an 
addiction or predilection or sheer greed – happens to the most devout of believers, but 
does not necessarily shake their faith or their conviction that what they did was, 
beyond all doubt, wrong. Everyone is susceptible to temptation that contradicts their 
ethical convictions. Flouting such a certainty might not amount to an aberration, but 
rather to a mistake. The judgement and its underlying structure of certainties need not 
be affected by actions, although regular transgressions would open the agent to 
charges of hypocrisy and, on Wittgenstein’s terms, an inauthentic faith if 
proclamations of religious virtue were a frequent feature of their life. 
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If a passionate commitment to a system of reference which ‘provides guidance for . . . 
life’ (LC, p. 53) is the crucial aspect of such a deep-rooted conviction – and it need 
not be Christian, but rather any religious or ethical conviction – then the regularity 
with which this guidance is followed indicates the depth of the conviction, the extent 
to which it has taken hold.
245
 Conversely, someone who, perhaps quite genuinely, has 
taken something like the Last Judgement as a passionate commitment to a system of 
reference but regularly fails their own conviction might still be said to have an 
authentic faith but nonetheless not a deep one.  
 
Within any guidance for life occasional failures of one’s own standards are more or 
less inevitable. Of further interest in considering the depth of the conviction would be 
the degree to which one castigates oneself following a transgression of one’s own 
system of ethical judging and asserting. The person who regularly fails to live up to 
their own ethical system of reference but suffers extreme guilt and seeks to make 
amends could still have a deeper faith than someone who fails just as often but 
brushes it off as inconsequential and makes no effort at redemption. The depth of a 
certainty in a person is a judgment we can make by examining someone’s consistency 
of practice and whether it accords with a conviction, but there is no checklist or 
system applicable to all cases by which we could make this judgement.  
 
Someone who holds a deep certainty would probably speak about his convictions in a 
different manner from one whose certainty is less deep. Whilst significant lexical 
discrepancies are unlikely, considerations of conversion are well placed here. 
Something has to change in an individual for a shallower certainty or faith to become 
a deeper one. In cases where ethical or religious judgements are part of the 
conviction, this process can often involve an elder or authority figure, whose 
certainties are already deeply embedded, to guide the recent convert or wavering 
believer deeper into the riverbed where his convictions are more secure. In the case of 
more widely applicable certainties – gravity, the dangerousness of fire, simple 
arithmetic, the age of the Earth – the depth of certainty between individuals is 
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 Consider again the comment mentioned in §5.2.2 that Wittgenstein made to 
Smythies: ‘If someone tells me he has bought the outfit of a tightrope walker I am not 
impressed until I see what is done with it’ (Monk, 1990, p. 464). 
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unlikely to vary much.
246
 However, in cases where conversion of a certainty is more 
likely, where certainties are more prone to be acquired and relinquished during the 
course of a person’s life, then differences of depth are more readily found. We now 
leave considerations of depth of certainties and consider the certainties of restricted 
domains in relation to Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy of certainties.  
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 For reasons that will become clear in §6.4 in addressing aspects of Moyal-
Sharrock’s taxonomy, we still ought to be wary of considering these certainties to be 
universal.  
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6.3 Restricted domains and Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy 
 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has ‘propose[d] a taxonomy of hinges’, listing fixed 
differences between linguistic, personal, local, and universal hinges.
247
 Whilst she 
concedes that ‘this classification is not Wittgenstein’s’, she argues that it presents a 
‘more manageable, and more perspicuous, presentation’ of the ideas in On 
Certainty.
248
 Moyal-Sharrock lists four types of certainty: 
 
1. Linguistic hinges: ‘are strictly grammatical rules that precisely define our 
individual use of words and of numbers . . . [they are different] from the 
generic class of grammatical rules.’ For example: ‘2+2+4’, ‘This colour is 
called blue/green (in English)’. 
 
2. Personal hinges: ‘to do with our individual lives’. For example: ‘I am now 
sitting in a chair’, ‘I have never been on the moon’, ‘The person opposite me 
is my old friend so and so’. 
 
3. Local hinges: ‘constitute the underlying framework of knowledge of all or 
only some human beings at a given time’. For example: ‘No one was ever on 
the moon’, ‘The earth is round’. 
 
4. Universal hinges: ‘delimit the universal bounds of sense for us: they are 
ungiveupable certainties for all normal human beings’. For example: ‘There 
are physical objects’, ‘I have forbears’.249 
 
Linguistic hinges are all ‘giveupable’; personal and local hinges both contain some 
‘giveupable’ and some ‘ungiveupable’ hinges. Universal hinges are all 
‘ungiveupable’.250 Moyal-Sharrock draws evidence for this distinction from On 
Certainty, §613, where Wittgenstein notes ‘a difference between the cases’ of water 
freezing when placed over a heat source and ‘doubting whether this person here is 
N.N., whom I have known for years’. In the case of water freezing when placed over 
a heat source, Wittgenstein says that he would ‘assume some factor I don’t know of’ 
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), pp. 100-103. See also Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of same 
publication. Note that although Moyal-Sharrock uses the term ‘hinges’ for what I 
have called ‘certainties’, there is no significant difference in our definitions for these 
purposes, and throughout this chapter I will use the terms interchangeably. 
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), pp. 101 and 102. 
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 102. 
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 106. The terminology used by Moyal-Sharrock is 
unwieldy, but we will retain it to avoid confusion.  
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(OC §613), whereas a doubt that he recognises his friend would ‘drag everything with 
it and plunge it into chaos’ (OC §613). Moyal-Sharrock takes a hinge to be 
ungiveupable ‘where no circumstances would induce a normal individual to give it up 
at any time’.251  
 
Within the class of personal hinges, Moyal-Sharrock distinguishes between 
autobiographical and perceptual hinges. Personal-autobiographical hinges ‘make up 
an individual’s objective certainty about who he is, where he is, what he is doing, the 
people he knows, his abilities, some of the events in his past, and so on.’252 Whilst she 
lists someone’s abilities as a feature of personal-autobiographical hinges, she does not 
elaborate on this feature, focusing instead on concerns of where someone has been 
and events in his past. Her examination of these matters is complex and impressive, 
but, for our purposes, two things are missing. First, a deeper understanding of ability 
certainties is desirable. Secondly, what – if any – effects this has on our understanding 
of communication and conversion between people who don’t share some of these 
certainties. To begin with, in §6.3.1 I will propose some justifications of my own for 
regarding various human abilities and practices as having certainties in principle, 
before considering some specific activities of restricted domains by way of illustration 
in §6.3.2 and §6.3.3.  
 
 
6.3.1 Justification for the certainties of practices and abilities 
 
There is a strong case to be made for considering many human practices as grounded 
and structured by certainties beyond those originally taken into consideration by 
Wittgenstein. By considering the manner in which Wittgenstein describes activities 
like doing mathematics or speaking a language as resting on certainties, and how he 
describes these as rule- and logic-governed practices like any other, we can expand 
our understanding of what constitutes a certainty-based practice. 
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 101. 
252
 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 124. Regarding the personal aspects of a world-picture 
cf. Hamilton (2013), Chapter 7. 
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When asking himself why he is ‘so certain that this is my hand’, Wittgenstein 
suggests that the ‘whole language-game rest[s] on this certainty’ (OC §446). So 
language-games involving hands depend on the certainty that one has a hand. He then 
compares this certainty with a basic mathematical certainty, the remark ‘12x12=144’. 
He claims that ‘both propositions, the arithmetical one and the physical one, are on 
the same level . . . The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical . . . My 
remark is a logical and not a psychological one’ (OC §447). As Moyal-Sharrock 
suggests, the basics of mathematics become certainties:  
 
‘2+2=4’ is a mathematical hinge for me (as for most numerate 
individuals), but not ‘235+532=767’ . . . as Wittgenstein notes, some 
calculations become ‘fixed’ or ‘reliable once and for all’ – that is 
removed from doubt and where checking no longer makes sense – 
whilst others do not.
253
 
 
The certainties we have mentioned – that one has a hand and that ‘12x12=144’ – are 
comparable with each other and belong to logic. What is it for a certainty to be a part 
of logic? Our first clue is that ‘everything descriptive of a language-game is part of 
logic’ (OC §56). Wittgenstein also emphasises that the ‘kind of certainty is the kind of 
language-game’ (PI §332). In separate statements, Wittgenstein has given indications 
that the kind of certainty describes the language-game, and that everything descriptive 
of a language-game is part of logic. Certainties comprise the logic of a language-
game. In the case of a language-game involving talk of hands, the certainty that we 
have hands belongs to the logic of that particular language-game. Wittgenstein also 
says that ‘What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs 
to the description of the language-game’ (OC §82). If something determines what 
counts as an adequate test of a statement then it makes up ‘the substratum of all my 
enquiring and asserting’ and belongs to our ‘world-picture’ (OC §162). Therefore 
logic makes up the character of our world-picture and thereby structures our 
language-games. Our certainty that we have a hand is part of logic, part of our world-
picture, and the ‘whole language-game rest[s] on this certainty’ (OC §446). 
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Language-games, again, are the conduit by which we can examine surrounding 
concepts, particularly as they are consistent features across both Philosophical 
Investigations and On Certainty. We can also compare Wittgenstein’s comments on 
language-games with those on mathematics. Philosophical Investigations stresses that 
languages-games are networks of rule-following practices (PI §§3, 31, 54, 68), 
different from other rule-following practices only in that they are linguistic (PI §§7, 
21, 23 51). Similarly, Wittgenstein states that mathematics is ‘an activity’ (PI §349), a 
series of techniques to master. Mathematics has certainties and it is a practice; not a 
privileged, special practice, but one amongst many others.
254
 So, if language-games 
and mathematics are practices and abilities requiring mastery, and these practices are 
defined by the type of certainties underlying them, then we would expect other, non-
linguistic and non-mathematical practices and abilities also to be at least partly 
defined by the kind of certainties that underlies them. Otherwise mathematics and 
linguistic activities would have to be privileged, special types of activities, which 
Wittgenstein is quite clear they are not.  
 
Other practices, too, ought to have certainties then. The difficulty here is that 
mathematics and language-games are more or less common practices to all humans. 
Whilst language-games definitely – and even conceivably ways of doing mathematics 
might – differ from person to person, community to community, almost everyone 
does them in some form. Other practices, though, are not so common to all. Whilst we 
have established that certainties could underpin any practice in principle, acquiring 
specifics will be a much trickier task. To aid this process, in the next section we will 
introduce the concept of restricted domains.  
 
 
6.3.2 Restricted domains 
 
There is a difficulty in investigating the certainties of restricted domains. The concept 
is intended to mark off the certainties according to particular practices. For any 
practice we pick to illustrate the idea, it is likely that most people do not participate in 
it. Therefore there will inevitably be difficulties in clearly articulating just what these 
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 Cf. PI §§254, 342, 343, 349, RFM VI-33-4, VI-41, VI-70. 
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sorts of certainties might amount to. Any example we pick might be recognisable to 
some readers, unrecognisable to others. As a result, examples can only be sketched 
out, and in an illustrative fashion, and some examples might strike some readers 
forcefully and others not at all. Luckily, Kuhn presented an example well suited to our 
purposes with which to begin, although as our examples become more specific, the 
domains more restricted, this will become more difficult. We have already considered 
this example of Kuhn’s in another context in Chapter 4, but it is worth repeating here: 
 
An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists 
took the atomic theory to be asked a distinguished physicist and an 
eminent chemist whether a single atom of helium was or was not a 
molecule. Both answered without hesitation, but their answers were 
not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule 
because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. 
For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom was not a 
molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably 
both men were talking of the same particle, but they were viewing it 
through their own research training and practice. Their experience in 
problem-solving told them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly 
their experiences had much in common, but they did not, in this case, 
tell the two specialists the same thing (SSR, pp. 50-1).  
 
Whilst two scientists might share a broad base of certainties, their respective 
specialities might lead to divisions. These two scientists, we presume, are from the 
same twentieth-century Western scientific tradition. Only a particular situation – 
being asked to respond to a very specific question – revealed a substantive difference 
in the foundations of their scientific paradigms. Each has some slightly different 
certainties (or, in Kuhn’s terminology, established bases) regarding the fundamental 
constituent parts of the universe.
255
 These differences presented as dissonances in a 
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 We could also consider a similar example between a Newtonian and an Einsteinian 
physicist. Russell McCormmach’s novel, Night Thoughts of a Classical Physicist, 
presents an interesting idea of what it was like for an old-fashioned, classical physicist 
to be faced with the emerging alternative paradigm (i.e. world-picture) of the 
relativistic physicists who followed Einstein in the early twentieth century. See 
McCormmach (1982). 
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particular circumstance that created a clash. When doing physics or doing chemistry, 
each operates with his own certainties structuring his own investigations. Outside of 
the laboratory, though, these certainties are irrelevant. Filling a balloon for a child’s 
party with helium from a canister, neither’s certainty – one taking a helium particle to 
be a molecule, the other not taking it to be a molecule – is structuring their actions. 
Only when doing physics or doing chemistry are their individual certainties relevant, 
structuring their practices for a quite specific set of actions. This is what we mean by 
the term restricted domains. These certainties are restricted to the domains of 
physical- and chemical-scientific practice respectively. Even were they both to engage 
in other scientific practices, this division in their paradigms might not be revealed. 
When with their own kind of scientist though, each can take a communally shared set 
of certainties for granted.  
 
Kuhn’s example using different specialities within the same professional field is a 
useful place to start. We could consider a similar, profession-related example, that of 
a London taxi driver who has passed the Knowledge. The Knowledge is the 
mandatory test in order to gain a license for all London black-taxi drivers. It requires 
that each candidate be able to drive between any two points in London within a six-
mile radius of Charing Cross without reference to a map or use of satellite navigation, 
as well as knowing the locations of various other points of interest such as hotels, 
theatres, schools, and hospitals. A London taxi driver who has passed the Knowledge 
– or indeed anyone who has taken that test – would consider a fellow cabbie’s claims 
that Pall Mall is in Islington to be indicative of madness, serious intoxication, or 
degenerative brain function, not a proposition to be seriously debated. They might 
debate between themselves the best routes, taking into account whether they wish to 
artificially increase the cost of the fare, frequent traffic hotspots, shortcuts, illegal but 
easily performed manoeuvres, locations of good rest stops or well-positioned taxi 
ranks, any number of things. But the correct locations of Pall Mall and Islington are 
beyond doubt. They, along with innumerate other locations and road plans, structure 
any debate they have on how best to get around London.  
 
I did not grow up in London and I don’t have any of these certainties regarding 
locations of various areas or points of interest. When I go there, I use a map and often 
still get lost. In time, through frequent repetition of routes and recognition of areas, 
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some locations might become embedded and form certainties of my own, rather like 
the driver who has passed the Knowledge. But until I am more familiar and have 
demonstrated my mastery of getting around London, I do not have some of the 
certainties the taxi driver has. Of course, even for the taxi driver, these are certainties 
of a restricted domain. Once he has finished his shift and goes home, the certainties 
about London locations are irrelevant, just as the respective molecule or non-molecule 
certainties are for the physicist and chemist outside of the lab.  
 
 
6.3.3 More restricted domains 
 
We can restrict our domains even further and discover certainties of even more 
limited practices. Perhaps in chess, that ‘check belongs to our concept of the chess 
king’ (PI §136), or that pawns can only move one space (two on the pawn’s first 
move), forwards into an open square or diagonally if taking a piece. For advanced 
players, various certainties regarding appropriate tactics, opening moves, different 
players’ styles of play could be discovered. I am not a good enough chess player to 
even be able to conceive of what these might be like.
256
 However, we could add an 
easy-to-understand possible certainty conversion. Many novice and even some quite 
experienced chess players are unfamiliar with the en passant rule, and play perfectly 
happily and competently without it, sometimes for years.
257
 It is a rare manoeuvre. 
Upon being told of the rule, a small part of the chess world-picture comes under 
revision. The possibilities – permitted moves, standards of enquiring whether x is a 
good move or a bad move – on the board are altered. The en passant rule itself is not 
the certainty, any more than Newton’s formulation of the law of gravity is a certainty. 
The way of acting whereby en passant is incorporated into the game and informs all 
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 At this level of restricted domains, short of training to Grandmaster level myself, 
non-philosophical works could provide an insight into how such certainties might 
function, what it might be like to be a skilled chess player and the sorts of things one 
can take for granted in developing ever more complex strategies. We could, of course, 
read Play Winning Chess, Seirawan (1990) and begin the process of training, but a 
better place to start might be fiction, such as The Luzhin Defense, Nabokov (2000). 
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 En passant can be played if white moves a pawn two squares forward for the 
piece’s first move. If on the next turn a black pawn could have taken the white pawn 
had the white pawn moved only one square forward, the black pawn may move one 
square diagonally as if the white piece had moved only one square, and the white 
piece is thus taken and removed from the board. The colours used could be reversed.  
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sorts of other moves – for example, white might move other pieces differently to 
avoid black taking white’s pawn via en passant – is a certainty in the domain of chess. 
The revision to how one can move pawns constitutes a revision to one of the 
certainties of chess. 
 
A proficient amateur pianist has certainties about octaves, tempo, the location of the 
piano keys relative to each other, and these structure her piano-playing activities. 
Whilst they may once have been part of her musical education, through drill and 
hours of practice they have become embedded into this domain of her world-picture. 
One could no more inform her that it has been discovered that the scale of C-major 
has a sharp (#) in it after all or that there is a minor note between keys E and F than 
that the Earth is only a day old. All the hallmarks of a certainty inhere in the way she 
plays, the way she can sight-read or play by ear, or teach a student.  
 
An accomplished tennis player acquires certainties which will not just be about the 
fundamental rules of the game, but also about tactics, positioning on the court, 
difference in pace of the match depending on whether one is playing singles or 
doubles, how tennis balls feel and behave when playing at different altitudes, or when 
the balls themselves are new compared to when they are six games old in a match 
between heavy servers when some of the bounce and fluff has come off.
258
 One 
becomes a better tennis player when advanced techniques like top-spin and a wrong-
footing inside-out forehand to the ad-court become embedded in one’s practice, 
structuring how one approaches the point without having to ask oneself within the 
split-seconds available ‘Am I capable of this shot?’ or ‘Does this technique work?’ 
Capable tennis players share these certainties, or similar ones. Some of these will be 
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 Again, trying to explain these phenomena within the rigid structures of a 
philosophical work might be futile. A fictional account would be useful, but perhaps 
even better would be David Foster Wallace’s superb ‘Roger Federer as Religious 
Experience’, Wallace (2012), a piece classifiable as that ugliest of things, sports 
journalism, only in the sense that it is about sport and was originally printed in The 
New Yorker. In distinguishing between the great and the simply extraordinary 
professional tennis players, it is also suggestive of the distinction of depth of 
certainties raised in §6.2.  
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different from those of other tennis players from other times, when racquets were 
heavier, balls were slower, and tactics more genteel and less aggressive.
259
  
 
My tennis certainties are not just idiosyncratic to me; I share them with many others 
who play tennis. Part of this will be revealed in our actions, by playing tennis, but also 
in how members of the tennis-playing community speak to one another. They debate 
the advantages of different types of racquet, which umpires on the circuit are known 
to be keenly observant of foot faults, the benefit of hitting a hard but somewhat risky 
second serve when it is set point to the opponent. As discussed in principle in §6.3.1, 
language-games reveal their own logic and their own certainties. We tennis players 
could not debate the merits of different racquets for generating top-spin if we didn’t 
operate with the certainty of what top-spin is, how to achieve it, how different racquet 
and string compositions affect it, and so on. None of these things needs to be defined 
or mentioned explicitly, but it is an axis around which other features of our tennis-
playing activities revolve. Of course, whilst an outsider could probably understand the 
gist of our conversation, there would be an aspect that remained incommunicable 
without having the certainties that come from playing the game. A dialogue and 
Wang’s back-and-forth movement would help achieve some communication on these 
matters with an outsider, but something remains incommensurable. If my friend is not 
certain as to what constitutes a set point, I cannot sensibly debate the appropriate 
tactics one ought to take when facing one, any more than Moore can debate with the 
king whether Shakespeare’s Richard III is an accurate portrayal of the monarch if 
(Moore’s) king is certain that the Earth began with him.260  
 
 
6.3.4 The activities of restricted domains within Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy 
 
The examples raised in §6.3.2 and §6.3.3 only indicate the enormous variety of 
activities that could be underpinned by certainties, following from the demonstration 
in §6.3.1 that such certainties are in principle a reasonable concept. Throughout the 
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 Insofar as certainties actually can conflict, rather than representing 
incommensurable dissonances, q.v. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. This, too, is a 
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260
 Q.v. §2.4. Let us presume that Moore is talented enough to perform an 
accomplished one-man version of the play for the king’s benefit.  
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examples, hints have been given that these practices bear the hallmarks of certainties. 
Now we will see if these can be accommodated within Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy. 
Permitting personal-autobiographical hinges to include the certainties that structure 
the practices of, say, playing chess, requires that we cannot be any more mistaken 
about the fundamentals of chess than we could be about having for months ‘lived at 
address A’ (OC §70) or never ‘having been in Asia Minor’ (OC §417). Wittgenstein 
asks: 
 
Could we imagine a man who keeps on making mistakes when we 
regard a mistake as ruled out, and in fact never encounter one? E.g. he 
says he lives in such and such a place, is so and so old, comes from 
such and such a city, and he speaks with the same certainty (giving all 
the tokens of it) as I do, but he is wrong? (OC §67) 
 
Wittgenstein’s point is not so much whether we really can imagine such a person – 
doubtless we could, but would regard him as delusional or lying – but rather to draw 
our attention to the tokens of certainty we ordinarily give for our own certainties of 
these things. Our certainties that we have lived at such-and-such a place and are so-
and-so old are not demonstrated by our expressing these things apropos of nothing. 
These tokens of certainty involve things like going home and opening the door with 
one’s own key or filling out one’s correct age on health-insurance documents. That is, 
when it comes to certainties, what one says isn’t all that important – as in the case of 
the man in OC §67 – but rather what one does, what tokens of certainty one reveals 
oneself to have indirectly. These examples of where one lives and one’s age are what 
we ordinarily think of as the very basics of what it is to have an autobiography, a life 
story. But our abilities and the practices in which we demonstrate them, as intimated 
but not explored by Moyal-Sharrock, are just as much a part of this.  
 
For instance, my proficiency at tennis is just as much a part of how I perceive myself 
and others perceive me as where I have lived for the last few years. I am no less 
certain that I am competent at tennis – could serve the ball into the correct box most 
of the time, on random request or in a match – than I am of my current postal 
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address.
261
 It informs many of my other actions – browsing and buying equipment; 
watching tennis on television and trying to learn and improve by observation; 
commenting on other players’ games – just as my living where I do informs what I 
put on documents and where I walk back to from the library.  
 
If someone were to tell me I had never played tennis and would be unable to hit a ball 
at all accurately, I would call them a liar, tell them they were seeking to offend, or 
worry they were deluded. If they persisted, and I began to question my own certainty 
– that is, for it to be dredged up from its place in my riverbed – I would offer to prove 
it and re-harden my certainty by inviting them to play a game with me; just as, if 
someone managed to instil in me a doubt about where I lived, I would offer to show 
them that my key to the door works. If it turned out I really was wrong, the ensuing 
chaos (OC §613) might not be as comprehensive as if something with a less restricted 
domain was found to be in error – my never having been in Durham, for example – 
but the consequences would nonetheless be drastic, and not just for my perception of 
my tennis-playing ability. I would have to question various other certainties, for 
example my identification of fellow tennis players and the reliability of my memory, 
where I got this trophy or that parking permit for (what I presumed to be) my tennis 
club from.
262
 Of course, similar examples could be drawn up for the London taxi 
driver, the chess player or the pianist, but these need not be explained in detail for 
every possible practice and ability.  
 
A final thought on restricted domains, although this can only be sketched out and has 
resisted any of my attempts at a formulation in philosophical terms. People can take 
things to be certain that others not only do not take as certain, but consider it bizarre 
that others do. For example, fanatical devotion to a sports team, such that no counter-
evidence is ever considered and various other surrounding actions are determined 
entirely by this conviction. Unprovoked violence towards supporters of other teams is 
common, for no reason other than that they are supporters of opposing teams. Such 
devotion, to an outsider, may seem particularly bizarre, for surely there is no such 
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 Cf. OC §613. 
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thing as ‘the best team in the world’ on anything like objective grounds. Nonetheless, 
peculiar convictions like these, often inherited as part of one’s upbringing in a 
particular area of a city or family with ties to the club, do set the terms for enquiring 
and assertion regarding their sport, are immune from doubt, and are largely 
incomprehensible to those who do not share this aspect of their world-picture. We can 
see parallel examples in the political sphere, although more in the developing world 
than in the West, with violent clashes between supporters even of democratic parties.  
 
A person can develop a violent, irrational dislike for a whole nation’s people on 
account of a single unpleasant encounter with one person of that nationality. This can 
structure all sorts of their actions, such as not visiting that country, refusing to buy 
goods from that country, speaking ill of it as a nation in general. If asked to give 
justifications for this discrimination, they are unlikely to be rational, but for all that no 
less deeply held. In fact, any sort of discrimination – for example, racism, sex-, 
gender-, or gender-identity discrimination, ageism, religious intolerance, ableism, 
homophobia – can take a pattern like this, and are often the product of a certain type 
of upbringing, never justified rationally because these certainties are never acquired 
rationally. Whilst it is unpalatable to consider these as certainties in the same way as 
certainties we might all share, such as gravity, or that many of us share, perhaps about 
chess playing, they do structure the lives and standards of enquiring and asserting for 
actual people. The network of possibilities for certainties, at this level, is too intricate, 
complex, and changeable to formalise in any serious philosophical sense. However 
we can take note of them and consider their effects and role in a general sense. We 
will not address this point directly any further, but it can be kept in mind throughout 
the following discussions. 
 
 
6.3.5 Communication and personal-autobiographical certainties 
 
The more restricted a domain, the more limited will be the problems of 
communication. The chemist and physicist from Kuhn’s example have a very 
localised dissonance. In fact, they could probably observe most of one another’s 
experiments and read one another’s papers and find no discrepancies between their 
conceptions of the fundamental constituent parts of the universe. The helium particle 
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(molecule or non-molecule) is an exception. However, with this example, we can see 
what communication difficulties within restricted domains might look like.  
 
They are less pervasive than broader world-picture clashes, in the sense that they are 
limited not only to particular activities in one’s life (physics and chemistry), but also 
to particular aspects of those activities (the helium particle). Such communication 
difficulties do reveal dissonances, but they are easy to spot and very localised. As 
such, they would not be too difficult to work around for the two individuals. In 
circumstances outside of these practices, the two individuals might never know that 
they had minor differences between their world-pictures. If the physicist and chemist 
met socially but did not know each other’s professions, it is unlikely that their 
different respective certainties regarding the helium particle would ever come up 
directly, or indirectly cause a problem for their communication.  
 
In the more specific examples related to abilities like playing tennis or driving in 
London, we are more likely to encounter dissonances in the shape of one person 
having an absence of certainties that the other person has, rather than an opposing 
one, as in the case of the chemist and physicist.
263
 A Grandmaster of chess can have 
conversations with fellow Grandmasters that make no sense to a non-player, not 
because the words make no sense – they probably do as long as the non-player is at 
least familiar with the very basic terminology – but because the non-player has no 
idea what it is like to be trying to avoid a zugzwang whilst seeking to maintain 
dominance with only a knight and three pawns.
264
 Such things form certainties for 
advanced players, with so many situations having been repeated in their experience 
that some moves will simply not be countenanced, without having had to work 
through all the possible permutations to discover exactly why in each separate 
instance. Depths of these types of certainties will also play a part. As a novice 
progresses, she might find less need to consciously work through the empirical 
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 A zugzwang is a situation in chess in which skipping a move – whilst 
impermissible by the rules of the game – would be strategically superior to any of the 
available choices. 
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process of considering all the possible permutations, and simply recognise where 
danger lies and where openings are presenting themselves. Around this axis, the rest 
of her play revolves. 
 
Whereas I need to consult a map to find out where Pall Mall and Islington are and 
then tortuously work out the route, probably inefficiently and with several mistakes 
requiring u-turns, someone who has the Knowledge not only drives around London 
with the certainty of various locations but probably also with the quickest routes. The 
sight-reading pianist does not need to check the keys of the piano to ensure there is no 
key between E and F. The tennis player plots shots and service tactics without having 
to investigate whether striking the ball at a slight angle will create topsin to drag the 
serve down and into court within the baseline, or that an extra degree’s angle of the 
racquet will create a heavy top-spin that kicks off the surface and forces the opponent 
to return the serve from head height. Repetition has inculcated this certainty, and 
many like it, into the restricted domain of tennis for the tennis player. In discussing 
such matters, none of this makes as much sense to the non-taxi driver, the non-pianist, 
or the non-tennis player as it does to their fellows within the respective restricted 
domains. For the advanced practitioners of each of these activities, some things will 
make more sense to fellow advanced practitioners in conversation than they would to 
novices.  
 
Restricted domains do beget their own certainties for individuals, and these fit 
roughly into Moyal-Sharrock’s personal-autobiographical category. They also create 
problems for communication with those who do not share this aspect of their world-
picture, or whose similar certainties are not so deeply embedded. In these cases, 
conversion may be too strong a term, and somewhat beside the point. One does not so 
much convert from swimming to tennis as learn a new sport, from driving in Durham 
to driving in London as learn the layout of a new city, from backgammon to chess as 
learn a new game. However, the familiar features of certainties, particularly in 
relation to Wittgenstein’s own comments on mathematics and linguistic practice – 
repetition until they become embedded, functioning as an axis around which other 
aspects of practice turn, immune from doubt – are all applicable to the certainties of 
restricted domains. In §6.4, we will consider a troublesome aspect of Moyal-
Sharrock’s taxonomy, that of universal certainties. 
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6.4 Problems with universal certainties 
 
Moyal-Sharrock suggests that there are some certainties that are necessarily universal, 
which she places in the fourth category of her taxonomy. §6.4 will explore three 
objections to her claim that such certainties can be said to exist: the very idea of a 
normal individual; a rejection of her casting ‘I have forbears’ as a universal certainty; 
and questioning whether it is possible to occupy the standpoint required to make such 
a pronouncement.   
 
6.4.1 The very idea of a normal individual 
 
Moyal-Sharrock describes ungiveupable certainties as those which ‘no circumstances 
would induce a normal individual to give it up at any time’.265 Presumably, a normal 
individual cannot simply be one who holds the ungiveupable certainties, for this 
argument would be circular: normal individuals are those who hold ungiveupable 
certainties, and the ungiveupable certainties are those held by all normal individuals. 
Moyal-Sharrock requires something outside of this circle in order to justify her appeal 
to a normal individual. The trouble for Moyal-Sharrock’s position, of course, is that 
normalcy is normalcy within a system. She cannot appeal to something beyond world-
pictures altogether to ground the idea of a normal individual.
266
 Instead, she has to be 
able to note something universally common to all humans, not just contingently but 
necessarily, but without reference to ungiveupable certainties. We place on her the 
requirement of necessity and not just contingency because contingency indicates 
possible differences in circumstances, and Moyal-Sharrock has already made clear 
that this feature of the normal individual is immune from circumstances.  
 
Wittgenstein does use the term ‘normal’ to refer to circumstances, people, and 
linguistic practice in On Certainty (§§27, 250, 260, 339, 420, 428, 441). However, 
there is no indication that he means anything by this other than what is normal for 
him, in his community, or those similar to it: 
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Even a proposition like this one, that I am now living in England, has 
these two sides: it is not a mistake – but on the other hand, what do I 
know of England? Can’t my judgment go all to pieces? Would it not 
be possible that people came to my room and all declared the 
opposite? – even gave me ‘proofs’ of it, so that I suddenly stood there 
like a madman alone among people who were all normal, or a normal 
person alone among madmen? Might I not then suffer doubts about 
what at present seems at the furthest remove from doubt? (OC §420) 
 
Here, Wittgenstein considers the concept of the normal person, and seems sensitive to 
the fact that if everyone else tells him that he is not where he believes himself to be, it 
might be they who are normal and he who is mad. Importantly, he recognises that there 
is no clear way to tell, no criterion of correctness. If he is the lone normal person, the 
term ‘normal’ seems to lose its meaning. If he is the lone madman, the words of the 
normal people who have come to tell him the error of his thought will accomplish 
nothing. To ask who is really right, he or the intruders into his room, would be ‘already 
going round in a circle’ (OC §191) Eventually, Wittgenstein decides that ‘everything 
speaks in its favour, nothing against’ (OC §4) the claim: 
 
I am in England. – Everything around me tells me so; wherever and 
however I let my thoughts turn, they confirm this for me at once. – 
But might I not be shaken if things such as I don’t dream of at present 
were to happen? (OC §421) 
 
Wittgenstein appears to settle on trusting his world-picture, whereby everything 
around him confirms his certainties. He might be shaken by incredible happenings – 
like people coming into his room and telling him he’s wrong – but nevertheless, 
everything around confirms at once his initial convictions. However, in the next 
remark, Wittgenstein reveals a crucial problem with this position: 
 
So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I 
am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung. (OC §422) 
 
 238 
The significance of the use of the Weltanschauung should not be underestimated.
267
 It 
indicates a deep uneasiness in the approach Wittgenstein has himself just sketched 
out. Usually in On Certainty, Wittgenstein uses Weltbild, which is closer to ‘world-
picture’ than Weltanschauung, which is usually translated as ‘world-view’. 
Weltanschauung appears at three other notable points in Wittgenstein texts, all with 
pejorative connotations. The first is in the Tractatus: 
 
6.371 The whole modern conception of the world  [Weltanschauung] 
is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the 
explanation of natural phenomena. 
 
6.372 Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as 
something inviolable, just as God and fate were treated in ages past. 
 
In these remarks, Wittgenstein is decrying the modern, scientistic worldview, one that 
precludes other forms of thought and investigation which he thought were being 
sidelined to our detriment. Weltanschauung indicates something that is proscriptive 
and inflexible, and applies to the dominance of science in modern life. Similarly, in 
Culture and Value, in reference to his claim that humour was wiped out in Nazi 
Germany, Wittgenstein states that: 
 
Humour is not a mood but a way of looking at the world 
[Weltanschauung]. So if it is correct to say that humour was stamped 
out in Nazi Germany, that does not mean that people were not in good 
spirits or anything of that sort, but something much deeper and more 
important (CV p. 87). 
 
The Weltanschauung, then, is something fundamental to how we perceive the world. 
It indicates a particular view of reality, one that is not taken as one among many 
equals, but as the one and only right way of looking at the world. This sort of 
dogmatism and claims of access to a special sort of truth are deeply opposed to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly that of the later period. For, in Philosophical 
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Investigations, he worries that the method he wants to recommend has strayed into 
such territory: 
 
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental 
significance for us. It earmarks the kind of form of account we give, 
the way we look at things. (Is this a kind of “Weltanschauung”?). (PI 
§122) 
 
Wittgenstein’s concern, according to Judith Genova, is that:  
 
A Weltanschauung forgets its status as a way of seeing and parades 
itself as the way of seeing. It takes itself too seriously, as the ultimate 
explanation and foundation of our convictions. In contrast, the concept 
of Weltbild completely avoids the knowledge game.
268
  
 
So, when Wittgenstein in parentheses accuses himself of succumbing to the 
temptation to propose a Weltanschauung – or at least worries that this is what he is 
doing – he is concerned with failing to observe his own warnings about advancing 
philosophical theories. The worry is that he has lapsed into making claims that could 
only be made from an unavailable objective standpoint. As John Edwards notes, this 
would amount to Wittgenstein’s being:  
 
seduced by a particular Weltanschauung, one which assumes that the 
response to a philosophical puzzlement must be promulgation and 
defense of a philosophical thesis. And, of course, it is just that 
assumption that Wittgenstein so vehemently rejects . . .
269
 
 
Returning to the remarks of On Certainty §§420-422 with this understanding of how 
Wittgenstein used the term Weltanschauung, they can be seen in a different light. 
When Wittgenstein states that he is being ‘thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung’ in 
his temptation to cite what he knows to be normal – the evidence of all that is around 
him – we can see that he is sceptical of the value of this move, even though he 
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recognises its allure. The allure consists in casting one’s own world-picture [Weltbild] 
as a Weltanschauung, applicable to all and immune from doubt even in extraordinary 
circumstances. Of course, in one sense, certainties and world-pictures are immune 
from doubt; that is what distinguishes certainties from instances of knowledge. Yet, 
that does not render world-pictures utterly immutable. Pre-Copernicans became 
Copernicans and atheists convert to Catholicism. As Moyal-Sharrock correctly notes, 
‘a hinge’s being giveupable does not mean that it is falsifiable, or that it is less of a 
hinge whilst a hinge.’270 However, her conclusion that she takes a hinge “to be 
ungiveupable where no circumstances would induce a normal individual to give it up 
at any time: where ‘[h]ere a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it 
into chaos’ (OC 613)” is deeply suspicious. Sometimes – and this is the point Moyal-
Sharrock ignores or does not accept – everything is plunged into chaos, and what 
seemed once unshakeable shifts for an individual. A conversion of this kind does not 
render that individual abnormal. Dictating what constitutes normalcy is precisely the 
sort of assumption that Wittgenstein rejects.  
 
 
6.4.2 The Pirahã and forebears  
 
Take one example presented by Moyal-Sharrock as a universal – and therefore 
ungiveupable – certainty: ‘I have forbears’. When compared with two of 
Wittgenstein’s own remarks from On Certainty, it is very clear that Wittgenstein did 
not regard such a certainty as ungiveupable: 
 
Men have believed that they could make the rain; why should not a 
king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if 
Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really 
prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not 
convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special 
kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way 
(OC §92). 
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I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances 
and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and 
therefore believed this. We might instruct him the earth has long… 
etc. – We should be trying to give him our picture of the world. This 
would happen through a kind of persuasion. (OC §262) 
 
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Wittgenstein did not think it necessary that all 
humans held the certainty ‘I have forbears’. However it would be strange for Moyal-
Sharrock to respond that the king has not given up the certainty of forbears but rather 
never had it, and so seek to salvage her case. The claim about this particular 
ungiveupable certainty was made in tandem with the claim that it is universal.
271
 It is 
interesting to note, though, that whereas we might initially be inclined to consider the 
negation of a certainty – not that this fully makes sense, as certainties are neither true 
nor false – we would be better served considering simply its absence. Rather than 
consider the certainty ‘I have no forbears’, we ought instead to consider a community 
in which no such comparable certainty exists. Indeed, such a community, or 
something very like it, does indeed exist. 
 
Consider the Pirahã (or Hi'aiti'ihi) people, indigenous to the Amazon rainforest. Due 
to a short lifespan, and a culture that seems to Western visitors as one of the most 
extreme empiricism, they have no word for great-grandparents, and are entirely 
uninterested in the concept of anyone they have never met. As Daniel Everett, who 
originally sought them out in his role as a Christian missionary, but writing later as a 
professor of linguistics, describes: 
 
The Pirahã men then asked, “Hey Dan, what does Jesus look like? Is 
he dark like us or light like you?” 
   “Well, I have never actually seen him. He lived a long time 
ago. But I do have his words.” 
  They then made it clear that if I had not actually seen this guy 
(and not in any metaphorical sense, but literally), they weren’t 
interested in any stories I had to tell about him. Period. [. . . They] 
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believe in things that someone else has told them, so long as that 
person has personally witnessed what he or she is reporting.
272
 
 
This may not rebut Moyal-Sharrock’s proposed universal certainty that ‘I have 
forbears’, because they are comfortable with the idea of the missionary having a father. 
But, for this community, the idea of anything existing any further back in history than 
an individual’s own memory – or the memory of someone you have personally met – 
doesn’t exist. It at least shows a conception of forbears very different from the one 
familiar to us. And if we wanted to see this for ourselves, we would only have to look 
at the Pirahã’s practices, linguistic and non-linguistic. On the linguistic front, the 
Pirahã have no words describing things in the past: 
 
Grammar and other ways of living are restricted to concrete, 
immediate experience (where an experience is immediate in Pirahã 
if it has been seen or recounted as seen by a person alive at the time 
of telling), and immediacy of experience is reﬂected in immediacy 
of information encoding—one event per utterance.273  
 
There is the barest minimum in their language of even a conception of the past: 
 
It has no perfect tense. It has perhaps the simplest kinship system 
ever documented. It has no creation myths—its texts are almost 
always descriptions of immediate experience or interpretations of 
experience; it has some stories about the past, but only of one or 
two generations back. Pirahã in general express no individual or 
collective memory of more than two generations past.
274
  
 
Not only is there no available tense in the Pirahã language for describing things in the 
past, but there is no conception of it in their lives at all. It is not just grammar that is 
restricted to concrete, immediate experience, but also other ways of living. Clearly, it 
forms part of the backdrop against which the Pirahã practices of enquiring and 
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asserting are played out. If Everett is correct, and the Pirahã have no concept of 
forebears further back than their grandparents, then ‘I have forebears’ cannot be an 
ungiveupable certainty in the way that Moyal-Sharrock describes. Further, the Pirahã 
have been living on the Maici river in the Amazon for at least several hundred years – 
contact was first made in 1714 – and do not seem to be in danger of extinction from 
anything other than external forces; their form of life is clearly not in and of itself 
unsustainable, and seems to be largely unchanged since the early eighteenth 
century.
275
 Here we have an example of a community that has never had such a 
certainty about forebears. The Pirahã might be unusual, perhaps even unique. 
Nonetheless the exception they present cannot be ignored. As we saw earlier, due to 
concerns over proposing a Weltanschauung, Moyal-Sharrock’s appeal to normalcy is 
not compatible with Wittgenstein’s thought. Anyone could be converted to the Pirahã 
world-picture and give up any previously held certainty about forebears, and the 
Pirahã themselves have done without it for centuries. 
 
It is worth noting that there has been significant academic debate regarding Everett’s 
claims, although most vociferously from Chomsky, whose theories on linguistics are 
imperilled by Everett’s account of the Pirahã.276 Even were all of Everett’s claims to 
turn out false, though, can Moyal-Sharrock seriously maintain that such a culture has 
never existed, does not currently exist, will never exist, and in fact could never exist? 
In the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough Wittgenstein states that we could imagine 
for ourselves the practices of other cultures, ‘and it would only be by chance if they 
were not actually to be found somewhere.’277 True, Wittgenstein was considering 
forms of life at this stage in his career; the world-picture was not yet a feature of his 
writing. Yet, the imagination of a network of practices structured in part – to our eyes 
– by a lack of a certainty regarding the existence of forbears is not beyond our 
comprehension. We still cannot disprove Moyal-Sharrock’s claim that there could 
never be humans without such a certainty, but it seems increasingly doubtful. 
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6.4.3 Past and future possibilities 
 
As long as we are comfortable imagining other forms of life in which radically 
different certainties from our own could take hold, the concept of ungiveupable 
certainties seems less and less plausible. Considering chronological differences in 
world-pictures as well in conjunction with geographical distances as with the Pirahã 
in §6.4.2 furthers our aims here. Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy belies a lack of 
sensitivity to the way that certainties change. She considers ‘No one was ever on the 
moon’ to be a local hinge, and engages in a good analysis as to how once-empirical 
propositions become ‘hardened’ into the river bed (OC §96).278 Of particular merit is 
her investigation into the hinge ‘A human being must be the offspring of two human 
beings’, noting that scientific advances have dredged this from the riverbed such that 
it is now an empirical proposition, not a norm of testing, because efforts are being 
made to create a child from one parent. Thus, a different hinge, along the lines of ‘A 
human being can be the offspring of a single human being’, is gradually being 
created, but so far the ‘repetition, drill, familiarity, banality, needed for it to become a 
hinge . . . have not yet occurred.’279  
 
This analysis, whilst excellent, raises further problems that Moyal-Sharrock does not 
seem to address. For as long as humans have existed until well in to the twentieth 
century, ‘A human being must be the offspring of two human beings’ was a universal 
norm of investigation. There is the possible objection that the mythology of many 
cultures, particularly religious ones, permits fertilisation by gods. The Greek god Zeus 
fathered dozens of semi-divine children with mortal women.
280
 Christianity features 
God’s union with Mary to create Jesus. The Egyptians had similar myths regarding 
their kings. However these children were, themselves, not quite human beings in the 
normal sense, according to their own mythology. They were cast as semi-mortal or 
semi-divine, or perhaps something more complex, as in the case of Jesus. The most 
usual method for producing human children has always been sexual intercourse 
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between two humans, not waiting for the nocturnal appearance of a deity. The hinge 
can remain as originally stated by Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
So, for millennia, ‘A human being must be the offspring of two human beings’ was 
perhaps a universal norm of investigation. Yet, Moyal-Sharrock, with the benefit of 
hindsight and the promises of modern technological innovation, classes this as a local 
hinge. Had she and Wittgenstein been writing a thousand, or even just a hundred 
years ago, the possibility of this hinge mutating would have been unthinkable. It 
would doubtless have been classed as a universal hinge. On the one hand, this is 
perfectly reasonable. Wittgenstein’s riverbed metaphor indicates an openness to 
change in the face of empirical considerations that drag hardened certainties back into 
the flow of hypotheses. However, it ought to cast doubt on Moyal-Sharrock’s casting 
of any certainties as ungiveupable and universal in her specialised, necessary sense. 
For if something that would, not so long ago, have been classed as a universal hinge is 
now a local one, what faith can we have in her list of current universal hinges? 
 
In answering this question Moyal-Sharrock points again to the riverbed metaphor, and 
emphasises what she takes to be a crucial phrase: 
 
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no 
alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand . . . (OC §99) 
 
This, she claims, is final proof that ‘just because some hinges are revisable does not 
make the whole bedrock revisable.’281 However, this is the only passage that Moyal-
Sharrock deploys to justify her argument. The rest of On Certainty does not support 
this line of thinking. To see this, we need to draw a distinction between Wittgenstein 
saying a) that it is impossible for him to doubt something without his whole world-
picture collapsing, and b) claiming that it is impossible that anyone could ever doubt 
something. For instance, Wittgenstein notes that one could doubt even something as 
fundamental as the propositions of mathematics on a theoretical basis, but that this 
would not justify an actual doubt: 
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Now can I prophesy that men will never throw away the present 
arithmetical propositions, never say that now at last they know how 
the matter stands? Yet would that justify a doubt on our part? (OC 
§652) 
 
Mathematical examples, as we noted in Chapters 1 and 2, are frequently treated as 
examples of things that couldn’t be more certain or more fixed. Whilst the possibility 
of future mutability would not justify a doubt on our part now, Wittgenstein does 
admit its possibility, however unthinkable it is to him. A few remarks later, 
Wittgenstein notes that ‘I have a right to say “I can’t be making a mistake about this” 
even if I am in error’ (OC §663). Here we see the distinction between a) and b) at 
play. On the one hand, Wittgenstein has settled on a certainty; let us call it the 
certainty, supposedly universal, that ‘I have forbears’. If he were to be in error, what 
would have to pertain? It cannot be that some particular truth has been found that 
transcends all world-pictures. It would have to be that another world-picture has 
supplanted his own. We say world-picture here, rather than just one certainty, because 
a supposedly universal certainty could not be doubted and revised without plunging 
everything into chaos, the whole world-picture all at once.  
 
On the other hand, even if this were ever to happen, or simply that Wittgenstein 
acknowledges the possibility that it could one day happen, that would not cast 
genuine doubt on this particular certainty. It would be an idle, philosophical, 
speculative doubt whereby nothing has happened to actually challenge his certainty. 
Yet, the point in the paragraph above, that if he were one day to be in error it would 
be according to another system rather than a discovered transcendental truth, is 
important. Moyal-Sharrock effectively claims that she has acquired some 
transcendental understanding. To claim that some certainties are forever unrevisable 
requires not just a view of all current and past world-pictures, but also all future and 
possible world-pictures too. For even if it is contingently the case that none of these 
so-called universal certainties are never doubted even far into the future, it does not 
follow that they could never have been doubted.  
 
Finally, Moyal-Sharrock may have misinterpreted OC §99. Consider again the words 
she puts in italics in her rendering of the remark. The way she characterises it, there 
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are two states of being for the hard rock of the riverbed. Some of it is ‘subject to no 
alteration’; some of it is subject ‘only to an imperceptible’ alteration. However, we 
could read that mysterious ‘or’ in a different way. It could just as easily be a 
correction of the preceding clause, a revised phrasing, in the same way I might say 
‘This train is not moving . . . or at least it’s hardly moving.’ In fact, in the original 
German the presence of a comma not included in the English translation backs up this 
reading of ‘only an imperceptible one’ as a qualifying clause: 
 
Ja das Ufer jenes Flusses besteht zum Teil aus hartem Gestein, 
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, 
 
das keiner, 
[subject] to none  
 
oder einer unmerkbaren Änderung unterliegt 
or only to an imperceptible alteration  
 
The verb – unterliegt – comes at the end in German, so we have transplanted it in 
square brackets to the beginning of the second line in order to make sense in English. 
The crucial point, though, is the comma after das keiner, which indicates that what 
follows is a qualification of the preceding clause. The English translation by 
Anscombe and von Wright omits the comma, changing the momentum of the 
sentence so that the ‘or’ seems to indicate an alternative rather than an amendment to 
the phrase.  
 
This in itself is probably not enough to decisively rebut Moyal-Sharrock’s claims 
regarding universal certainties. Nor, taken individually, are the points made above: 
the difficulties of invoking a ‘normal individual’; the benefit of hindsight with which 
she classes ‘A human being must be the offspring of two human beings’ as a local 
hinge; the case of the Pirahã, who seem to live without some of the proposed 
universal certainties; the concerns that she is attempting a statement that requires a 
transcendental perspective. However, the conglomeration of these concerns gives 
sufficient cause to doubt her proposal of universal and ungiveupable hinges, at least 
via the arguments Moyal-Sharrock has suggested. If this account is flawed, then the 
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idea that all humans at all times and all locations will share a core of a few 
unshakeable certainties must be relinquished.  
 249 
6.5 A dissenting voice 
 
Towards the end of Annalisa Coliva’s Moore and Wittgenstein, she makes some 
radical claims. Whilst I agree with much of her analysis except for her propositional 
account of certainties, the claims Coliva makes regarding the possibility and actuality 
of alternative world-pictures present an account very different from the one we have 
argued for, and therefore merit a detailed response.
282
 Rather than re-state arguments 
that have already been presented in this thesis, we will reject Coliva’s claims 
individually and on their own merits, although mention will be made in the footnotes 
of relevant areas of this thesis for each argument. Coliva makes two key claims: that 
there are no alternative world-pictures, and that alternative world-pictures are 
inconceivable. We’ll examine each in turn. 
 
6.5.1 There are no alternative world-pictures 
 
Coliva presents three arguments – which we will call A), B), and C) – for the 
rejection of alternative world-pictures. She denies the idea that world-picture 
conversion is a non-rational process: 
 
A) Despite appearances to the contrary, Wittgenstein held that it is 
more evidence than persuasion that can induce us to abandon some of 
our hinges in favour of different ones . . . not by showing them false, 
as such, but by forcing us to turn them into empirical propositions.
283
 
 
She argues that the primitive practices do not present a different account of nature, but 
only a faulty version of our own: 
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B) Different tribes and people, on [Wittgenstein’s] view, present more 
different religious and symbolic elements than a fundamentally 
different account of nature.
284
 
 
These first two arguments lead her to her final claim that there are no alternative 
world-pictures: 
 
C) Yet, explanations of natural phenomena may evolve over time, but 
this simply marks the development of one shared world-picture.
285
 
 
All three claims turn on her suggestion that:  
 
there is just one system of justification – Science – which evolves and 
develops over time, where certain propositions and theories may be 
outdated by others, because new information comes in and actually 
proves certain beliefs or theories false, or calls for a new kind of 
explanation.
286
 
 
As we will see, this reading is only possible because she has she synonymised terms 
like ‘evidence’ and ‘explanation’ with ‘scientific evidence’ and ‘scientific 
explanation’.287 Coliva supports A) with reference to an example we have already 
considered in §4.5: that of Ptolemy’s geocentric astronomical model compared to the 
modern, Copernican, heliocentric model. Coliva’s claim is that it: 
 
seems plausible to think that both Ptolemy and Wittgenstein would 
have been rationally persuaded to change their views had they had all 
the evidence available to us: pictures taken from satellites, in the 
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former case, and images of Armstrong and associates landing on the 
Moon in 1969 in the latter case.
288
 
 
Coliva takes it that Ptolemy’s conception of evidence would in no way differ from 
what we take to count as evidence. Wittgenstein, though, claims that ‘all testing, all 
confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system’ 
(OC §105). For A) to make sense, we, Ptolemy, Wittgenstein, modern scientists, 
essentially everyone must always have worked within the same system – i.e. world-
picture – within which all our standards of evidence, enquiring, and asserting are 
identical. What differs between all these people is not the system, but ‘the quantity 
and quality of the evidence available to them.’289 
 
It seems unlikely that Ptolemy would count as evidence the same things that we do.
290
 
Had one shown a photograph taken from a satellite to Ptolemy, we would first expect 
him to ask ‘What’s a photograph?’ The idea of a machine that could record images, 
let alone on something that wasn’t papyrus, would be utterly foreign to him. He 
would probably dismiss it as a skilled drawing. Even then, would he really believe 
someone who approached him and told him they had sent a machine capable of space 
flight – if he could grasp the concepts of electricity, rocket launchers and so on – with 
such a photographic device on board? Coliva’s claim that he would readily be 
persuaded by evidence – as if evidence is an agent-neutral, universally accepted 
standard – is hard to maintain. 
 
Coliva apparently considers all systems of justification and evidence to be faulty 
versions of the one true system of justification – Science – towards which all our 
other theories ‘tend to converge’.291 Consequently, when considering the practices of 
primitives tribes like those described in Frazer’s Golden Bough, she seems to agree 
with Frazer, not with Wittgenstein, that “looking at the way animals’ interiors 
deteriorate . . . once deprived of all its symbolic and religious elements, would just be 
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a piece of, as it were, ‘primitive’ Science.”292 This is exactly the position of Frazer’s 
that Wittgenstein is at pains to criticise.
293
 Frazer deems magic ‘a mistaken 
association of ideas.’294 He claims that its error lies in a ‘total misconception of the 
nature of the particular laws which govern that sequence.’295 Wittgenstein’s response 
was that ‘the characteristic feature of primitive man, I believe, is that he does not act 
from opinions he holds about things (as Frazer thinks).’296 That is to say that practices 
like divination from looking at the way animals’ interiors deteriorate weren’t the 
product of bad theories, but rather played a different role in the lives of past cultures.  
 
Coliva attempts to justify her interpretation of Wittgenstein. She notes that subtracting 
the symbolic elements from past religious practices may be illegitimate, but maintains 
nonetheless that this does not mean “we can’t judge their epistemic practices, taken as 
such, and deem them erroneous, or, at any rate, ‘primitive’, if compared to ours, 
should they so be.”297 Yet her fundamental mistake remains in that she persists in 
characterising practices like divination as misguided epistemic practices, a series of 
faulty understandings of causal relations. What she fails to appreciate, by 
Wittgenstein’s lights, is that there is no reason to think that such practices as 
divination were considered to be part of the same reliable sequence of cause and 
effect as the way the primitive ‘really does build his hut of wood and cuts his arrow 
with skill and not in effigy.’298  
 
To further justify her position, Coliva seeks to separate ‘opinions and theories, on the 
one hand, and the symbolic and religious elements of a ritual, on the other.’299 She 
claims that Wittgenstein proposed a “continuity between the opinions and theories of 
the ‘primitives’ and ours, for, presumably they evolve as possible answers to the same 
kind of questions”, whereas ‘the symbolic and ritual elements differ and might 
actually disappear for us.’300 Wittgenstein’s point is quite the opposite. He notes that 
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symbolic and ritual practices persist in the sense that we can see connections between 
primitives’ behaviour and ours, for instance when we kiss ‘the photo of a loved 
one.’301 In contrast, he does not pass any judgement on whether the opinions and 
theories of primitives are comparable to ours. He is concerned with the ritualistic and 
magical features of such people, and with casting doubt on Frazer’s interpretation of 
them. Coliva’s claim that different tribes and peoples do not present a fundamentally 
different account of nature can only be held if one accepts her stance that the practices 
of any past culture are simply bad versions of our own Science, and that proper (i.e., 
our own type of) evidence would rationally persuade them to alter their practices. 
This is not an accurate interpretation of the Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. 
 
In support of C), Coliva asserts that OC §§108 and 286 ‘support precisely this view’ 
that there is just one system of justification and that is Science. In OC §108, 
Wittgenstein questions whether there is then:  
 
‘. . . no objective truth? Isn’t it true, or false, that someone has been on 
the moon?’ If we are thinking within our system then it is certain that 
no one has ever been on the moon . . . our whole system of physics 
forbids us to believe it. [In response to someone who said]: We don’t 
know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once 
that they are there; and even you can’t explain everything.’ We should 
feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this 
(OC §108). 
 
Coliva equates Wittgenstein’s idea that we would feel intellectually very distant from 
such a person with her very different claim that evidence alone would change such a 
person’s mind. She also ignores Wittgenstein’s stress that travel to the Moon is 
impossible ‘if we are thinking within our system’; and there is nothing there to 
indicate that Wittgenstein thinks his to be the only system of justification, and that it 
is a scientific one. For again, in OC §286, Wittgenstein claims that ‘If we compare 
our system of knowledge with theirs, then theirs is evidently the poorer by far’. Yet, 
this shows nothing beyond our propensity to denigrate alternative epistemic systems. 
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The ability to scorn an alternative world-picture does not entail that one’s own is 
either correct or indeed the only genuine world-picture. Wittgenstein’s point in both 
examples is only that alternative world-pictures will likely seem strange, misguided, 
or even unintelligible to us, not that ours is either innately superior or the only one.  
 
Coliva’s account is burdened with maintaining that the vast multiplicity of what 
would seem to be alternative epistemic systems amount to just one epistemic system. 
Thus, past scientific paradigms, contra Kuhn, are really just one continually 
developing scientific paradigm, whether it be Ptolemaic astronomy or Copernican 
astronomy, Corpuscularianism or atomic theory, phlogiston or oxygen theories, 
Newtonian or Einsteinian dynamics. Religion, whether past or present, is just flawed 
Science. On Coliva’s conception, all the religious believers in the world would be 
converted to her one true Scientific world-picture, if only they had the correct 
evidence. Presumably all believers are currently ignorant of all such evidence, or they 
would have been rationally persuaded by now. Coliva’s claims are a part of her larger 
project to reject an interpretation by which Wittgenstein was a relativist. Regardless 
of this goal, her means to do this, a total rejection of pluralism in relation to world-
pictures, is unpersuasive. She has not shown that there is just one system of 
justification and that is Science, that past practices like divination were forms of bad 
Science, or that there is just one shared world-picture. 
 
 
6.5.2 Alternative world-pictures are inconceivable 
 
For the claim that alternative world-pictures are inconceivable, Coliva presents two 
supporting arguments. First, that: 
 
D) Wittgenstein was in fact . . . an anti-realist, who wanted us to 
realize the metaphysical ungroundedness of our conceptual and 
epistemic systems, as well as their ineluctability for us.
302
 
 
From D), Coliva derives: 
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E) Hence, they would always screen off the intelligibility of 
conceiving of radically different [conceptual and epistemic systems], 
thus making relativism simply incomprehensible from our own 
standpoint. All it [sic., presumably ‘that’] remains is thus the idea that 
it is metaphysically possible that there be creatures with radically 
different conceptual and epistemic systems, though we can’t really 
understand the ways in which they would deviate from ours.
303
 
 
Essentially, Coliva’s claim is that for an alternative epistemic system to be a genuine 
alternative epistemic system, it must be intelligible to us, i.e. commensurable with our 
own. If it is not intelligible to us, there are only two options. Either is it not a 
genuinely alternative epistemic system, or it is a faulty version of our own privileged 
one – Science – and by showing them evidence of the proper quality and quantity they 
will improve their epistemic system to match ours. In the latter case, any 
discrepancies in language can be shown to be error, and corrected in order to match 
ours too. As we will see, not only are these claims not justified, but Coliva’s 
interpretation is far removed from scholarly consensus, particular with regard to the 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.304  
 
Part of claim D) is uncontentious, that Wittgenstein wanted us to realize the 
metaphysical ungroundedness of our conceptual and epistemic systems. However 
Coliva’s claim that Wittgenstein was an anti-realist – or at least that it is possible to 
clearly classify him as one – is contestable. There is a vast amount of literature on this 
debate, and doing it justice with a full investigation is impossible here.
305
 However, 
there are reasons to doubt Coliva’s justifications for making this claim. There are 
indeed strains of anti-realism in Wittgenstein’s thought, perhaps most notably in his 
rejection of the idea that ‘the beginning of a [mathematical] series is a visible section 
of rails invisibly laid to infinity’ (PI §218).306 This would be anti-realism specifically 
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about numbers as abstract objects, although the implication in the surrounding 
passages is that linguistic rules and therefore linguistic meaning are also determined 
by communal agreement, not by anything mind-independent.
307
 His point is perhaps 
best summed up by the phrase: ‘The word “accord” and the word “rule” are related to 
one another; they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the 
use of the other with it’ (PI §224). However, Wittgenstein’s position is subtler than 
straightforward anti-realism; he would likely be horrified at being told that he was 
espousing a thesis anyway. Even in PI §218, Wittgenstein’s position was not quite 
one of anti-realism, but rather he aimed to show that when we continue a 
mathematical series, it is not the case that our moves are correct on the grounds that 
the steps pre-exist human minds, existing mind-independently and metaphysically.
308
 
He wanted to demonstrate the nonsensicality of such a position as held by realist 
philosophers. Wittgenstein’s position precedes and undermines the realist/anti-realist 
debate, seeking to cast doubt on the sense of the debate itself.
309
 
 
The example of PI §218 is restricted to numbers, but in Zettel he makes a similar 
point with regards to realism versus idealism (the latter itself an anti-realist position) 
about the external world: 
 
One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist and 
teaches his children accordingly. In such an important matter as the 
existence or non-existence of the external world they don’t want to 
teach their children anything wrong.  
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 What will the children be taught? To include in what they say: 
“There are physical objects?” or the opposite? . . . (Z §414) 
 
§415 But the idealist will teach his children the word “chair” after 
all, for of course he wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to 
fetch a chair. Then where will be the difference between what the 
idealist-educated children say and the realist ones? Won’t the 
difference only be one of battle cry? (Z §415) 
 
Many expressions of Wittgenstein’s could be made to fit the ends of either the realist 
or the anti-realist. However a more nuanced reading places his position as 
undermining the debate, because Wittgenstein is inclined to deem it a nonsensical 
one, one only of battle-cry. As Zettel §§414-5 demonstrates, it is impossible to 
adjudicate between world-pictures because this position requires a metaphysical 
vantage. As Hutto comments, ‘Unless we imagine ourselves in the position of a 
philosophical God, there is no sense in our sponsoring either metaphysical realism or 
idealism.’310 Wittgenstein sought to convey this point by setting out examples and 
permitting perspicuous representation to do the work. He never states bluntly that he 
is trying to undercut the debate, but nor does he make unequivocal remarks that he is 
either a realist or an anti-realist. Coliva does not provide any serious justification to 
persuade us that anti-realism was Wittgenstein’s preferred position. 
 
Claim E) in its original formulation is hard to understand. It is originally phrased as 
follows: 
 
Hence, they would always screen off the intelligibility of conceiving 
of radically different [conceptual and epistemic systems], thus making 
relativism simply incomprehensible from our own standpoint. All it 
[sic., presumably ‘that’] remains is thus the idea that it is 
metaphysically possible that there be creatures with radically different 
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conceptual and epistemic systems, though we can’t really understand 
the ways in which they would deviate from ours. 
 
‘They’, in the first line is not clearly defined. Given that E) follows D), it would seem 
to indicate ‘conceptual and epistemic systems’. Thus, the first line now reads, 
‘Conceptual and epistemic systems would always screen off the intelligibility of 
conceiving of radically different conceptual and epistemic systems, thus making 
relativism simply incomprehensible from our own standpoint.’ The initial claim that 
radically different conceptual and epistemic systems (hereafter just ‘conceptual 
systems’) would be necessarily unintelligible needs challenging. So, too, does the 
further claim that this understanding leaves only the metaphysical possibility of 
radically alternative conceptual systems, and that it is not a contingent possibility.  
 
The problem with the initial claim is that Coliva continues by asserting that if we fail 
to translate the practices and words of another community using family resemblance 
in a way that we can understand, then we must:  
 
regard their use either as a mistaken application of the same concepts 
we use, or as a use of a different concept, which would call for a more 
careful translation of their words; or else, as the use of a different 
concept, which, however, we can’t quite grasp in such a way that we 
would end up not finding them intelligible, or to find them partially 
intelligible but on the background of a largely similar conceptual 
scheme.
311
  
 
So Coliva presents two options: either this other community uses our concepts but in 
a mistaken way that we could correct by showing them the proper evidence; or, if we 
can’t understand them, we simply have to work harder at acquiring a proper 
translation, in which case they have a largely similar conceptual scheme. The 
alternative community either shares our conceptual scheme and there are problems in 
our translation, or they share our conceptual scheme but some of their linguistic use 
and other practices are in error. Coliva’s method places an unfair burden on an 
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alternative conceptual scheme that renders the possibility of one impossible. To be an 
alternative conceptual scheme it has to be intelligible to us; but if it is intelligible, it is 
not an alternative conceptual scheme. Coliva has – to be fair, unintentionally – 
presented the philosophical equivalent of a zugzwang.  
 
This point is best demonstrated by her analysis of the example from Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics in which a community ‘sell timber by cubic measure’.312 
The example progresses, and it now transpires that they calculate the cost of the 
timber by the surface area that it covers: “I should, for instance, take a pile which was 
small by their ideas and, by laying the logs around, change it into a ‘big’ one.”313 
Nonetheless, the sellers respond that now it is a more valuable pile of wood. They 
seem resistant to what Coliva might call rational persuasion.  
 
Coliva suggests that “what they really mean when they say ‘There is more wood here’ 
is simply ‘There is a bigger area of wood here.”314 This is the sort of interference in 
language that Wittgenstein so vehemently opposed. A person can make a mistake or 
learn a word wrongly in relation to a given community, but to assert that a whole 
community is in error with its linguistic use is thoroughly un-Wittgensteinian. In other 
words, for Coliva, no explanation could ever justify a community measuring wood in 
a way different from her own. Either we understand them perfectly but they are wrong 
and with some rational persuasion they will come to think as we do, or their practices 
and the words they use to describe them are unintelligible now but simply must be 
like ours if only our translation would permit us to see so. The hubristic position 
adopted by Coliva is a direct result of her claim – addressed in §6.5.1 – that there is 
only one system of justification, and that is Science.  
 
It is not a reasonable requirement that a purported alternative world-picture be 
intelligible to us. In fact, difficulties in communication would be one of the likely 
signs that we are dealing with an alternative world-picture.
315
 It might well be that this 
is not an alternative epistemic system. It could be just one peculiar ritual amongst a 
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tribe who share many other aspects of our form of life. But it could also be a secretive 
sect, whose members believe that a god of theirs decreed that this is the way they will 
engage in transactions for wood.
316
 Perhaps according to their mythology, he was a 
diminutive god of the forests, and resented the sale of timber reaching higher than the 
top of his head. Whatever the reasons, it is at least conceivable that there is a certainty 
here which, when compared to ours regarding timber selling, reveals a dissonance.
317
 
And if that were the case, we could not legitimately respond to our puzzlement when 
we do not understand them by claiming that they are making a mistake. So Coliva 
might be unintentionally correct, this might be an innocuous difference in their 
culture, not an alternative conceptual system. But she might, in some instances or at 
the very least conceivably, be wrong, and there could be very deep reasons to do with 
their world-picture as to why they are like this. In which case, her second claim that 
alternative world-pictures are only metaphysically and not contingently possible must 
be deemed false. This community of wood sellers, with a world-picture different from 
ours is both conceivable and contingently possible, and we must reject Coliva’s claim 
that alternative world-pictures are inconceivable. 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter began in §6.2 by exploring the possibility that certainties can be situated 
at different depths in the riverbed, noting proneness to revision and consistency of 
practice according to a certainty as means by which an outsider might observe these 
difference of depth, as suggested by D.Z. Phillips in his remark on the varying depths 
of religious faith. 
 
§6.3 set out the reasons for considering actions other than those of mathematical and 
linguistic practices to have comparable certainties, structuring the logic of those 
activities and delineating the kind of language-game relevant to the practice. We then 
introduced the concept of restricted domains, exploring various examples, beginning 
with Kuhn’s chemist and physicist and on to more esoteric activities like playing 
chess or driving in London, and finally gesturing towards some even more personal 
features of one’s world-picture. We then sought to situate the activities of restricted 
domains within Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy, in the category of personal-
autobiographical certainties, before considering ways in which differences in world-
pictures between individuals at the level of restricted domains affects communication.  
 
§6.4 raised some problems with a separate aspect of Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy, that 
of universal certainties. We suggested that whilst it might be contingently the case 
that all humans share a broad base of certainties, Moyal-Sharrock’s justifications for 
considering this a necessary feature of human life were unpersuasive.  
 
§6.5 closed the chapter by addressing the claims of Annalisa Coliva, whose 
interpretation of On Certainty – that alternative world-pictures both do not exist and 
are inconceivable – is deeply opposed to ours. We rejected the initial claim that there 
are no alternative world-pictures, pointing out her highly unusual reading of the 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough and her equating all standards of evidence and 
explanation with those of Science. Finally, we rejected her inclination to reject 
alternative world-pictures as inconceivable because of the unreasonable burden she 
placed on a putative alternative world-picture that it be intelligible to us.  
 
 262 
Chapter 7 will draw conclusions for the issues of communication and conversion in 
On Certainty in light of the reading of the world-picture proposed in the preceding 
chapters. With the world-picture now refined such that it looks as though individuals’ 
world-pictures can vary hugely beyond the broad base of shared certainties depending 
on religious convictions, occupations (e.g. the physicist and the chemist), and abilities 
(e.g. playing chess or tennis), we need a refined understanding of what it is for 
language to be a communal activity.  
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Chapter 7 – Reappraising the communal view of language 
 
7.1 The communal view of language 
  
7.2 The individual world-picture 
 7.2.1 The variety of world-pictures 
 7.2.2 The composition of an individual world-picture 
 7.2.3 Ascertaining the world-picture of others 
7.2.4 Aggregating aspects of individual world-pictures 
 
7.3 Language-games revisited 
7.4.1 Mistaking identities 
7.4.2 Revising what we mean by ‘communal’ 
 
7.4 Dialect and dialogue 
 7.4.1 Native and alien dialects 
7.4.2 Private language 
 
 
7.1 The communal view of language 
 
This final chapter will consider whether the communal view of language (henceforth 
the ‘static-communal account’) as presented in §1.5.6 possesses the subtlety required 
to accommodate the sorts of linguistic differences in communities presented by 
world-picture variables. In arguing that it does not, we propose a modified account 
called the dynamic-communal account. In common with the way incommensurability 
was analysed in Chapter 5, the background against which language use takes place 
should be seen as dynamic and flexible, in constant flux depending on whom one is 
speaking to and in what circumstances. In terms of Kripke’s rendering of the problem, 
his claim that ‘beings who agreed in consistently giving bizarre quus-like responses 
would share in another form of life’ will seem unpersuasive and a little crude in light 
of our investigation.
318
 Such beings might share another form of life from our own, 
but they might also have a different world-picture, or engage in a specific restricted-
domain practice governing their use of addition, or a complex combination of these. 
Our reading of On Certainty subtly alters the concept of a linguistic community from 
how it was presented in Philosophical Investigations.  
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The core reason for shifting from the static- to the dynamic-communal account is that 
our investigation into what constitutes a linguistic community has fractured the 
homogeneity of what was originally considered to be a single form of life. 
Wittgenstein, at the time of Philosophical Investigations, as well as Kripke and most 
subsequent commentators, were correct in claiming that the community must agree in 
their understanding of the rules that govern a practice: ‘The ‘word “agreement” and 
the word “rule” are related to one another, they are cousins’ (PI §224). In 
Philosophical Investigations, this sort of agreement is ‘part of . . . a life-form 
[Lebensform]’ (PI §23), and even to ‘imagine a language means to imagine a life-
form’ (PI §19). On Certainty introduced world-picture considerations, which, if one 
accepts the claims made throughout this thesis, suggest that individuals can hold 
different world-pictures whilst sharing a single form of life.  
 
This interpretation of On Certainty renders the static-communal account lacking in 
subtlety. Not all linguistic variations can be attributed to a different form of life, even 
– and perhaps especially – in the cases of fundamental differences over terms like 
‘addition’, ‘God’, or ‘right’. Kripke’s quusers could share every aspect of their form 
of life with Kripke, but have a world-picture variation when it comes to their 
mathematical practice. Kripke is too keen to dismiss their practice as bizarre, much as 
Coliva was overly hasty in dismissing the wood-sellers of RFM, I-148.
319
 If we really 
did encounter such a community of quusers, we would do better to consider them as 
holding dissonant mathematical certainties which, whilst unfamiliar to us, clearly 
work for them and their variations on mathematical practice and language.  
 
Casting Kripke’s quusers as possibly holding a world-picture variation is an important 
step. Having proposed a series of certainty variables that, in turn, affect the 
composition of a world-picture, we now need to consider how this might affect an 
individual’s world-picture, their particular collection of certainties. §7.2 addresses 
these issues, noting the variety of world-pictures, and suggesting that we can consider 
an individual as holding a unique world-picture. Some preliminary concerns with 
ascertaining the world-picture of other people will be raised in §7.2.3, awaiting a 
fuller treatment with language-games specifically in mind in §7.4.1. Towards the end 
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of §7.2, we will also propose that we can aggregate aspects of various individual 
world-pictures to form loose collections and label them as singular things like the 
‘Christian world-picture’, or the ‘chess-playing world-picture’, provided we do so 
with the awareness that we are linking individuals’ certainties through family 
resemblance relationships, not by having one thing common to all.  
 
§7.3 reintroduces linguistic concerns, examining language-games against the 
background not of the homogenous form-of-life community of the static-communal 
account, but rather against the multifarious backdrop of millions of individuals each 
with subtly different world-pictures. We will consider what it is to see a connection – 
between one’s own world-picture and that of another individual – with which one can 
build a dialogue, and also what it is to make a mistake in seeing such a connection 
and its consequences for communication.  
 
§7.4 introduces a final piece of terminology: the dialect. In encountering people with 
certainties different from our own, we learn how to communicate with those with 
different world-pictures. Improving our communication results in our becoming 
partially fluent in unfamiliar dialects which we do no speak natively. We might learn 
the dialect of a religion whose beliefs we do not share, the polemic of a political 
position we find anathema to our own, or just the practices of a restricted domain we 
do not actively participate in. We do this by engaging in dialogue, learning of 
certainties which we do not hold, and in doing so we improve our dialogue. §7.4 will 
close by indicating ways in which the introduction of terms and concepts like 
restricted domains, dissonances, and dialects might re-frame the private-language 
debate for future scholarship.  
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7.2 The individual world-picture 
 
7.2.1 The variety of world-pictures 
 
We have considered several variables of world-pictures and explored the 
consequences for communication and conversion when particular aspects of world-
pictures – religious, political, professional, abilities, and considerations of the depth of 
certainties – are incommensurable between individuals. Consequently, we no longer 
view world-pictures as homogenised across a community. The static-communal 
account depended on homogeneity across a form of life, and this no longer fits our 
conception of human practice. Given the distinctions drawn in Chapter 5, there can 
not even be such a thing as a single religious world-picture or a single scientific 
world-picture. Religious certainties vary from religion to religion, again within 
denominations and subdivisions of religions, and again in individuals with regard to 
depth, as explored in §6.2. Scientific world-pictures vary not just across epochs via 
paradigm shifts, but also within disciplines and sub-disciplines – as for Kuhn’s 
physicist and chemist – and again in terms of how broad their scope is; whilst, as 
Wittgenstein says, Lavoisier has ‘got hold of a definite world-picture’ that forms the 
‘matter-of-course foundation for his research’ (OC §167), once he leaves the 
laboratory for the day the certainties of his chemical research can lie dormant, and 
others become more important. If he goes to meet a friend for a game of chess, the 
certainties of the chess restricted domain structure his moves and thoughts on the 
game. If he attends a church service – Lavoisier retained the religious belief of his 
upbringing throughout his life – he is probably not justifying his faith in the way he 
would an empirical hypothesis when back in the laboratory. This is the concept we 
have called restricted domains.
320
  
 
Dissonances between world-pictures present problems for communication, although 
the fewer the dissonances the easier it is to construct a practical dialogue between two 
individuals. It appears now that differences between people’s world-pictures, though 
often quite small, are nonetheless more widespread than originally thought. In the 
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broader sense of the world-picture, for example differentiating Moore and the king or 
a Christian and an atheist, we have considered the consequences for communication 
and conversion. However, not only does Moore’s world-picture differ radically from 
the king’s, it probably also differs subtly from those of his fellow travellers. Despite 
belonging to the same English form of life as his companions – we could even 
presume that they are fellow philosophy dons at Cambridge – some might be 
Christians, some atheists; some Nazi sympathisers, some liberal pacifists; some chess 
players, some backgammon players. The variety of certainties is enormous, and 
connections cannot be made solely on the basis of a shared form of life. We turn now 
to examining how an individual’s world-picture is comprised of a variety of 
certainties.  
 
 
7.2.2 The composition of an individual world-picture 
 
Individuals are not just Christians or atheists, piano players or tennis players. Each 
person holds an indefinitely complex array of certainties. A Christian can also be a 
tennis player and a physicist and a driver in London. An atheist can also be a New 
York taxi driver with a penchant for chess and neo-Nazi ethico-political convictions. 
The Christian might be an adept mathematician and the atheist innumerate. A Jewish 
person with particular religious certainties could also be a flat-Earther and Moon-
landing denier. A Blue Dog Democrat – a Southern Democrat in the USA bearing 
more in common with a Southern Republican than a Northern Democrat – might bear 
an irrational conviction that his favoured American football team is the best in the 
world, and supporters of the team in the neighbouring state are universally worthy of 
unprovoked assault.
321
  
 
The variables mentioned above are only a small selection of those possible, the ones 
already used as examples in this thesis. No exhaustive list of possibilities could be 
supplied; we can only gesture towards their variety. It is conceivable that, 
contingently, there are one or more certainties held simultaneously by all living 
humans, but Moyal Sharrock’s claim that there are – necessarily – universal 
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certainties was found to be unpersuasive.
322
 Therefore it is possible that the following 
claim is correct: no two world-pictures are identical. Even if by chance it is not 
accurate and two individuals’ world-pictures happen to be identical, we could make 
the weaker claim that most individuals’ world-pictures are non-identical with each 
other. The differences might be slight and rarely – if ever – come to light; dissonances 
are only revealed in certain situations.
323
 With those we know well, the idiosyncratic 
convictions and abilities of others are familiar to us, particularly if they are 
uncharacteristic for the social group. The greater the scale of the dissonance in 
comparison with the group the quicker it is likely to be discovered and the more 
obvious it will be.  
 
In the company of established friends, whom we have known for years, we are 
usually aware of the practices they engage in, their religious beliefs, and their political 
convictions. Since usually we share most certainties with those around us, we speak 
easily and freely, accommodating others regarding the small dissonances that we are 
aware of by tailoring our language use as appropriate. One could not expect to be 
fully understood if one’s conversation were full of references to an activity that those 
listening do not engage in. I could talk to Roger Federer about some general features 
of tennis, but if he were to speak to me about tactics for playing a major Open final on 
a clay surface, or about ways to out-psyche an opponent before stepping on to the 
court in front of thousands of fans, I would not – and he ought not expect me to – 
fully understand, even if, via a dialogue, I could achieve some partial understanding. 
His certainties about his practices structure his language use, and there are some 
certainties within the restricted domain of ultra-elite tennis professionals that cannot 
be acquired without becoming such an athlete oneself. The same could be said for any 
sport, other activities like chess or piano playing, and even for professions as for the 
physicist and chemist. Similarly, if I know that I speaking to a Christian, even about 
something other than Christianity, I might, in some situations, deploy terms like 
‘God’ or ‘faith’ in a way I might not with atheists or Buddhists. Conversely, I could 
purposefully use religious – and in particular Christian – metaphors and terminology 
in order to convey a point in a manner persuasive to that person.  
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With someone we do not know well, the details of their world-picture are less familiar 
to us. We might be able to guess at certain broad features, given the upbringing we 
presume they have had and the inherited mythology imparted to them.
324
 I tend to 
presume that most of the new people I meet near where I live share my certainties 
about gravity, about being in England, about being living human beings, and so on. If 
present, large-scale dissonances might be revealed almost immediately. For example, 
the person one is speaking to might not hold the certainty that they are a living human 
being if they are exhibiting symptoms of Cotard syndrome, sufferers of which believe 
they are dead.
325
 The dissonance between his world-picture and one’s own regarding 
being a living human being would probably be revealed rather quickly, although if 
they are not talking it might be hard to pin down exactly what their certainty is 
beyond that it is radically different from one’s own.   
 
 
7.2.3 Ascertaining the world-picture of others 
 
The example of Cotard syndrome might be an extreme one, but it raises the question 
of how we ought to consider those well outside the norm. Moyal-Sharrock, it would 
seem, would want to dismiss such cases. Ungiveupable certainties are those, by her 
lights, which ‘no circumstances would induce a normal individual to give it up at any 
time’.326 Being a living human being comes under her definition of a universal 
certainty.
327
 However, for reasons we explored in §6.4, there are serious concerns 
with her reliance on the term ‘normal’ to describe a human. We might wish to dismiss 
the Cotard syndrome sufferer as abnormal, someone who doesn’t have a different 
world-picture from us, but is merely deluded. Two things should give us pause before 
we do so. First, that although everything tells us that this person is alive – the patient 
breathes and has a pulse – it is not a state out of which a patient can be reasoned by 
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 Cf. OC §§94 and 95. 
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 See Helldén (2007). Sufferers report their body feeling ‘unfamiliar’, ‘shut off from 
the surrounding world’, and in extreme cases become ‘convinced [they are] dead’. It 
might be debatable whether this is a certainty, depending on whether the individual 
acts thoroughly as though they are dead, or whether their interacting with some 
features of the world contradicts this apparent conviction, although some patients do 
exhibit full-body paralysis akin to rigor mortis.  
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 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 101. 
327
 Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 101. 
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appeal to evidence. Everything in the patient’s experience conforms to his perception 
that he is dead, even if that requires some very strange interpretations of his 
experiences. Within the world-picture of the patient, asking whether the system itself 
is true or false is meaningless (OC §162). It structures their enquiries and actions in 
the world, even if, in the case of Cotard syndrome, that manifests in total inaction and 
lack of enquiring.  
 
Secondly, it might be relatively easy to dismiss a case as rare, extreme, and an 
aberration – by the standards of our world-picture – in terms of the claims made by 
the sufferer as Cotard syndrome. But what of other – for instance medical – concerns 
that place one outside the norm in a less extreme way? Consider those with: bipolar, 
postpartum, or psychotic depression; an autistic-spectrum disorder; drug, alcohol, sex, 
or food addiction; dyslexia; obsessive-compulsive disorder; narcissistic-personality 
disorder; schizophrenia; anorexia or bulimia; post-traumatic-stress disorder; any sort 
of phobia, be it social, object-specific, abstract, or any other; any sort of philia, be it a 
paraphilia of some kind, or Wittgenstein’s own possible philalethia.328, 329  
 
Some of these examples are the feature of current debate as to whether they are 
genuinely classifiable medical concerns, forms of addiction in particular. Whether or 
not any of these are classifiable as medical disorders or not is irrelevant to our 
interests. We are interested in how these people engage with the world, regardless of 
classification and diagnosis. If Cotard syndrome could present a genuinely different 
world-picture from our own, then so too could less strikingly bizarre and somewhat 
more common differences in a person’s mental and physical state, even if such world-
pictures might differ from our own less radically than that of a Cotard-syndrome 
sufferer. And whilst it might be easy to write off Cotard syndrome as a pathology, 
discarding as cases worthy of consideration all those who fall into the categories listed 
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 “‘Call me a truth-seeker’, [Wittgenstein] once wrote to his sister” Monk (1990), p. 
3.  
329
 I am not an expert on mental health and use these classifications only as the sorts 
of examples fellow non-experts might have a vague understanding of.  Investigating 
each of these classifications, the extent to which diagnoses, causes, and best 
treatments are debated, whether sufferers report symptoms akin to gestalt switches 
and changes of world-picture ever or at certain stages in the disorder, whilst 
fascinating, are considerations beyond the remit of this thesis, but a promising avenue 
for future research.  
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above would be barbaric. Hardly anyone would be left as a normal human being, and 
particularly so when one expands these concerns to those who might not warrant a 
diagnosis but exhibit limited symptoms of a classifiable illness such that it forms part 
of their personality. Once again, fiction (or sometimes autobiography) might be a 
better method than philosophical formulations to gain some understanding of how 
such features of people’s lives have them experiencing a particular type of world-
picture.
330
 Regardless, dismissing their state of mind as a faulty version of our own 
world-picture seems an inadmissible manoeuvre. 
 
The certainties that form a part of one individual’s world-picture might be not just 
absent from those of another but also incomprehensible to another person. In 
encountering someone with Cotard syndrome it would be easy to notice a difference 
in world-picture. But meeting for the first time someone with an addiction who has 
avoided a relapse for many years, or with a mild autistic-spectrum disorder, or post-
traumatic-stress disorder (particularly in a calm, stable, familiar environment), such 
differences in world-picture would probably not be obvious, possibly not for many 
more meetings. It might require a specific set of circumstances to reveal the 
dissonances, such as a loud noise for a sufferer of post-traumatic stress, or a situation 
in which people are taking drugs or alcohol for the addict. Therefore, our claims that 
someone has a similar world-picture to our own must be made with caution, just as 
we approach conversation with a new person we know nothing about with caution. 
We can surmise broad swathes of commensurability, and have them confirmed 
indirectly and almost immediately. The more minute differences, encompassing 
practices and abilities or features of personality that might border on medical 
definitions (or venture into them), require interaction and dialogue to ascertain.   
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 For accounts of depression, see Styron (1991), Alvarez (2002), or Kane (2001). 
For an account of an autistic-spectrum disorder, see Haddon (2004). For accounts of 
drug addiction, see De Quincey (1975), St Aubyn (2012), or Burroughs (1972). Not 
all of these are fiction. Styron (1991) and De Quincey (1975) are autobiographical 
and Alvarez (2002) is a conceptual study with the author’s personal experience 
interwoven. It is telling that with all except Haddon, personal-autobiographical 
experience forms a crucial part of the works, suggesting perhaps that these are 
particularly difficult world-pictures and experiences to understand from the outside, 
as few attempt it successfully in writing.  
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Wittgenstein, following from Moore, was primarily interested in the things we can 
readily take for granted as being in common with those around us (recall the Moorean 
propositions from §2.2). These are, roughly, the certainties Moyal-Sharrock classed as 
universal, although it might include some personal and linguistic hinges too.
331
 
Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy is useful in getting us to consider the diverse nature of 
certainties, those that not everyone shares, and to consider the variety of which an 
individual’s world-picture is made up: the universal, local, personal, and linguistic. 
The examples of medical disorders would seem to fit into her category of personal 
hinges, as relating to a person’s ‘states’, ‘biography’, and ‘perceptions’.332 However, 
at the stage we are now at, of taking into account tiny dissonances, minor points of 
incommensurability, the taxonomy becomes less appropriate; it could not classify 
every possible certainty even within the category of personal certainties without 
becoming overburdened by its own complexity.  
 
Whilst we can use the taxonomy as a guide, it is no substitute for seeing connections 
for oneself. Once connections are made, how one classifies them is a matter for the 
philosopher, not the ordinary person in everyday scenarios, and such efforts at some 
point become unhelpful to the ordinary person. However, if we are not to be 
overwhelmed by the possibilities for other individuals’ world-pictures, we need some 
way of grouping them together. Seeing connections would be exhausting if we had to 
see them utterly afresh each instant, and it is useful in our lives to be able to label – if 
only mentally in order to aid our interaction – features of other people’s world-
pictures.   
 
 
7.2.4 Aggregating aspects of individual world-pictures 
 
Refinement of our understanding of the concept of the world-picture has led us to be 
aware of how simplified labels like the ‘religious world-picture’ or the ‘scientific 
world-picture’ really are. Such ascriptions do not take into account distinctions within 
these labels, and also erroneously presume that, for example, believers share an 
identical world-picture with each other, regardless of other certainties, such as those 
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 Cf. Moyal-Sharrock (2007), p. 101. 
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from restricted domains. Nonetheless, there is still a clear purpose in having such 
labels. Communication is easiest with those who share more of one’s certainties, and 
it is useful to be able to recognise those who might be in such a position. We are able 
to see connections between individuals’ different religious world-pictures and see 
something in common we call religion, but we can do so only with the awareness that 
we have found family resemblance relationships, not the general form of a religious 
world-picture, with one feature common to all. Further, we must be aware that in 
seeing connections between different people’s religious practice, we have not made 
connections between their world-pictures as the sum of all their certainties, but only 
between particular certainties or aspects of their world-pictures. We therefore need to 
be careful of considering those with whom we share only aspects of our world-picture 
as sharing more of their world-picture than they actually do.  
 
Seeing connections is a core feature of the dialogue proposed by Wang.
333
 In 
recognising a person as having a religious world-picture, we are making connections 
between it and other religious world-pictures we have encountered, though there may 
not be a single feature uniting the whole group. Dialogue with those of alternative 
world-pictures serves two purposes. First, we speak to communicate simply because 
we want to communicate. But we also communicate and ask questions and probe 
ideas because we want to know to what extent we are being understood and how to be 
understood better. Doing this requires getting to know someone’s certainties 
appropriate to the conversation that is taking place. Two people discussing religious 
beliefs are not interested in each other’s certainties about tennis – if either has them at 
all – but they are interested in each other’s certainties of religious belief. To 
understand how this process happens, we need to return to language-games. As we do 
so, we will gain a clearer understanding not just of the backdrop against which the 
dynamic-communal account of language takes place, but of the strictly linguistic 
aspects of the dynamic-communal account too.  
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 Cf. Wang (2007), p. 275-277, and q.v. §5.3.3. 
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7.4 Language-games revisited 
 
The language-game concept was introduced by Wittgenstein to draw attention to the 
variety of language use.
334
 He suggested a variety of practices, including ‘forming and 
testing a hypothesis’, ‘reporting an event’, ‘making up a story; and reading it’, and 
‘play-acting’, amongst many others, as examples (PI §23). He also declared that ‘to 
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (PI §19). Some activities feature 
across several forms of life but differ from one another in their rules and practice. 
Take ‘forming and testing a hypothesis’ (PI §23). It would be hard to think of a 
culture, past or present, that did not feature some sort of activity along these lines. 
However, as we have seen, a practice like this and how one goes about it is not 
dependent solely on the form of life in which it takes place. Certainties impact what it 
is to formulate and test a hypothesis, what counts as evidence and standards of 
verification.  
 
The physicist and the chemist, sharing a form of life, consider the formation and 
testing of a hypothesis to be held to different standards, different background 
assumptions, when it comes to matters concerning the helium particle as either non-
molecule (the physicist) or molecule (the chemist).
335
 In turn, their language use 
differs and they play different-language-games; bluntly, one calls it a molecule and 
the other does not. The discrepancy is not a simple case of replacing one word with 
another, as it might be between natural languages. The physicist, in conversation with 
the chemist, cannot simply start calling helium a molecule and thereby ensure that he 
and his theories and certainties are communicated and understood by the chemist. 
Language-games need to be re-examined, this time set against the backdrop of a 
variety of world-pictures and certainties in combination with forms of life. A crucial 
effect of the introduction of world-pictures for our language-game considerations is 
that, whilst one is relatively unlikely to mistake the form of life that someone belongs 
to, it is much easier to make a mistake in assuming the certainties that someone holds. 
Kuhn’s physicist and chemist could have spent a long time speaking at least partly at 
cross-purposes unless one or the other knew a little about the other’s discipline, or an 
interrogator asked them a direct question about helium and showed them each other’s 
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 Q.v. §1.2.2. 
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 Q.v. §4.4.1, §6.3.2. 
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answers. We return now to an issue raised briefly in §7.2.3, that of being mistaken in 
one’s assumptions about another’s world-picture; this time, we do so with language-
games at the forefront of our thoughts. 
 
 
7.4.1 Mistaking identities 
 
In Kuhn’s example, the responses given to the question reveal the differences in the 
two scientists’ restricted domains. However, we are not always aware of such 
discrepancies. We make mistakes. We can misinterpret someone else’s world-picture, 
either using terms they don’t recognise, or using the same terms they do in a different 
way from how they use them. That is not to say that any linguistic discrepancy 
between two people is indicative of incommensurable certainties; some mistakes are 
innocuous, linguistic mistakes. We might accidentally mispronounce a word, or, due 
to regional differences, pronounce it in a way unrecognisable to them, or have nearly 
identically world-pictures but be playing different language-games. For example, if I 
and another person with an almost identical world-picture were speaking about bats, I 
might be using the word to indicate an instrument used to hit the ball in table tennis, 
and my friend to speak of the winged mammal. We could both be active participants 
in table tennis and zoology, and know both the rules of both language-games equally 
well, but still encounter confusion if we don’t know which language-game each other 
is playing. 
 
However, we can also make mistakes about someone else’s world-picture. In order to 
communicate at all, we need to assume some basic commonalities. The core 
certainties such as those regarding gravity and being a living human are reasonably 
assumed in almost any situation. Our mistakes are more likely to be about specialised 
aspects of someone’s world-picture. For example, everyone has probably had the 
experience of engaging in a perfectly pleasant conversation with someone who seems 
quite like-minded, only to find that the person you’re speaking to is an appalling racist 
– perhaps he tells a joke and reveals himself – full of vitriolic hatred for no reason 
other than inherited prejudice.
336
 By the things they say, it becomes indirectly clear 
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 Q.v. §6.3.4. 
 276 
that such a person holds certainties totally dissimilar from one’s own, especially 
ethical and political ones. Incredulity at their views may be matched by their 
incredulity at one’s own views. Rational argument is not going to effect a conversion 
of their certainties because the things non-racists take as evidence, fact, and standards 
of proof differ from the things racists take as evidence, fact, and standards of proof. 
We have a dissonance in certainties, and communication will be hindered on some 
points. Whilst we could – if one were willing to – still engage in conversation about 
chess or tennis if we both played, discussions of ethics, race, immigration, and certain 
aspects of history would be impinged by different structures informing our enquiring 
and asserting. In particular, our language differs; we use terms differently, and it is 
not a matter of correcting one another. To each, the other’s use of some terms is an 
aberration, not a simple linguistic error.
337
 
 
At first, recall, we did not notice this alarming dissonance in our world-pictures, 
because, unpalatable as it may seem, in other respects racists are almost exactly like 
us. They have certainties about gravity and having hands, and they might be good 
chemists and chess players. Accordingly, much of the racist’s language is just like 
ours. However, it was through a linguistic act – telling an offensive joke – that 
suggested an underlying dissonance. Whilst, of course, we could have observed a 
clearer indication such as an act of violent aggression directed at someone of another 
race, more commonly we will notice such differences via language. This is an 
intentionally extreme example for the purposes of illustration, but we could easily 
consider subtler, less noticeable ones, particularly with regard to the certainties of 
restricted domains or differences of depth in similar certainties.  
 
If we can be mistaken, at least temporarily, about something as divisive and relatively 
obvious as someone’s discriminatory certainties about race, then we can also – 
probably more frequently – be mistaken about smaller dissonances, and these 
mistakes can go unnoticed for far longer. Their effects on communication might, 
proportionally, be less significant; however several small mistakes could amount to a 
great deal of miscommunication. Even on the static-communal account, the idea that 
                                                 
337
 Cf. Wittgenstein’s distinction between the statement ‘I believe in the Last 
Judgement’ and ‘There is a German aeroplane overhead’ (LC, p. 53), and q.v. 
discussion of this passage in §5.2.1. 
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we can make meaningful use of language on grounds no firmer than communal 
agreement – a ‘congruence of subjectivities’ – induces ‘a sort of vertigo’ in 
McDowell.
338
 The dynamic-communal account that is emerging here seems as if it 
should compound the vertigo; not only must we presume a congruence of 
intersubjectivities, we must do so in more respects and in greater variety than on the 
static-communal account that depends only on a shared form of life.  
 
 
7.4.2. Revising what we mean by ‘communal’ 
 
Language, on the dynamic-communal account, remains communal. There is nothing 
that constitutes linguistic meaning other than there being a custom of use within a 
community. But whereas Philosophical Investigations largely encourages a very 
broad understanding of what constitutes a community, on the reading of On Certainty 
presented here what we take to be a community is restricted. Instead of seeing 
language and meaning as played out against the backdrop of very large communities 
with a variety of language-games taking place therein, we should imagine a complex 
network of smaller, overlapping communities. Traditionally, communitarians, as 
Stern calls them, described the form of life as the backdrop of human activity from 
which communal language acquires meaning.
339
 As we have seen, this communal 
background has been fragmented by taking into account not just world-pictures to 
form the breadth-depth axis, but also the variations on world-pictures individuals may 
have. The faith in intersubjective agreement required for the original understanding of 
the communal view of language looks to be a far bigger leap in the face of this more 
complex rendering. 
 
When we attempt to communicate with anyone, we naturally assume some things: 
core certainties that nearly everyone holds. In these assumptions we might 
occasionally be surprised, perhaps by encountering a flat-Earther or a racist or 
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 McDowell (1981) p. 149, in response to Cavell’s description of meaning’s 
dependence on nothing more than a shared form of life as ‘terrifying’, Cavell (1969) 
p. 52. 
339
 Stern (2004), p. 155 
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someone with a medical disorder.
340
 Usually, though, we are on safe ground when it 
comes to the more fundamental aspects of communication. However, as our 
communication becomes more specialised and complex, we cannot so readily assume 
a common background of understanding. Variations in world-pictures multiply the 
closer one looks, and we are bound to misidentify aspects of others’ world-pictures, 
whereby we assume that they share certainties they in fact do not. When this happens, 
it is our language that falters. We assume a congruence of intersubjectivities where 
there isn’t one, or at least not in the areas relevant to our discussion. However it is 
also our language that provides the means of working around these problems. We 
engage in dialogue, a back-and-forth movement, and see if we can locate where it is 
that we differ. If we rule out a simple mistake of playing different language-games, 
we look for something deeper in our certainties. If we can locate with some degree of 
precision exactly where our dissonances lie, we simultaneously map out with greater 
precision where we have an accord, and where our communication might be less 
hindered. Further, in locating the dissonances, we can try, through more 
communication, to convert the other. Conversion for either party would expand the 
domain of congruent intersubjectivities – i.e. commensurable certainties – for the two 
speakers.  
 
Whilst this process up to but excluding the point of conversion facilitates 
communication, no one’s world-picture has to undergo any sort of change. We can 
amass information and improve understanding with anyone through this process of 
dialogue. As we do so, we can become increasingly adept at speaking to people with 
particular aspects of their world-picture different from ours. This is hardly surprising. 
Prolonged exposure to any group different from our own improves our ability to 
understand them and their language-use: the concepts they deploy and the words they 
use to describe them. Even if some features remain utterly incommensurable, an 
atheist who spends a lot of time with Christians and develops a feeling for what their 
certainties might be like – how they influence their lives and their judgements, their 
enquiring and asserting – will achieve more effective communication with them than 
an atheist who has never encountered a Christian in discussion. 
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 As suggested in §7.2.2, we ought still to consider these as world-pictures in their 
own right, however much they fail to accord with our own. 
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A community of any sort indicates that one can see connections in features shared 
between its members. In terms of linguistic meaning, we are part of several linguistic 
communities, memberships of which are determined by with whom and to what 
extent we share aspects of our world-picture and our form of life. Furthermore, just as 
our world-pictures and forms of life may change in the course of our lives – we can 
acquire new skills, move to new countries, convert to or from a religion or a deep 
political conviction – so too may our linguistic community, those with whom we can 
communicate. The concept of a linguistic community is flexible and dynamic from 
the point of view of the individual, even though a community itself might not change 
significantly with the addition or loss of a single member. We become part of and 
cease to be parts of several linguistic communities throughout our lives.
341
 With any 
community, there are those on the periphery and those at the centre, and those 
anywhere in between. Drawing a strict boundary where there is not one in practice is 
futile, although that in no way prevents us making the associations required to 
consider communities as collections at least somewhat distinct from one another.
342
 
 
In continually engaging with communities other than our own, we learn to speak a 
range of dialects. And like the dialects of a natural language, we can be fluent or a 
novice. Without changing our world-picture we can expose ourselves to those with 
aspects of their world-picture that are incommensurable with ours, and engage with 
them about those aspects, locating dissonances, getting a feel for what it might be like 
to be a Christian or a neo-Nazi or an elite tennis player or a London taxi driver. Some 
people are particularly skilled at this or particularly driven to acquire such 
understanding. For example, Isaiah Berlin’s biographer described Berlin as having 
had ‘an ability to enter into beliefs, feelings, and attitudes alien and at times acutely 
anitpathetic to his own.’343 Whilst this might indicate particular empathic skills – a 
matter for another sort of discussion altogether – to know what those alien beliefs, 
feelings, and attitudes were, before even considering entering into them, would have 
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 Q.v. §6.3.1, which considered the riverbed metaphor and how certainties can 
change in relation to individuals as well as communities qua individuals-writ-large. 
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 Cf. ‘[T]his boundary will never entirely coincide with the actual usage, as the 
actual usage has no sharp boundary’ (BB, p. 19). Cf. BB pp. 27-8, PI §§68-9, 499. 
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 Ignatieff (1998), p. 256. The remark was originally made by Berlin about 
Turgenev – see Berlin (1978), p. 263 – but Ignatieff, who knew Berlin personally, 
uses it to describe Berlin himself.  
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required significant efforts of communication and dialogue in order to acquire an 
understanding of the alternative position. We learn – although not always as 
effectively as Berlin – to speak a variety of dialects, and acquire at least partial 
understandings of alternative world-pictures, without being committed to the world-
pictures they express.  
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7.5 Dialect and dialogue 
 
One last piece of new terminology is needed. Restricted domains and other world-
picture variables have been explained, and their consequences for communication 
explored; there are significant consequences for our linguistic practice depending on 
the certainties of our world-picture. In a sense, the physicist speaks a slightly different 
language from the chemist when the physicist is doing physics; there are unique 
terms, and some terms appearing in both scientists’ vocabularies have different uses 
and therefore different meanings between the two. We will describe this phenomenon 
as their speaking different dialects. Calling them different languages would be too 
extreme, but the analogy with dialects of natural languages fits well. There are also 
further distinctions, which we’ll call sub-dialects, for example the language used by 
those working in branches of physics like electromagnetism or optics, or belonging to 
denominations within Christianity. If we were particularly keen on classifying and 
taxonomising, we could list sub-sub-dialects, sub-sub-sub-dialects; as many subs- as 
one wishes. However the boundaries between each subdivision are unlikely to be 
clear enough for this to serve any real purpose. As Moyal-Sharrock intimates, the 
taxonomy is designed to guide and aid, not to posit metaphysical categories of 
certainties.
344
  
 
 
7.5.1 Native and alien dialects 
 
We can distinguish between native dialects and alien dialects. Our native dialects are 
those which accord with or express our own world-picture. If I have certainties about 
gravity, being a living human being, having hands, these – and their effects on our 
linguistic use – are native dialects that we can use comfortably with those like us. In 
the case of the preceding examples, that’s nearly everyone. Then there are our 
specialised dialects, often features of our practices of restricted domains, like those of 
the physicist and the chemist. Their have different native dialects when it comes to 
science.  
 
                                                 
344
 Cf. Moyal-Sharrock (2007), pp. 101-2. 
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Alien dialects are those that depend upon certainties that I don’t have. If I’m not a 
chess player, I don’t speak the chess dialect. If I have never studied medicine, I’m not 
a native medical-dialect speaker. The native/alien distinction represents two extremes. 
Like any non-native dialect or natural language encountered, one can acquire 
conversational ability without being fluent. Just as with the dialects of natural 
languages, there are some idioms the significance of which cannot quite fully be 
grasped without having lived in that place for a long time, rather like a conversion of 
a certainty entailing a gestalt switch. Between the extremes of native and alien, we 
can acquire partial fluency in several dialects. I could learn some medical jargon and a 
bit of anatomy and engage in some very limited dialogue with medical professionals. 
I would be a non-fluent, but conversational, speaker of that dialect. Usually, this will 
go with being a central rather than peripheral member of a community. It would be 
extremely difficult to become a fluent medical-dialect speaker without spending time 
with other medical students in labs, classes, and hospitals, around patients, nurses, 
anaesthetists, porters, and surgeons. Much of the daily language of the community – 
idioms and in-jokes based on shared experience and customs – would not be found in 
Gray’s Anatomy or DSM-V. 
 
To acquire a better degree of fluency in an alien dialect, it is not sufficient to learn 
only the phrases and words by rote. The form-of-life aspects of language – that is to 
say, linguistic actions that inform noting more than cultural traditions – can be picked 
up fairly readily. One can spend time in an unfamiliar area and learn some features of 
the common language-games. For instance, visiting school sports teams could pick up 
that we called our lined paper block. On the other hand, to understand an alternative 
world-picture is usually not so easy as picking up new words. Deep-rooted certainties 
that inform the practices – of enquiring and asserting and much else besides – for, say, 
the king of OC §92 require deeper integration and efforts at dialogue than could be 
picked up by Moore simply altering small portions of his vocabulary. 
 
Acquiring fluency in an alien dialect requires dialogue, Wang’s back-and-forth 
movement, to see connections where some certainties are held in common, to locate 
where dissonances remain, and to then work around those dissonances to continue 
improving communication. Conversion is facilitated by knowing as precisely as 
possible which features of another individual’s world-picture they need converting on 
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if they are to see the world in a way more similar to ours, i.e. to convert to a world-
picture closer to our own. Failing this sort of awareness, we are in danger of 
continuing to speak partly at cross-purposes, not realising that we are using terms 
differently in a way that belies not just linguistic differences, but core differences in 
the things we take to be certain in our lives.  
 
 
7.4.2 Private language  
 
Kripke’s work on the private-language argument was mentioned briefly in §1.5.3. 
There is no room for a detailed discussion of the complexities of debate surrounding 
the topic here, but it is worth noting how this interpretation of On Certainty might 
reframe the discussion. Briefly, the private-language argument stems from a remark in 
Philosophical Investigations: 
 
To think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’; otherwise thinking one was 
obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI §202). 
 
Debate has then ensued as to whether a logically private language – i.e. one that is 
logically rather than contingently restricted to an individual, due to lacking external 
criteria of correctness for the application of terms – is possible on Wittgenstein’s 
account. Fogelin (1984), McGinn, C (1984), and Blackburn (1984) argue that a 
logically private language is possible. Richter argues that it is not, primarily because 
“the words ‘private language’ do not refer to anything that satisfies the person who 
wants to use them.”345 Stern, similarly, argues against the possibility of private 
language, arguing that the concept is nonsensical given the way that linguistic practice 
is explained in Philosophical Investigations.
346
  
 
All of these commentators, though, Kripke included, assume that language is 
grounded in a form of life. As we have seen, this is only part of the picture. Kripke, 
                                                 
345
 Richter (2004), p. 182. 
346
 Stern (2004), pp. 175-185.  
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on encountering some unusual behaviour surrounding practices of mathematical 
addition, declared that ‘beings who agreed in consistently giving bizarre quus-like 
responses would share in another form of life’.347 In attributing this feature of the 
quusers’ practice as a form of life, he misses the significance it probably holds in their 
lives. Provided they are not playing a prank on Kripke, this is a fundamental 
mathematical certainty for them, on a par with any of our own, and forms a part of 
their world picture dissonant from ours. If we were to encounter such people in 
sufficient number in real life, we would be keen to find out how their system works, 
engaging in dialogue to do so. Their world-picture would be subtly different – in one 
particular respect certainly, but perhaps in others too – from ours, and dialogue would 
help us learn their dialect. 
 
A reassessment of the debate ought to be carried out in light of the reappraisal of the 
community view of language, taking into account the linguistic considerations that 
fall out of, first, the introduction of the concept of the world-picture, and, secondly, 
out of the refinement of the world-picture to include incommensurable certainties, 
restricted domains, and world-picture dialects. Stern and Richter, for example, deem 
the private-language argument nonsensical because the very concept of language is 
defined by communal agreement, something that is by definition unavailable to a 
logically private language. The reliability of examining one’s own internal sensations 
as a criterion of linguistic correctness in order to provide a custom is called into 
question in comparison with the widely accessible communal rules that govern public 
language. However, the refined world-picture suggests that it is hard to be positive 
that one is taking part in the identical background assumptions of language as one’s 
interlocutor. As §7.4.1 suggested, we make mistakes with regards to ascribing 
particular features of world-pictures to other individuals. Whilst these mistakes are 
unlikely to be regular features of our lives when it comes to the more universal 
certainties, about the more esoteric and idiosyncratic ones we are more prone to error, 
and there are genuine consequences for linguistic meaning and (mis)communication. 
 
The dynamic-communal account therefore redefines what it is for language to be 
communal. Consequently, the way in which we contrast private language with 
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 Kripke (1982), p. 96.  
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communal language changes as we shift from the static- to the dynamic-communal 
account. Whilst still communal, language is not communal in the same way as the 
original communal view of language described in §1.5.6. The vertigo, as McDowell 
puts it, of hoping that those around you share a common form of life within which 
linguistic rules and uses are communally held is nothing like the more severe vertigo 
of hoping that you have successfully pinned down, as far as possible, the certainties of 
each individual one encounters separately, given the almost infinite variety of 
composition of a world-picture for each person.
348
  
 
The consequences of such a mistake might not be too dramatic. For example, if I use 
a chess metaphor in conversation with someone whom I believe to be a keen chess 
player but in fact isn’t, she is likely sufficiently partially fluent – i.e. knows what 
chess is, what a board and the pieces look like – not to wildly misinterpret my 
metaphor. Can I always be sure of this, though? And can I be sure, at all, that my 
metaphor is received in the way I intended it, the way that I would had someone else 
expressed it to me? Overconfidence will lead to mistakes and impaired 
communication, often without our realising it. On the other hand, too much doubt, and 
we are left with an untenable generalised scepticism of the sort that Wittgenstein 
sought to undermine in On Certainty. Ultimately, my life shows that I am certain of 
being understood. Not directly through philosophical statements to that effect, but 
indirectly, in talking about chess, religion, tennis or literature. Dialogue is a persistent 
feature of our lives, and whilst we make mistakes in guessing at someone else’s 
world-picture, they are localised enough that we need not doubt the entire linguistic 
enterprise.  
 
The most important reason for moving to a dynamic-communal account of language 
is not to cast doubt on meaning, but rather to refine the way in which we consider 
meaning to derive from intersubjective agreement; not against the backdrop of a form 
of life, but instead against that of a complicated network of communities. These 
communities are related to each other in the way in which we see connections on a 
family resemblance basis. We can be a central or a peripheral member of any of these 
communities, or anywhere in between. Closely paralleled – although not necessarily 
                                                 
348
 Q.v. §7.4.1. 
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strictly so – to our status in these communities, we can be native or alien speakers of 
dialects, novices or fluent. Without being aware of this, or ever having to state it 
explicitly, our lives show our certainty that we communicate effectively and are being 
understood, though we are not immune from error and miscommunication.  
 287 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter began by re-introducing the static-communal account of language as 
described in §1.5.6. Having examined the concept of the world-picture and introduced 
refinements to it, particularly addressing the breadth-depth axis, incommensurability 
of certainties, and restricted domains, the form-of-life background against which the 
static-communal account was originally set looked to be too simplistic. Chapter 7 
took up the task of reappraising the static-communal account of language, finding it 
lacking and proposing instead a modified version: the dynamic-communal account of 
language.  
 
§7.2 reminded us of the variety of world-pictures, considering the network of 
certainties that makes up the world-picture of an individual, and how it might be non-
identical with any other individual’s world-picture. We claimed that we can still speak 
of aggregations of aspects of individuals’ world-pictures, seeing connections between, 
for example, the religious certainties of various individuals in order to speak generally 
of religious world-pictures. However, we must do so with the awareness that the 
connections we make are based on family resemblance relationships, and no single 
feature is common to all. The more general the qualifying term – e.g. religious, 
ethical, political – the looser these connections will be. On the other hand one would 
expect more specific features, particularly relating to restricted domains – chess, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, London taxi drivers – to bear tighter connections to one another 
in individuals who hold them.  
 
§7.3 reintroduced language-games to this more complex backdrop of human practices 
and certainties. It is through language, and specifically differences in our language-
games, that we are likely to come across dissonances and variations in world-pictures. 
Not all linguistic discrepancies between individuals belie dissonances (i.e. 
incommensurable certainties), but, if we want to ensure we are communicating 
effectively, understanding and being understood, we ought to be aware of the 
possibility of such dissonances. If we encounter them, language and dialogue are how 
we can work around our differences, and perhaps even effect a conversion once we 
know precisely where the dissonances lie. In re-introducing language-games, we can 
see just what the shift from the static- to the dynamic-communal account amounts to. 
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The concept of communal language has been redefined, away from a homogenised, 
form-of-life-based community, to an intricate network of overlapping smaller 
communities, of which we can be central or peripheral members. The boundaries of 
these communities are rarely distinct, and our position between the centre and 
periphery is flexible. 
 
§7.4 proposed that we call our different use of language as members of different 
communities dialects. Within dialects there is still a multiplicity of language-games. 
However, because these communities are distinguished partly along the lines of 
certainties held (the other part being form-of-life considerations), similar activities in 
different communities can be structured by very different sorts of certainties, resulting 
in different practices – and in particular different linguistic practices – that run too 
deep to be considered just different language-games. We distinguished between native 
and alien dialects, and likened our getting to know the certainties of a community 
other than our own as gaining fluency in an alien dialect. In gaining fluency, we 
improve our communication by getting to know where dissonances lie as well as how 
to work around them with a fluent speaker of an alternative dialect. A process of 
dialogue facilitates communication and aids pinpointing what needs converting in 
another if they are to acquire a world-picture more like our own, as well as providing 
the linguistic tools for conveying non-rational means of effecting such a conversion. 
Finally, we briefly considered how the movement from the static- to the dynamic-
communal account of language might impact further debate on the private-language 
argument. Ultimately, our lives show our certainty that we are communicating and 
being understood effectively, even if, when encountering certainties dissonant with 
our own, localised doubt as to whether we are being understood is perfectly justifiable 
and may in fact prompt a dialogue that improves communication further.  
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Thesis conclusions  
 
 
General conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to reassess the conception of language set out in Philosophical 
Investigations within the context of Wittgenstein’s final work, On Certainty. The 
ideas of On Certainty regarding certainty and its distinction from knowledge, the 
world-picture, and persuasion and conversion are interesting and merit attention in 
themselves, but gain a new significance when the concerns of language-games and 
rule-following are considered in relation to them. This thesis has argued that one of 
the ways in which our reading of linguistic meaning in Philosophical Investigations 
might need to be amended is in light of the revised framework within which human 
action – linguistic and non-linguistic – takes place. The dynamic-communal account 
of language is a product of integrating the investigation into On Certainty with the 
discussion of Philosophical Investigations. 
 
 
Chapter-by-chapter recapitulation 
 
Chapter 1 set out the basis of Philosophical Investigations, explaining the concepts of 
language-games and rule-following. Seeing connections is an essential skill for 
gaining a clear view of language and how use determines meaning, returning later in 
the thesis when comparing certainties with people who hold different world-pictures 
from one’s own. At the end of Chapter 1, Kripke’s arguments regarding private 
language and the quus problem helped to explain the communal view of language, 
setting up the core concern of this thesis: how we must revise our concept of what it is 
for language to be communal and what constitutes a linguistic community. 
 
Chapter 2 began by addressing the background of On Certainty, Moore’s two papers, 
and discussed Wittgenstein’s response to them. The concept of certainty was 
distinguished from knowledge primarily along the lines of being immune from doubt 
and structuring all other forms of enquiring and asserting. The collection of 
someone’s certainties forms a world-picture. Recognising certainties as non-
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propositional has lasting ramifications for how one considers On Certainty. It is 
important that we take certainties to be at such a depth in our lives that we are largely 
unconscious of them and, therefore, do not tend to verbalise them. Whilst certainties 
may have propositional counterparts, particularly in a heuristic capacity when 
teaching children or in quite particular circumstances where something like ‘I know 
that I have a hand’ is an appropriate topic for empirical investigation, when they are 
part of the scaffolding of our thoughts they have no propositional role. This reading 
firmly establishes the depth of certainties, and provides a means of contrasting 
certainties and the world-picture they comprise with the breadth considerations of the 
form of life.  
 
Chapter 3 further explored the depth of certainties. Although certainty received some 
attention in Philosophical Investigations, the emphasis was largely on the breadth of 
practices across a community, rather than how deeply they inhere in individuals’ lives 
and the extent to which they structure other actions. On Certainty focused on the latter 
enquiry, spanning interests far beyond the starting point of noting problems with 
Moore’s rejection of scepticism. Chapter 3 charted the development of the concept of 
certainty from Philosophical Investigations to On Certainty, contrasting it with the 
form of life, before tying them together in a breadth-depth axis on which to plot 
human practices. 
 
Chapter 4 investigated how the world-picture, which structures all our actions, is 
comparable with the way in which Kuhn’s paradigms set the boundaries for scientists’ 
practices. The parallels between Wittgenstein and Kuhn extend beyond rule-following 
and anti-essentialism, and into their methodologies. Both present examples, real and 
fictional, as a means to acquiring a perspicuous representation. In both Kuhn and 
Wittgenstein there is the idea of something immune from doubt and belonging to 
logic that structures our enquiring and asserting in the form of the paradigm and the 
world-picture. Both recognise the importance of non-rational persuasion and 
religious-like conversion in cases where clashes involve either the paradigm or world-
picture. Consequently, Kuhn’s analysis of incommensurability becomes a useful tool 
in evaluating what happens in cases of world-picture clash. 
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However, just what incommensurability amounts to was a matter of some debate. 
Chapter 5 proposed a dynamic interpretation of incommensurability, the advantages 
of which were clear: communication is rendered neither impossible nor unrealistically 
simple. Instead, individuals must see connections for themselves, noting as best they 
can where similarities lie in order to construct a dialogue and work around the 
dissonances that remain incommensurable. Incommensurability ought to be seen as 
dynamic and context-dependent. The greater the similarity of two clashing world-
pictures, the greater the incommensurability. Incommensurability between world-
pictures will manifest in both linguistic and non-linguistic actions. 
Incommensurability can be worked around, via a back-and-forth movement, 
establishing points of similarity via dialogue. Improved communication will help to 
locate irreducible points of incommensurability, which we have called dissonances. 
 
Chapter 6 considered incommensurability along finer divisions that those initially 
suggested in On Certainty. This process required noting where smaller dissonances 
might lie between individuals’ world-pictures. The concept of restricted domains 
suggested specific practices, each with idiosyncratic certainties underlying and 
structuring them, which some people hold and others do not. Religious and ethical 
convictions are the most obvious, but the certainties of restricted domains present 
other ways in which individuals’ world-pictures might subtly differ from one 
another’s, and present more complex ways of grouping the world-pictures of various 
people under one category. Whilst practices such as playing the piano or chess were 
initially fitted into Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy under the category of personal-
autobiographical hinges, the later stages of Chapter 6 suggested some problematic 
features of constructing a taxonomy, and warned that it can best be used as a helpful 
guide rather than a strict system into which all certainties must find a unique place. 
Chpter 6 closed by addressing a radically different conception of world-pictures by 
Annalisa Coliva, rejecting her claims as being either misinterpretations of 
Wittgenstein or a consequence of her equating all standards of evidence and 
explanation with those of science. 
 
Chapter 7 reappraised the communal view of language in light of the preceding 
chapters of the thesis. The world-picture of an individual can be made up of an almost 
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infinite variety and particular combination of certainties; no two individuals’ world-
pictures are necessarily wholly identical, although some of their certainties might be.  
 
Engaging in dialogue allows us to note where there are similarities, where there are 
dissonances, and finally promote further dialogue by creating more common ground 
with which to work around the dissonances. Ultimately, the sort of persuasion 
required to effect a conversion will be easier if one knows which certainties the other 
holds, and therefore what type of non-rational persuasion might be effective. Rather 
than suggesting that we share a homogenous background of practice against which the 
original communal conception of language plays out, we should consider ourselves as 
being members of a network of various smaller, overlapping communities, speaking a 
number of dialects, with varying degrees of fluency. We need not share the 
commitments of a community in order to be able to achieve at least partial fluency – 
and therefore communication – with its members. This dynamic-communal account 
of language captures how our ability to communicate with others and share linguistic 
meaning depends on what it is that is being discussed and which relevant practices 
both parties engage in – the extent to which a world-picture is shared – rather than 
grounding language only in a form of life. 
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Possibilities for further enquiry 
 
Psychiatric conditions 
 
In §7.2.3 we addressed the problem of ascertaining the world-picture of others, and 
briefly mentioned possible differences in certainties and world-picture along the lines 
of medical conditions. I only gestured towards some broad medical classifications 
such as Cotard syndrome, autistic-spectrum disorders, and various addictions and 
phobias. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent such medical disorders 
present variations on world-pictures; whether individuals with such conditions hold 
different certainties that structure their enquiring and asserting compared with so-
called healthy or normal people. In particular, given the growing trend for lowering 
the threshold of mental disorders, the diagnostic distinction between a borderline case 
and a clear one in relation to world-picture considerations presents a promising route 
for further enquiry. 
 
 
Ethical dimensions of world-pictures 
 
This thesis has focused on exploring a communal account of linguistic meaning 
adapted from Philosophical Investigations but integrated with the later work of On 
Certainty. In order to do so, some sketches of world-picture variants have been 
sketched and the consequences of an ungrounded set of certainties explored. 
However, aside from drawing comparisons with Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, there 
has been little space for progress in examining the practical ramifications of 
recognising convictions held immune from doubt. Whilst in general terms the roles of 
non-rational persuasion and conversion have been explored, one area in particular that 
could benefit from further detailed enquiry is that of ethics.  
 
Ethical convictions do sometimes derive from recognisably widespread and deeply 
held religious beliefs. However in an age of increasing secularism and movement 
away from organised religion, particularly in the developed West, religion is no 
longer necessarily a person’s first source of ethical guidance. Nonetheless, ethical 
quandaries are no less prevalent than they have ever been, and developments in 
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science – particularly in medicine – continually present new ethical dilemmas. The 
ethics of euthanasia in an increasingly ageing (and often infirm) population, of organ 
donor eligibility and restrictions, and of conceiving children bearing the DNA of three 
parents via in-vitro fertilisation in order to avoid rare hereditary mitochondrial 
diseases, are all examples of germane debates in current life. Recent responses to 
concerns like these often reveal deeply held convictions that do not seem open to 
rational persuasion.  
 
Nigel Pleasants (2009) has proposed the concept of basic moral certainties derived 
from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, and this is a promising avenue for further enquiry. 
Whilst I originally intended to focus on developing the idea of basic moral certainties 
and incorporating them into the refined world-picture as presented in this thesis, it is 
an aspect of the project that never came to fruition. Nevertheless, the detailed 
investigation presented here into the refinement of the world-picture, 
incommensurability between world-pictures, communication within the refined 
world-picture, and broad sketches of how ethical dissonances might play out, ought to 
provide a more developed base from which to explore the concept of basic moral 
certainties than has previously been available. This thesis might be considered to lay 
the pre-ethical groundwork within which to situate the ethical convictions and 
practices of humans. 
 
 
Use of literary examples 
 
I have occasionally referenced works of fiction or non-fiction in footnotes where I 
believe that the point might be better conveyed by means other than philosophy. 
Sometimes, no doubt, this indicates a lack of philosophical ability on my part, but I 
also think that there are deeper reasons occasionally to gesture towards non-academic 
means of expressing an idea. This is particularly relevant where we want to see 
connections, for in order to see connections we first need something to see 
connections between. Wittgenstein was adept at creating fictional language-games, 
but observing actual language-games unfamiliar to us would often serve just as well. 
However, alien language-games are not always readily available to us because the 
forms of life and broad features of world-pictures that surround us are usually quite 
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familiar. There are of course many ways of exposing oneself to unfamiliar practices. 
Travel is an obvious option, although not everyone has the opportunity to go and meet 
people like the Pirahã for oneself. Travel literature or documentaries may provide a 
simulacrum of real, first-hand experience, but fictional depictions are often more 
accessible. 
 
Further enquiry could be made with regards to Wittgenstein’s showing/saying 
distinction. Obviously, fictional literature says things, but they are not necessarily 
propositions intending to depict an actual state of affairs. We can speak of a book 
saying something true, but true in an indirect way; not because the characters lived or 
did those things, but because the text as a whole expresses something that resonates 
with us, something that accurately reflects an aspect of our lives. This idea need not 
be restricted to literature. Any art form, particularly theatre and film, but potentially 
also art and music can provide similar depictions of alternative forms of life and 
world-pictures.  
 
Enquiry could take the form of seeking to formalise the relationship between the ideas 
expressed in art forms and Wittgenstein’s idea of seeing connections and providing 
fictional examples. However, it is likely not the case that such a philosophical 
formalisation would improve the efficacy of such depictions, but only provide 
material for a curious philosopher. If one does not enjoy reading fiction or viewing 
art, no amount of philosophical persuasion will engender an appreciation for 
alternative forms of life or world-pictures via these means. Nonetheless, there is scope 
for further attempts to express philosophical ideas in artistic form. There are already 
notable examples: Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Sartre’s Nausea; Camus’ The 
Outsider (usually translated as The Stranger), amongst many others.
349
 So far, with 
the exception of Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress and This is Not a Novel, there has 
been less success in expressing the ideas of analytic philosophy via fiction than 
broadly defined continental or phenomenological philosophy.
350
 It is also worth 
noting that, aside from Markson, the fiction mentioned above was written by the 
philosophers themselves, expressing their own ideas. Other writers have depicted 
their ideas, but the results are usually not quite as famous. For example, almost all of 
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350
 See Markson (1988) and (2010).  
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Hermann Hesse’s works express themes from either Nietzsche or Eastern 
philosophy.
351
 It is perhaps a clue to Markson’s success that Wittgenstein somewhat 
straddles the analytic/continental divide, but if one wished to seek a formalisation of 
the relationship between philosophy and literature, it might be fruitful first to examine 
why analytic philosophy seems to be less easily rendered in fiction and other art 
forms than continental philosophy.  
 
A further line of enquiry might be simply to seek out pre-existing artistic works of 
any kind and relate them to philosophical ideas, whether the association with 
philosophical ideas is intentional or not. Literary criticism does this regularly – albeit 
largely in relation to the continental-influenced structuralist and post-structuralist 
movements – but philosophy seems more reluctant to admit non-philosophical 
material to its considerations. In particular, in relation to this thesis, it would be of 
interest to trace fictional accounts of what could be regarded as world-picture clash 
and ensuing communication difficulties. In such a way, we might expand the scope of 
our ‘intermediate cases’ providing fresh opportunities for ‘seeing connexions’ (PI 
§122).  
 
                                                 
351
 See, for example, Siddartha, (Hesse, 1998) and The Glass Bead Game, (Hesse, 
2000). 
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